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ABSTRACT 
This is an exploratory study which investigated the process by which banks' lending 
behaviour in Myanmar (Bunna) was influenced by the institutional environment and their 
responses towards them. The theoretical framework used in this study was primarily 
drawn upon Scott's new institutional theory. Since the theory focused on the convergent 
perspective rather than divergent perspective, the theory of Oliver's strategic responses to 
these institutional pressures, coercive, normative and mimetic, was incorporated in the 
theoretical framework development. The main method of data collection was interviews. 
NVIVO was used to analyse these interviewed data. However, descriptive statistics were 
also used to provide a comprehensive picture of the context being studied. The findings 
suggest that banks' always attempted to extemalise risks to borrowers. Their responses to 
institutional pressures were to conform but a range of other forms of resistance were also 
found. However, strong forms of resistance were uncommon. I have also identified the 
situations in which the banks would choose either strong or weak forms of resistance to 
institutional pressures. Such identifications may add understanding to the specific lending 
strategies that are developed in different circumstances. The study also contributed to 
closing the gap in banking literature through conducting research in the context of 
Myanmar, which was previously unexplored. In addition, it suggests areas needed to be 
improved for financial sector development in Myanmar. 
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1 

Introduction 
Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This section provides background on the research topic: banks' lending behaviour in 
Myanmar, the need for research, and outlines the thesis structure. The research problem is 
identified through indicating gaps in literature. Rationales for the research approach and 
the contributions that this research has made to the knowledge are summarised followed 
by the organisation of thesis. Therefore, this chapter has three parts. 
The first section focuses on the developments and problems of the Myanmar's banking 
sector. It reviews some of the unresolved issues in banks' lending found in existing 
literature. The second section provides a general introduction to the geographical and 
demographic characteristics of Myanmar, and a discussion of its economic policies, 
conditions and developments over the years. In addition, an overview of the Myanmar's 
banking system is also provided along with a comparison between the UK's banking 
regulatory structure in order to explain how Myanmar's financial regulatory structure is 
different from those countries with developed financial system and why Myanmar 
provides such an important context. This will enable the reader to understand the research 
findings within its context. 
The final section explains the importance of integrating interdisciplinary approach of 
studying banks' lending behaviour along with the literature gaps being addressed in this 
thesis. After setting out the research aims and objectives, an overview of the thesis 
developments is provided. 
I 
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/~,~!
•1.2 Background to the Research I 
I 
I 

;< "~This study investigates the effects of institutional environment on commercial banks' i 
,
I 
'I 
lending behaviour towards businesses in Myanmar. The availability of financing for 
businesses has received considerable attention from researchers because of its role in I 
I 
economic development and contribution to employment growth. Moreover, banks can I 
11 
have serious impacts on different types of stakeholders, for example, through their credit I 
I 
.\'1 
and lending activities, investment policies, industrial portfolio engagement, asset 
\~ 
management, etc. Businesses in Myanmar are not exempt from this situation. Many of ~ 
the studies which have been done on business financings are based on Europe and other I ~ 
well-established economies. Only theoretical research has been found regarding the J 
business financing in Myanmar. Such research focus only on the difficulties faced by 
businesses' access to finance and little attention has been given to what constrained the 
banks from lending to these businesses. 
The importance of studying banks' lending in Myanmar has become more important as 
the country is currently undergoing a new phase of financial liberalisation process after 
the change in government in 2010. This is an important process because it can establish 
an environment which can efficiently mobilise fmancial resources. In most of the 
countries, in which established capital markets exist, financial resource mobilisations take 
place through banks as well as via listings in stock exchanges. Although Myanmar 
liberalised its financial system in 1990, the existing capital market is yet to mature; thus, 
official mobilisation of financial resources can only be done through the banking system. 
The importance of Myanmar's financial and economic growth depended on the banking 
sector as it is the only source of financial intermediation. With no capital market, 
businesses have only banks and private lenders to depend on for financing their 
businesses. 
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In Myanmar, there are significantly fewer banks compared to other developed and 
developing countries. There are 19 private banks and four state banks. Among those 19 
private banks, which four of them have started their business only in late 2010. From this 
figure, it seems that financial system is dominated only by banks. However, public's trust 
in commercial banks is low due to the banking crisis that took place in the country in 
2003. Therefore, the commercial banks in Myanmar have limited inflow of deposits and 
are operating under tight regulatory requirements. Research in Myanmar context has been 
vague and no empirical study has been undertaken to study what extent the commercial 
banks' lending behaviour in this kind of environment differed from other liberalised 
nations. In addition, no study has been found that investigates the effects of banks' 
lending behaviour in Myanmar.lt is, therefore, timely to study Myanmar financial system 
as it is undergoing major changes due to democratisation in the political environment in 
the recent years. 
This study has significant importance as it captures banks' lending behaviour in different 
institutional environments. Thus, changes in different institutional effects on banks and 
their responses in the light of these changes are investigated. In addition, sensitivity of 
banks' lending behaviour in response to changes in institutional environment is explored. 
Previous studies in this area have been based on statistical models using ex-post data with 
the assumption that decision making of banks and within banks are 'rational'. Especially 
in banking, where risk is inevitable, the degree to which the environment has an effect on 
banks' risk assessments need to be analysed as the changes in banks' lending in different 
countries can be seen in Lane and Quack (2002). Though research has been done on 
banks' lending in different countries, the results cannot be replicated to Myanmar. This is 
because of the degree and the forms of financing businesses through banks vary 
significantly between countries as a reflection of different institutional environment in 
which banks and firms engage in financial transactions. 
I 
I 
,,;) 
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I 
Moreover, economists are becoming more interested in the issue of rules enforcement in 
different institutional environments. Since the best institutions from better-performing 
economies cannot be replicated by other economies due to the fact that they have I 
different types of rules: formal rules such as laws and contract, and informal rules such as I 
norms and customs (Aoki, 2001). In underdeveloped and developing countries, culture 
and informal rules play significant roles in decision making. Therefore, it requires a 
framework to study how decisions are made up of to conform to institutional pressures in 
order to get the best results for policy implementations in these countries. At the same 
time, traditional macroeconomic studies have viewed banks as passive channels affected 
by the changes in monetary policy. On the other hand, bank level studies focus on banks' 
responses to institutional pressures. However, the interplays between banks and 
institutions have yet to be explored. 
In banking, risk is not an "objective" fact that can be assessed through statistical models. 
Rather, it is created by bankers themselves when they make decision in relation to 
observed risk structures and risk behaviour of potential business partners in their 
environment while contemplating their profitability and legitimacy of their existence in 
the institutional environment. Therefore, in this research, neo-institutional social theory 
emphasising the social embeddedness of perception and handling of risks has been 
integrated to understand the bank lending practices in Myanmar. 
In this study, the country is described as 'Myanmar' instead of 'Burma'. This is due to the 
fact that the country has diverse ethnic groups and the main ethic group is called 'Bamar' 
which has the same pronunciation as 'Burma'. Thus, by using the term 'Myanmar', I will 
be able to avoid any confusion that might arise in interpretations of the data. This will 
also make it easier to refer back to the laws which are named after the country's legal 
name 'Myanmar'. Moreover, it is the official name accepted by United Nations. Its use in 
this thesis does not represent a political statement of any kind. The word 'Myanma' 
5 Introduction 
should not be treated as an error as it is used as a possessive noun of 'Myanmar' in 
Burmese language. This word is used by many of the institutions in Myanmar to associate 
with the citizens ofthe country. 
1.3 Myanmar's PopUlation Dynamics and Social Context 
Myanmar is the largest country in Southeast Asia sharing international borders with 
China, Laos, Thailand, and Bangladesh. It has a population of 58.8 million where over 
four million people reside in the country's largest city and the most important commercial 
centre, Yangon. It is used to be the capital city of Myanmar until 2006. Mandalay is the 
second largest city and also the royal capital before British colonial rule in 1885. While 
Yangon is the economic hub of the country's lower region, Mandalay serves as the hub 
for upper Myanmar. The third largest city, Naypyidaw, is a newly established 
administrative capital which is still under construction. Therefore, most of the business 
activities take place in these three major cities. Due to the political suppressions and 
economic underdevelopment, Myanmar's migration rate is estimated to be -0.3/1000 in 
2012 (CIA, 2012). 
Geographically, Myanmar is located in the monsoon region of Asia. Its climate and 
natural resources encourage development in agriculture, therefore, more than 70 percent 
of the processing and manufacturing sector is agro-based and exports are dominated by 
agricultural products. It also has rich natural resources such as precious stones including 
sapphires, pearls, jades and rubies. Hence, the government's income is also generated 
through annual sales. Other natural resources include textiles, wood products, natural gas, 
oil, metals and construction materials. Despite of it having abundance in natural 
resources, Myanmar's economic underdevelopment has always been referred to as having 
'resource curse' (Pick and Thein, 2010). 
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Myanmar has ethnic diversities stemming from eight major ethnic groups namely Kachin, 
Kayar, Kayin, Chin, Bamar, Mon, Rakhine and Shan. Therefore, there are different 
languages spoken across the country. According to Goddard (2005), there are 
approximately over one hundred languages. Having been administered as a province of 
British India under the colonial rule, English has always been taught as second language 
starting since kindergarten. Until the end of middle school, students have to take 
Burmese, English, Maths, Geography, History and Science. All these textbooks except 
English are taught in Burmese. From high school to university level courses, all the 
textbooks except Burmese are replaced with English language textbooks. In the 
universities, English is said to be the medium of instruction. However, the deliveries of 
lectures in Burmese are common. Hence, Burmese people tend to be able to communicate 
in written English better than in listening and spoken. It is also spoken by 65% of the 
population as their mother tongue and the rest as their second language as they have their 
own etlmic languages or dialects (Lewis, 2009b). Hence, the interviews were conducted 
in Burmese and translated into English in tlUs study. Due to the significant priority given 
to education in Myanmar society and a strong tradition of monastic education, the literacy 
rate is high. According to 2002 UNESCO data, the literacy rate is 91.8 percent. However, 
there is high unemployment in the country among young people. This is contributed by 
the existence of limited number of businesses. 
Many religions are practised in Myanmar without obstruction. This can be seen from how 
Buddhist Pagodas, Mosques, Hindu temples and Churches are located in the centre of 
Yangon city. Religion also plays a significant role in Myanmar communities. Theravada 
Buddhism is practised by 89 percent of the population. Therefore, Buddhist beliefs also 
play a significant role in conducting businesses and community engagements which in 
turn are embedded in the national culture. 
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1.3.1 Policy Dynamics and Political Structure 
Before mentioning the country's economic condition, one should also describe the 
political systems as the economic policies tend to change with changes in political 
structure. This in tum affects the country's economic conditions. The political systems of 
the country after the colonial rule can be divided into four different periods namelyl : 
1. 	 Parliamentary democracy period (1948-1962) 
2. 	 Socialist period under military rule (1962-1988) 
3. 	 Market-oriented period under military rule (1988 -2010) 
4. 	 Democratic period under the constitution set by the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC) in 2003 (2010 to the present) 
Thein (2004) describes the economic system of Myanmar in relation to the political 
systems in the country. It is necessary to state this because as authoritarian style of 
leadership has been prevalent in the country from 1948 unti12010. It can be argued that 
the parliamentary democracy period (1948 - 1958) would give democratic governance. 
However, it should also be noted that the parliament would meet only for two months out 
of the entire year, causing the Prime Minister to exercise his authority the rest of the year. 
Afterwards, the military government's presence exists till now though parliamentary style 
discipline flourishing democratic reform is promised by the Union Solidarity and 
Development Party (USDP), a military backed institution in November 2010 election. 
Thus, the country's economic system is similar to control-oriented command economy. 
1 Only three periods are mention in THEIN, M. 2004. Economic development ofMyanmar, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. However, the fourth period is added by the researcher as it is 
a recent reform. 
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Table 1-1: Chronology of Developments in the Political Economy of Myanmar 
Period Political System Economic System 
1. 1948-1962 Parliamentary democracy A mix of nationalism, 
socialism, and market 
system 
Same as above 
(1958-1960) Military caretaker 
government 
2. March 1962- 1988 Socialist, military Nationalisation and 
Burmanisation 
(1962-1974) Revolutionary Council of 
Command economy, 
self-reliance isolation 
the military 
(1974-1988) 
Burmese way to socialism 
under military rule; one­
party system (BSPP) 
Same as above except 
for re-acceptance of 
Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) 
loans and partial 
reforms 
3. 	 September 1988-2010 Military rule by State Transition towards a 
Peace and Development market-oriented 
Council (SPDC) economy in the first 
half of the 1990s 
4. November 2010 - to the 	 Discip line-flourishing Refonns toward 
present 	 democracy by military liberal democracy and 
backed Union Solidarity mixed economy 
and Development Party 
(DSDP) 
Table 1-1 shows Myanmar's political and economic systems from 1948 (independence 
from the colonial British rule) to the present. Immediately after 1948, Myanmar was 
under parliamentary governance and market systems until military takeover in 1962. 
Since then, military involvements can be seen in every economic and political system. In 
2010, it underwent a dramatic change to political reform towards liberal democracy with 
mixed economic system; however, state involvement is still present. Consequently, 
hierarchical national culture is created over the years affecting the banks' regulatory 
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environment. The military government in Myanmar maintains a firm, but increasingly 
contested hold on power and is responsible for the declination in economic and political 
conditions. 
In 2010, Myanmar has taken a big step towards democratisation and changing policies 
towards economic liberalisation with the hope of sanctions being imposed on Myanmar 
by the West to be lifted. As a result of these changes, sanctions by the Australian 
government have been removed and the United States has softened its sanctions on 
Myanmar. Therefore, it is expected that there will be significant improvements in the 
country's economic conditions. One of the immediate results that the country's new 
government encountered is that it has been awarded the Chair of the 2014 summit of the 
Associations of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It includes countries from 
Southeast Asia countries, namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. It has the 
collective goal of creating as integrated economic area by 2015. It is seen as a move by 
the government to gain domestic and international legitimacy followed by the elections in 
November, 2010. 
1.3.2 Economic Conditions 
The country is one of the poorest nations in the South East Asian region. Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) has increased steadily from 1998 to 2010; however, the inflation rate has 
always been larger than the GDP growth rate (see Figure 1-1). In addition, the reliability 
of the inflation data should not be taken on its face value due to the doubtful reliability of 
the information given by the government. Many of the organisations and banks perceive 
that the real inflation rates are larger than the official data. Myanmar's high inflation rate 
has affected not only household expenditures but also the development of many 
businesses. It is mainly caused by printing money to cover fiscal deficits. Economic 
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2012, CBM announced that it has issued Money Changer Licenses for 17 out of 19 
private banks and there are 62 money changer counters across the country. 
1.3.3 Financial and Banking Regulations in Myanmar 
The financial regulations of Myanmar's commercial banks can be traced back to the 
colonial Burma. Under British rule, Burma used 'rupee' as the currency of exchange and 
the financial institutions were controlled by the authorities in Calcutta and Delhi prior to 
its independence in 1948. Therefore, financial regulatory laws are derived from that of 
laws established by the British. Myanmar's banking regulations have been criticised by 
international communities and academics for their inefficiencies in facilitating financial 
resource mobilisation and growing volume oftrade and economic activities. 
A market-oriented economic system has been adopted in Myanmar since 1988 following 
a change of government. From 1980s to the present, the Myanmar's financial sector has 
undergone major changes. The first change took place in 1988, along with the change of 
government and implementation of market-oriented economic system. New banking laws 
were passed in 1990. They are the Central Bank of Myanmar Law, the Financial 
Institutions Law, and the Myanma Agriculture and Development Law. Under these laws, 
21 private banks and 47 representative offices of foreign banks were established in 1992. 
Hence, with every change in the political system, Myanmar's financial sector faces new 
policies. 
Currently, there are 23 local banks consisting of four state banks and 19 private banks in 
which four banks received license to operate in 2010. However, there is no foreign bank 
operating in the country except their representative offices. A new Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) law has been passed by the Myanmar's parliament in 2012. Its main 
purpose is to promote economic liberalisation. It states that foreigners are no longer 
required to have local partner to start a business in the country. They are able to lease 
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land legally but Myanmar citizens must constitute at least 25% of the finn's skilled 
workforce, and with subsequent training up to 50 - 75%. Thus, along with the 
implementation of FDI law, it is expected that foreign banks will start their operations in 
Myanmar in the near future. 
Myanmar's financial system was not much affected by 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and 
2008 global financial meltdown due to its underdeveloped capital market. However, this 
does not mean it has never experienced any financial crisis. It has experienced bank runs 
a number of times due to the people's lack of trust in the banks. Unlike banks in other 
countries, Myanmar banks were unable to provide money transfer worldwide due to the 
economic sanctions by European Union (EU) and the United States (US) until November 
2012. Once the sanctions were lifted by US and EU, some banks in Myanmar have 
collaborated with Western Union to facilitate money transfers. 
The non-bank financial institutions consist of a state-owned insurance enterprise, a state-
owned small loan enterprise, a private owned leasing company and one securities 
company. The Myanmar Securities Exchange Centre (MSEC) was launched in April, 
1996, a joint venture between the Ministry of Finance and Revenue and the Japanese 
Daiwa Institute of Research. However, there are only two listed companies, namely the 
Forest Products Joint Venture Corporation and the Myanmar Citizens Bank Ltd. Thus, 
there is no mature capital market for banks and other private sectors for financing. As a 
result, the development of banking sector has become significantly important for the 
mobilisation and allocation of financial resources and thus, for economic development. 
The banks in the country are operated under CBM which is governed by the CBM law 
enacted in 1990. The bank operates with relative independence and to exercise regulatory 
and supervisory authority over a wide range of financial institutions, both state and 
privately owned (Win, 2010). According to the CBM law (Section 57) and the Financial 
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Institutions of Myanmar Law (Section 48), the bank acts as an adviser to the government 
on economic matters; issuance of currency and securities; acting as a banker to the 
government as well as financial institutions; fonnulating and implementing monetary 
policy; managing the international reserves of the State; controlling foreign exchange 
transactions; and licensing, inspecting, supervising and regulating fmancial institutions. 
Similar to other central banks around the world, CBM also acts as a lender of last resort. 
However, this function of the CBM has been criticised by Turnell (2003) stating that the 
bank had not provided liquidity support to banks during the financial crisis triggered by 
the collapse of a series of informal finance companies in early 2003 in Myanmar. These 
companies were primarily trading companies but took deposits from the public with 
promises of giving high returns. These companies were involved in highly speculating 
investments. In contrary, Win (2010) states that CBM intervened as a lender of last resort 
and provided adequate liquidity assistance to the banks. Nevertheless, there were "runs" 
on banks, therefore, CBM restricted withdrawals and recalled loans from borrowers 
which affected people's trust on domestic banks and contributed to financial instability. It 
can be seen from decline in deposits in private banks since 2003. At that time there were 
only 4 state-owned banks and 20 private banks (Tin, 2000). This will be further explained 
in chapter six. 
1.3.4 	 Comparison of Banking Regulatory Structure in Myanmar and the United 
Kingdom 
This section is provided to readers to give a clear idea on how the structure of Myanmar's 
banking system is different from those of developed economies. Here, the structure of 
UK's banking system is used as a comparison because it is considered as a model for 
modern banking systems. 
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While the UK's banking regulatory framework is comprised of different institutions 
having their respective responsibilities and duties to maintain financial stability, CBM is 
solely responsible for all these functions (see Figure 1-3). They are either directly or 
indirectly controlled by the government. In Myanmar, types of financial institutions can 
be mainly divided into banks and building societies. These institutions offer range of 
financial services including travel insurance, underwriting shares, credit and debit cards. 
In Myanmar, banks only engage in traditional banking activities such as taking deposits, 
remittance services and making loans. Banks are not allowed to provide insurance and 
credit cards. Recently, the government has allowed banks to provide debit cards and 
Automated Teller Machines (ATM) machines in Myanmar. E-banking services have also 
been introduced by some of the large banks in the country. In addition, ahead of the 
Southeast Asian Games in Myanmar in 2013, CBM working with VISA and MASTER 
cards to provide international banking services. Prior to that, none of these services were 
available, at least widely to the general public. 
The ownership structures of Myanmar banks can be divided into are three types, namely 
'State-owned' or 'Government-owned', 'Private' and 'Semi-government' banks. There is 
no foreign bank currently operating its banking activities in the country. The decision to 
open up for foreign banking activities is still under considerations. Despite of these 
classifications, in Myanmar, clear cut distinction of the ownership structure of the banks 
cannot be made. This is because the funding of these banks usually come from 
government related organisations. 
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and needs improvements in terms of protections for financial crises and efficient 
mobilisation of funds through credit allocations. 
1.3.5 Overview of the Performance of Lending Institutions in Myanmar 
To test the success of the banking sectors, three indicators of financial intermediation are 
shown in the following table. The government does not disclose all the information to the 
public. Therefore, most of the banking data are not available to the public. Even the 
World Bank database can only provide banking data until 2004. These ratios are 
calculated as proposed by Enchzajaa (2006) to analyse the success and efficiency of the 
banking sector. 
Table 1-2: Ratios Measuring Performance of Lending Organisations (figures 
calculated based on World Bank Data) 
Ratios in % 1588 1989 1!!0 1991 1!!2 1993 1954 1956 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
M21GDP 27.0 21.7 24.1 26.7 26.9 24.2 24.3 25.9 27.2 25.6 23.5 22.7 26.7 27.5 24.0 20.2 20.1 
Cash Outside BanksIM2 20.6 17.1 20.1 23.3 23.5 20.4 20.8 20.8 21.2 19.7 17.5 15.8 18.2 19.8 17.9 15.4 16.4 
Total Loans/GDP 69.0 30.9 32.8 44.5 41.0 34.5 32.9 32.5 33.6 30.7 28.2 26.8 32.1 I 33.9 28.7 22.1 24.8 
The first ratio (M2/GDP) demonstrates the financial deepening of the fmancial system. 
Compared to the figure in 1988, when Myanmar adopted market-oriented economic 
system, there is no increment; instead, it went down to 20.l% in 2004. Thus, Myanmar's 
financial system has lower liquidity. This indicates that there are lesser opportunities exist 
for continued growth. The ratio of cash outside banks to M2 ratio measures the level of 
confidence amongst the general public. From the figure given above, the public'S 
confidence in the banking sector was constantly decreased since 1996. The year of worst 
performance, 2003, coincides with the collapse of the Myanmar Mayflower Bank and the 
Asia Wealth Bank. The crisis originated with the collapse of informal finance enterprises 
through the second half of 2002 (Turnell, 2003). The ratio of total loans to GDP also 
decreased since 1988. This indicates that the demand for loan has not been adequately 
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met through official financial intermediation. This section will be elaborated further in 
chapter six. 
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives 
Research into banks' lending behaviour has mainly focused on the ex-post calibration of 
different factors and bank lending. However, institutional theory argues that besides being 
financially successful, organisations also need legitimacy to survive. Owing to the tension 
ofinstitutional pressures, banks structure their risk handling strategies. The main aim of 
this paper is to gain better understanding of institutional pressures on banks' lending 
behaviour in Myanmar. The objectives of the research are: 
1) To develop a framework to explore institutional pressures in banks' lending 

2) To identitY the main components of institutional pressures that help shape banks' 

lending strategies 

3) To gain better understanding on how banks shape their lending strategies to 

respond to these institutional pressures 

4) To understand the factors that help shape banks' conformities and variations in 

banks' lending strategies 

5) To understand the results of banks' conformities and strategic responses to 

institutional pressures 

1.5 Research Questions 
Within this study, the following research questions are addressed in this study: 
RQ 1: How are banks' lending practices influenced and what sources influence them? 
RQ2: How do banks respond to these pressures? 
RQ3: What are the influencing factors? 
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RQ4: How do their chosen strategies affect the end outcome, legitimacy or efficiency? 
1.6 Research Assumptions and Limitations 
The main assumption of this study is that banks' lending practices or risk handling 
strategies are dependent upon pressures exerted on the banks, either from institutional or 
task environments. The scope of this study is limited into the management aspect of 
lending policies and decision making in determining whether to accept or reject loan 
applications; and how these are influenced by the institutional and task elements. Hence, 
it would be more comprehensive if the findings in relation to banks' lending practices in 
other countries in the same region such as in Singapore were able to be compared with 
those of Myanmar's. As this research has undertaken qualitative research, the findings 
cannot be generalisable. However, as the researcher was able to interview more than half 
of the higher level management of banks in Myanmar, it has some quality of 
representati veness. 
1.7 Significance of the Research 
The idea of undertaking this research in the area of banks' lending practices in Myanmar 
occurred to the researcher for three main reasons. Firstly, the research has identified the 
issue of financial sector development as a result of the country's changes in political 
environment in Myanmar, especially with the regard to assess to finance from the banks 
by the businesses have not been given any attention. Therefore, there is a need to do 
research not only from the borrowers' but also from the banks' perspectives in order to 
make successful policies for economic development. 
Secondly, the researcher aims to address the issues of applying successful practices from 
other countries onto Myanmar by international organisations such as World Bank and 
International Monetary Funds (IMF). It aims to provide the need for customised policies 
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as the country has different institutional context and developments over the years which 
can have different results if those successful practices are applied without considering 
other institutional factors. 
Thirdly, it aims to develop a framework that study banks' lending behaviour by engaging 
institutional and bank level factors. Through this, the research will give a clear picture on 
conformity and non-conformity to institutional pressures by banks. This study also aim to 
provide useful guidelines for planners and decision makers in designing programmes for 
financial sector development, to encourage banks' lending to businesses and overall 
economic development. 
1.8 Contribution of this Research 
There are three main expected contributions of this research: 
Firstly, this thesis develops a framework for studying banks' lending practices by 
integrating two theories to derive a comprehensive framework to study interplay between 
banks and institutions. 
Secondly, a clear structured of research methodology is developed for the basis of 
studying phenomenon in Myanmar, i.e. by recognising culture that has been embedded in 
people's mental attitudes. 
Thirdly, the findings have practical implications not only for financial regulators and 
banks but also for other stakeholders and sustainable community developments. 
1.9 A Review of Subsequent Chapters 
The thesis is structured in eight chapters. In this section, a brief description of the 
organisation of the thesis has been given. As explained earlier, this chapter has identified 
the gaps in the literature and have suggested reasons why research on the banks' lending 
Introduction 21 
behaviour should be studied using different approaches. It has also provided the brief 
research context for the reader to relate the research findings and become familiar with its 
respective context. The main body of the thesis contains six chapters, organised and 
structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides conceptual background of the role of risks and risk perceptions in 
decision making in banking sector. The purpose of this chapter is to generate an 
understanding and appreciation of how risk perceptions can shape banks' lending 
decisions theoretically and practically. The, the literatures on banks' lending behaviour 
are divided into their perspectives, such as psychological and classical decision 
theoretical perspectives, and analytical domains such as macro and micro levels, to 
clearly present the existence of literature gaps from different angles. As the perspectives 
of literature are concerned with the rationality in decision making, discussions on the 
issues of rationality will be discussed which also provides justification for the 
interdisciplinary approach in this study. 
Chapter 3 provides the development of theoretical framework. It presents some of the 
potential theories and limitations. Then, justifications for the combination of institutional 
theory and Oliver's strategic responses to institutional pressures to study banks' lending 
behaviour are given. A framework is developed further by relating empirical banking 
literature and sociological theories. 
Chapter 4 provides the research methodology employed in the research. It begins with 
general discussions on different paradigms and the competing paradigms for institutional 
theory. Then, the justifications for the qualitative approach are given. This is followed by 
a description of the choice and rationale of the research design, the sampling choice and 
the data collection procedure along with the process of data analysis. This includes the 
means by which research validity and reliability are achieved. For instance, the 
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interviewees' descriptions, the interview process, the formation of coding principles and 
the use ofNVIVO data analysis software are given in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 presents the findings from secondary data. It is based on cross-sectional data to 
make the readers become familiar with the current situation of Myanmar's financial 
sector, with the main focus on the banks' lending activities. 
Chapter 6 presents the findings from primary data. It is based on interviews with 
representatives of the banks and they are presented with the concepts derived from those 
two theories that formed the framework. 
Chapter 7 is the discussion chapter. It discusses the implications for theories and practice 
especially in diverse policy developments. These are based on the analyses assisted by 
NVIVO; therefore, the diagrams and tables developed from the software are used to give 
clear descriptions of the studies. 
Chapter 8 is the final chapter where the summary of the findings are presented 
emphasising on the most important theoretical and empirical findings. The chapter 
concludes with some observed limitations of the investigation and suggestions for future 
research. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
It has been identified in the previous chapter that the main objective of this study is to 
explore the pressures exerted on bankers' lending decision process. In order to study this 
process, the existing literature on risk perceptions, judgements, instruments used for risk 
management, and gaps identified in this chapter. Essentially, the aim of this chapter is to 
critically review the prior banks' lending literature to explore the research gaps. The 
chapter begins with focus on the definitions of risks and uncertainties in banking, a 
general model of lending decision process, determinants of imposing high and low 
premiums, the non-existence of rationality in banks' lending decisions followed by 
presenting literature gaps. Since there are many papers on banks' lending behaviour from 
different points of views, these scholarly works are be divided into two categories 
according to their perspectives, where lending decisions are viewed as either rationalised 
or institutionalised; and analytical domains of studies, where different levels of factors 
affecting lending decisions are researched upon. 
2.2 Decision Making in Banks' Business Financing (Ex-Ante) 
Though the term 'decision making' sounds simple, many authors have defined it in 
different ways. In our everyday lives, it is not considered as a process but as an end 
product, 'decision' or 'judgement'. The process of arriving to a decision is hardly 
considered as important. However, in academic literature, it is considered as an 
intellectual process of differentiating among alternatives (Harrison, 1996) and choosing 
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the best alternative (Eilon, 1969). Schwarber (1967) identifies three critical aspects of the 
decision making activity. They are identified as objectives, alternatives and risks. These 
are followed in a sequential manner by the decision makers. In general, decision making 
involves the following steps (l) diagnosing the problem that necessitates a decision, (2) 
identifying the criteria or attributes relevant to the solution of the problem and (3) 
evaluating, choosing and implementing the feasible alternatives (Mahmood, 2000). 
Unlike the literature, decision making in banks' Jending starts with an opportunity, not 
with a problem. Due to the nature and function of the business, borrowers are the 
opportunities that come along with risk and return where banks have to choose the 
borrowers with high credibility and repayment ability. However, determining these risks 
is difficult due to the difficulty in determining borrowers' credibility arising from 
asymmetry of information. Thus, banks' financing decision making is similar to strategic 
decision making process because allocation of limited resources to the right people or 
businesses requires making appropriate judgments through contemplating risk and return. 
Therefore, in banks' lending, the risk perceptions of those involved in lending decisions 
are more important, thereby creating a different sequence of decision making. 
According to Deshmukh et al. (1983), lending process is a sequence of credit decisions 
taken by an intermediary, banks, facing uncertainty of credibility of borrowers as to both 
the quantity and quality of loan demand. It involves four main steps (see Figure 2-1): (1) 
application for a loan; (2) credit evaluation; (3) loan review and (4) repayment 
performance. Firstly, application for a loan is initiated by the borrower due to the 
perceived need to add external debt financing. Once the bank receive the application, it 
will look through the borrower's credit worthiness by evaluating five key elements, 
character (integrity), capacity (sufficient cash flow to service the obligation), capital (net 
worth, financial statement analysis), collateral (assets to secure the debt) and conditions 
(ofthe borrower and the overall economy). 
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When the borrower submits loan application, this would not reflect the credit worthiness 
as borrowers do not always provide all the information required, and even if they do, not 
all information will be correct. Asymmetry of infonnation is created when the borrower 
does not provide all the required information. This asymmetry concerns the lender 
whenever the borrower can use this information profitably at the lender's expense 
(Bebczuk,2003). 
While evaluating the borrower's ability for repayment, lenders will have to bear in mind 
not to cause adverse selection (ex-ante) and prevent moral hazard (ex-post). The former is 
occurred as a result of the existence of asymmetry of information between borrower and 
lender where banks do not know borrower's repayment ability, thus lead to Stiglitz and 
Weiss' (1981) adverse selection problem. Consequently, this could cause borrowers to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour which in tum gives rise to moral hazard. Therefore, 
banks must ensure that credit is allocated to those who have the capabilities and 
willingness to repay the loan and interest, and deny those who are not. In doing so, banks 
are engaged in evaluating riskiness of borrowers. 
As risk assessment is recognised as a methodical process of quantitatively or qualitatively 
describing risk (Daneshkhah, 2004), assessment of borrowers' credibility can be 
determined through hard and soft information. Most banks use a mnemonic as a check 
list and the most prevalent being CAMPRI (Character, Ability, Margin, Purpose, 
Amount, Repayment, and Insurance) (Rouse, 2004). This framework is used primarily in 
the United Kingdom while '5Cs' of analysis (Character, Capacity, Capital, Collateral, and 
Condition), is mainly used in the United States (Davies and Kearns, 1992). 
Character has been identified as a primary factor in both of the analysis frameworks. It is 
defined as a reputation of the borrower in terms of borrower's credit track record, years of 
managerial experience, financial management, expertise and the age of the firm are the 
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variables used to determine character (Orser and Foster, 1994, Lyn C, 2000). Bryant 
(2001) claims that character evaluation is a subjective estimate of the probability that a 
borrower would honour the obligations. He also states that high moral standards are 
indicators that borrower would make a good effort in repaying the indebtedness. 
Gustafson (1989) argues that character is not ethical or moral sense but is a variable that 
has significant economic importance. For large businesses, not only the borrower himself 
but also the shareholders' reputations and the firm's relationships with its stakeholders 
such as customers and suppliers are also required to be investigated as these are useful 
information sources for banks to investigate character of loan applicants and their related 
parties. 
Capacity, the second 'C' of the lending assessment, analyses the borrower's 'ability to 
repay' which coincides with 'A' in CAMPARI framework where it looks at the earning 
potential and cash flow of the business to determine borrower's repayment ability. For 
instance, loan officers will ask for a detailed budget or business plan from small business 
star-up borrowers or historical and projected financial statements from those with existing 
businesses to demonstrate that they can afford the repayments (Chapman, 2009). 
Capital, on the other hand measures the financial strength of the borrower. The capital of 
the borrower is determined by the firm's financial position using risk ratios including 
liquidity and solvency measures (Gustafson, 1989). The fourth 'C', collateral is a fornl of 
security or insurance against any unforeseen future situations or developments from 
borrowers. It has two main uses, liquidation purpose and to assess the borrowers' 
commitments in the business (Robbie et aI., 1983). This will be further explained in the 
next section. The last 'C', the condition, refers to the environment which the borrower's 
business is situated. The assessment includes both controllable and uncontrollable factors. 
In other words, it is the assessment of borrower's vulnerabilities to the changes in the 
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regulatory, economic, political and technological conditions (Sinkey, 1983). 
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After evaluating the credit risk of the borrower, loan officer will make a decision whether 
to grant the loan or reject depending on their acceptance level of risks. If the risk exceeds 
the acceptance level, banks simply reject the application. Otherwise, loan officer would 
detennine the level of risk and set premiums accordingly. 
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Figure 2-1: A Summary of Banks' Lending Decision Process (Developed by the 
Author) 
There is extensive research on decision making. They can be differentiated into different 
analytical domains and perspectives on studying diverse influences because the scope is 
wide. Thus, review on decision making research is challenging. Nevertheless, in this 
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paper, only those literature that is related to banks' financing decisions will be discussed 
in the following sections. 
2.2.1 Different Premium Options 
In finance and banking, the term 'premium' is associated with risk. It is the primary 
component of any risk-return model (Liparii et aI., 2011). They are positively correlated; 
in other words, the higher the risks, the higher the premium would be. Once again, it 
could be seen as another role of risk perceptions. Finance and banking literatures have 
mentioned premiums a number of times and the methodologies used to calculate them. 
However, what they are and their uses in lending decisions are not mentioned in detail. In 
general, the concept behind premium is that the greater the perceived risk, the larger the 
premium that the borrower will be imposed. We can never know the real risk due to 
principal (banks) and agent (borrowers) relationship. Hence, risk perceptions are more or 
less similar to expected return by the banks or the loan decision makers who have to take 
into account of adverse selection, moral hazard and asymmetry of information. These 
come with costs which are termed agency costs (Berger and Udell, 1995) including 
monitoring costs, resulting from the activities of the agent (borrower) must be monitored 
to ensure that he or she conforms to the contract; bonding costs, incurred by the agent to 
guarantee that he or she will not take certain actions that would harm the principal 
(banker) and/or to ensure that the principal is compensated if the agent does take such 
actions; and residual loss, results from a divergence of decisions made by the borrowers 
and those that would maximise returns to the banks (Landstrom, 1992). Hence, bankers 
require greater return to cover these costs. Risk premiums can take place in many forms. 
In order to explain this phenomenon, one needs to understand what causes the perceived 
risk to be higher. It was mentioned in the previous section that banks assess the borrowers 
depending on 5Cs framework. In addition to this, there are also other factors that 
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influence risk premium such as the banks' risk aversion, if the banks are more risk averse, 
the risk premium will decrease and vice versa; the economic risk, if the economy is 
predictable with interest rates and growth with low volatility, the premium will decrease; 
the quality of information, if the companies are listed, their quantity of infonnation 
available to the banks also increase which consequently reduce the risk premium; the 
liquidity of the capital market; the risk of a catastrophe event which can significantly 
decrease the wealth of banks; the behavioural or irrational component of the banks; the 
illusion of money, which is caused by the expected inflation rate; and the banks' asset 
portfoli02 (Lipara et aI., 2011). Other factors apart from the quality of information arise 
from a country's economic context. However, when making lending decisions, these risks 
are reflected on borrowers through shorter loan maturities, variable and/or interest rates, 
size of the loans and higher collateral requirements. These are categorised as 
externalisation of risks to the borrowers (Lane and Quack, 2002), while guarantor 
requirements are transfer of risks to third parties (Bessis, 2002). Among them, risk 
premium is reflected most on interest rates and collateral requirements. 
·-··---------·l ]"" ECollateral V " Transfonns credit risk into asset riSk~ .. ---­ l 
I 
Risk transfer to 'guarantor +Third-party Guarantees borrower' 
Pre-emptive - Proactive corrective Covenants 
actions 
Figure 2-2: Risk enhancing impact of guarantees (Bessis, 2002) 
2 These factors are presented in the literature related to financial instruments; however, these are 
presented in relation to the banking context. 
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Banks often perceive that raising interest rates above the market level will allow them to 
achieve optimality (de Meza and Webb, 1987). However, this has been seen as a problem 
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who stated that that adjusting interest rates does not reduce 
adverse selection or moral hazard but attracts risky borrowers or alters their behaviour to 
adopt risky projects. Imposing variable interest rates rather than fixed interest rates also 
allows banks to transfer the risk of interest rate fluctuations onto the borrowers. 
Alternatively, banks may reduce the loan size or increase collateral requirements, use of 
loan covenants, and/or enforcing additional conditions onto the loan contracts. 
Collaterals are another common tool used by the borrowers to obtain loans. The greater 
the quality of the collaterals, the easier it is for banks to approve loan applications. There 
are two different types of collaterals which are business collaterals, pledging assets 
owned by the firms and personal collaterals, pledging of assets outside the firm (Berger 
and Frame, 2005). Accepting the former is termed as internalisation of risks as banks 
absorb some risks in case of business failure, while the latter as externalisation of risks 
because banks hope to recover their losses through claiming on the borrowers' personal 
ownerships. They are used to signal borrowers' commitments to the success of business 
ventures because the owners are unlikely to undertake riskier projects or to reduce their 
efforts unless they are willing to lose their collaterals. Hence, theoretically, it resolves the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Besankor and Thakor, 1987) and prevent 
credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Another tool is the covenant which limits the actions of the borrowers. Its intention is to 
control and prevent borrowers from engaging activities that conflict with lenders' 
interests. This causes borrowers to consult with the banks to obtain permission if they 
want to change their strategies or operational activities. Some authors have found that 
these control rights reduce the risk of adverse selections and moral hazard (Clifford and 
Warner, 1979, Berlin and Mester, 1997). An other tool that is associated with loan 
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covenant is loan maturity. It is well accepted by the bankers that the longer the loan 
maturity is, the greater the risk that the borrowers will alter their risk behaviours. 
Therefore, banks tend to give shorter term loans where negotiations with the borrowers, 
evaluation and monitoring occur frequently. 
'Fhese high interest rates and collateral requirements causing high lending and borrowing 
costs can be overcome through relationship lending through using soft infonnation. 
Basically, banks' lending methodologies can be differentiated into two types, namely, 
transactional and relationship lending. Transactional lending involves fmancial statement 
lending, small business credit scoring, asset-based lending, factoring and trade credit. The 
nature of the information used in this type of lending is mostly "hard" infonnation (e.g. 
credit scores from extemal credit bureaus) (Berger and Udell, 2004). When these types of 
hard information are not available or not feasible and cost effectively solved by the 
aforementioned technologies, relationship lending, where primary information used by 
lenders is based on "soft" information (Rajan, 1992), is employed. Thus, information 
availability determines the types of technologies used by the banks in accessing credit 
worthiness of the borrowers. 
Therefore, under many circumstances, opaque borrowers have an alternative to 
relationship lending (Berger and Udell, 2004). In this regard, credit managers or 
relationship lenders collect information beyond which is available in the finn's financial 
statements and the information that is readily available to the public, including 
information on the entrepreneur's local community/business environment, the 
entrepreneur and the Small and Medium Sized Enterprises' (SMEs) interactions with that 
environment and other factors that lender might consider relevant. This is not only 
applicable to relationship but also to transactional lending in which "soft" information 
plays a complementary role. During the interpretation of this infonnation, objectivity is 
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not easy to achieve as humans are subject to the vagaries of fear, greed, pride of opinion, 
and all the other excitable states that prevent rational judgement (Pring, 1993). 
The uses of these tools are again differentiated into 'going concern' or 'gone concern' 
approaches. However, many banks advocated that they employ both approaches when 
making lending decisions (Robbie et al., 1983). For instance, in the going concern 
approach, collaterals are assessed on the basis of borrowers' commitment to the business 
while the gone concern approach view them as a tool for liquidation in case of the 
borrowers' default. In these two approaches, the former is more concerned with the 
relationship between borrowers and lenders while the latter assumes the past activities to 
reflect on the future. 
These risks result from the high cost of intensive monitoring to avoid the moral hazard of 
borrowers when the banks do not have all the required information to judge borrowers' 
repayment ability. First-time borrowers, small b~sinesses and start-ups are more prone to 
higher premium charges on them by the banks. In summary, other factors apart from 
borrowers' repayment ability, the contextual conditions such as underdeveloped capital 
markets where banks cannot externalise risks through credit derivatives, high inflation 
and catastrophic events (e.g. financial crisis) can induce higher premiums. Thus, when 
studying the banks' lending behaviour, we cannot isolate factors but to study their 
interconnectedness in influencing or shaping their lending practices. 
2.2.2 Rationality in Decision-Making 
The term rationality is defined by Bazerman and Messick (1998, p. 478) as 
, ... the decision-making process that is logically expected to deal to the 
optimal result given an accurate assessment of the decision-makers' values 
and risk preferences' 
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In other words, decision makers who are rational will arrive at objective and logical 
judgements. In fact, the costs associated with gathering complete information is high or 
impossible, making rational decision is implausible. Moreover, rational decisions tend to 
be made based on unrealistic assumptions (Robbins and Coulter, 2011): 
• 	 the problem is clear and unambiguous where decision makers have complete 
information; 
• 	 the decision is single, well-defined goal that the decision maker is trying to 
achieve and there is no conflict over the goal; 
• 	 the decision maker can identify relevant criteria, lists all the viable alternatives, 
and is aware of all possible consequences of each alternative; 
• 	 the decision maker can obtain full information about the criteria and alternatives 
because it is assumed to that there are no time or cost constraints; and 
• 	 the rational decision maker always chooses the alternative that will yield the 
maximum payoff 
In lending, as mentioned before, lending decision is not about solving a problem but 
contemplating whether to take an opportunity for return to realise in the future from 
investment. These opportunities come with uncertainties and it is impossible for banks to 
have complete information. Similarly, the full information about the consequences, in this 
case, borrowers engaging in risky activities cannot be obtained. The final comment is 
impossible if we take into account of the influence of institutions in decision making. 
Heme (2011) finds some evidence showing that individual choices disappear when 
individuals have an opportunity to learn and correct their choices to be more in line with 
the standard utility model depending on the situation where decision making takes place, 
thereby concluding that different institutional structure affect such differing preferences. 
Similarly, the studies also find that the standard utility model works well in certain types 
of competitive markets but not in other institutional environments. These are the results 
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of individuals' limited cognitive capabilities, information processing capacity, time and 
cost constraints on decision makers to obtain complete information. In other words, 
optimal 'risk perception' is not attainable. Thus, the term 'bounded rationality' is created 
by Simon (1976, p.82) stating that 
'The human being striving for rationality and restricted within the limits of 

his knowledge has developed some working procedures that partially 

overcome these difficulties. These procedures consist in assuming that he 

can isolate from the rest of the world a closed system containing a limited 

number of variables and a limited range of consequences' 

He further asserts that due to these limitations, individuals construct simplified models of 
the real world in order to deal with it. He refers to it as picking a course of action that is 
satisfactory, 'satisficing' or 'good enough' under circumstances. Applying his views on 
banks' lending context, collaterals, interest rates, for example, are used by lenders to 
simplify complicated issues of deciding whether to approve or reject loan applications. In 
developed countries, the over reliance on credit rating agencies is also the result of banks' 
attempts to simplify complex processes. Similar to Herne (2011), Simon (1976) also 
states that it is impossible for individuals to analyse logically and dispassionately to make 
the best possible decision as they are constrained within the realm of cultural, 
organisational or their own values. 
Banking is one of the most regulated industries in the world, among various regulatory 
measures, the regulation of bank capital is crucial due to the important roles it plays in 
banks' soundness and risk taking behaviour and its influence on the competitiveness of 
banks (Zhu, 2008). Therefore, different types of regulatory frameworks have been 
introduced for internationally active banks to follow. For instance, at the international 
level, in 1988, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) formed Basel Accord 1. 
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According to this, bank loans of different risk have same weight which allows banks to 
swap low risk assets with high risk ones. In other words, this Basel Accord allows 
regulatory arbitrage (Zhu, 2008). Then, in 2004, Basel II which is a revised version of the 
fonner one was released. It allows banks to compute the capital requirements for 
managing credit risks, standardised approach, Foundation Internal Ratings-Based 
approach (FIRB) and Internal Ratings-Based approach (IRB). In order to use the latter 
approaches, it needs approvals from regulatory authorities and is costly; therefore, banks 
opt to use the fonner approach which relies on external rating agencies. In this case, the 
effects of institutions and environments on credit risk measurements come from two 
directions, one from external rating agencies and another from the banks themselves. 
During the times of economic and financial crises, these rating agencies downgrade credit 
risks including sovereign debts. At the same time, banks become more cautious in lending 
which creates two directional influences in changing banks' credit risks perceptions. 
In addition, the effects of those institutional constraints cannot be ignored if we take into 
account of countries that have implemented Basel Accords and those that have not. Even 
those countries that have implemented the same Basel Accord also tend to have different 
approaches in their lending practices, for instance UK and Germany (Lane and Quack, 
2001). If the decision makings was rational, we would not have financial crises and banks 
would not be accused of irresponsible lending. Therefore, the statement which states that 
rationality exists becomes questionable. 
Similar to other decision making research papers, researchers of banking and fmance 
communities are interested in understanding why people make the choices and judgments 
that they do, for example, the reasons for inflicting higher interest rates on one group of 
borrowers and lower interest on the another, and why banks refuse to lend to small 
businesses. Though banks' credit risk assessment process has been discussed in the 
-----
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previous section, the question of whether decision makers are rational, that is what makes 
to choose one alternative over another still remains unanswered. 
2.2.3 Limitations in Bank Lending Literature 
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Figure 2-3: Graphical Presentation of Literature Gaps 
Due to the vast amount of literature in this area and based on the theoretical 
underpinnings, literature gaps are divided into two, one based on the perspectives used by 
the researchers to study risk perceptions and banks' lending, i.e. where lending decisions 
are viewed as either rationalised or institutionalised; and analytical domains, where 
different levels of factors affecting lending decisions are researched upon. The summary 
can be presented as in Figure 2-3. 
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2.3 Perspectives 
Research on risk in decision making has been dominated by statistical estimations which 
are often inadequate to alleviate people's attitudes toward risks (Renn and Swaton, 1984). 
Such methodologies are designed to be objective. However, they lack interpretability of 
results as they do not take into account of public perceptions and social effects. Since risk 
is not an "objective" fact in the business environment (Luhmann, 1993), studying risk 
perceptions by banks using probability calculus will not allow us to understand the factors 
influencing banks' lending behaviour (Lane and Quack, 2001). In general, this type of 
methodology fails to include bounded rationality and subjective rationality in various 
estimations process. Thompson (1967) supports this fact by stating that uncertainties and 
risk pose major challenges to rationality which is manifested itself in an individual's 
perception. To bridge this gap, many researchers have taken different perspectives such 
as sociological and psychological to study risk in different areas of research such as in 
foreign direct investment (Francis et aI., 2009), information systems (Tsohou et aI., 
1993), organisational communication (Lammers and Barbour, 2006) and so on. 
According to Renn and Swaton (1984), these perspectives of risk in decision making are 
divided into four categories: 
1) 	 Classical Decision Analysis - focuses on rationality of decision making process and 
what motivational and cognitive biases are incorporated to optimise our own 
judgement. 
2) Psychological Decision Theory - emphasises individuals' processes of information 
about risk and logical structure in arriving at an overall judgement. 
3) Social-psychological Judgement and Attitude Theory - concentrates on the 
interaction between social values and personal judgement. 
4) Sociological Theories and Policy Analysis - investigates the social goals, values, or 
motives that drive persons and social groups to come to final judgement. 
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2.3.1 Classical Decision Theory 
Classical decision theory assumes that individuals are rational decision makers and 
optimise their judgements through formal axioms. Grandori (1984) asserts that classical 
decision theory incorporates an optimising model. In other words, these theories match 
the decision processes with a nonnative model of rational reasoning thereby maximising 
utility of individuals or groups (Renn and Swaton, 1984). Oliveira (2007) used the term 
'normative' or 'rational' decision theories to describe this process. In rational decision 
making models, a number of possible alternatives from different scenarios are analysed 
by decision makers before making a final choice which would have the highest 
probability of outcome in the best expected scenario (Oliveira, 2007). Therefore, most of 
the research papers using classical decision or normative theories seek to understand how 
decision makers solve problems through identifying different alternatives. Banks' 
decision making processes have been studied by economists emphasising 'markets with 
imperfect information', 'bounded rationality of decision-makers', 'moral hazard' and 
'adverse selection' (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Some of the economic theories that are 
used to employ rational decision making models are expected utility theory and game 
theory. 
Economic theory, for example, limits its attention to goods, bonds and money as long as 
the institutionalisation of saving and investment is confined to the monetary system 
(Gurley and Shaw, 1955). Its methodology involves rational decision making models that 
follow three steps process of (1) analysing the feasibility of the alternative, (2) pondering 
the desirability of alternative, and (3) choosing the best alternative by combining both 
desirability and feasibility (Rubinstein, 1998). Grandori (1984) states that in the economic 
theory of competitive decision, the payoff structure is considered as 'known' until a 
system of information, the price system is there to reflect the influence of al1 the relevant 
factors. In reality, competitive equilibrium cannot be achieved as said in economic theory 
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at least in banks' lending because of the use of non-interest item, for instance, collateral is 
used to offset asymmetry of information existing between the lender and borrower. 
Moreover, the lenders are unaware of the default probabilities of the borrowers, therefore, 
are unable to rank and choose the feasible and desirable alternatives. If the lenders were 
able to rank default probabilities of borrowers using their credit ratings and collaterals, 
nonetheless, the information is ex-ante and cannot determine the occurrence of moral 
hazard. 
Economic theory has been used to study banks' lending by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
Their study has been the most influential in banks' lending studies (de Meza and Webb, 
1987, Besankor and Thakor, 1987, Su, 2010, Wette, 1983, Arnold and Rile, 2009). Their 
main idea is that in a competitive equilibrium, a loan market is characterised by credit 
rationing. In their model, banks categorise borrowers according to the expected return of 
projects. It shows that if a bank increases its interest rates charged on borrowers, it will 
suffer from adverse selection as only risky borrowers are willing to borrow at such high 
rate and cause moral hazard as they would choose riskier projects. Therefore, interest rate 
being charged on the borrower is sensitive to banks' risk ranking of them according to the 
repayment probabilities. They also examined the role of collaterals but only for risk­
averse borrowers. This argument has been further extended by Wette (1983), however, 
only for risk-neutral borrowers and focuses on collateral requirement while interest rate is 
held fixed. Thus, in these types of models of studying banks' lending behaviour, 
borrowers' risk classes are first sorted. These assumptions and results led to conclude that 
lower quality borrowers could only be attracted at higher interest rates and collateral 
requirements. In these types of study, different decision makers would arrive at the same 
conclusion which in reality is not the case, because their experiences, intuitions and the 
institutional environments that they operate in also have significant influences on how 
they make judgments. 
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It is true that classical decision theory and rational decision making models are the most 
reliable and robust for describing and predicting aggregate-level outcomes that are the 
result of individual level decisions especially with the case in situations where monetary 
markets, where information regarding preferences are readily available (Cook et aI., 
1990). North (1990, p.ll) also argues that classical theories are compatible with and have 
made major contributions to market analyses in developed countries but fail to 
characterise underdeveloped markets. As Myanmar's financial market falls into the latter 
category with information deficiency, these types of studies would be incompatible. 
Other limitations also exist. Firstly, they assume that a clear distinction can be made 
between high and low risk borrowers. Secondly, almost all the research papers using 
classical decision theory to study decision making lack empirical testing of the underlying 
assumptions. Most importantly, the simplifying approach of classical decision theory 
does not capture the complexities of national and organisational environmental effects on 
the variations in risk assessments. Thus, classical decision theories with over emphasis on 
an individual level of analysis should be avoided. 
2.3.2 Psychological Decision Theory 
While economic literature on loan officers assumes that they are fully rational people, 
making decisions on the base of real, although information concerning the quality of 
applicants and their investment projects are not verifiable, psychological decision theory 
recognises the role of individuals in arriving judgements. Their personalities and 
perceptions, roles and organisations including their values and emotions can affect their 
decision making styles. Psychological decision theory gives emphasis on individual 
process of reasoning while incorporating the social desirability of perceived 
consequences and specific motivational factors in processing risk and uncertainties 
leading to the formation of an overall judgement (Renn and Swaton, 1984, McNamara 
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and Bromiley, 1997). Thus, embodiment of 'bounded rationality' concept into economic 
organisations has revolutionised economists from a fully rational model of decision 
making (Rakow, 2010). Game theory, prospect theory, attribution theory and theory of 
choice are the most common theoretical assumptions used in psychological decision­
making models (Oliveira, 2007). In addition, researchers have also integrated 
psychological-based theories to study investors' behaviour in financial decision making 
process. In these types of behavioural finance models, traditional assumptions of 
individual rationality hypothesis are relaxed and agents' cognitive psychology IS 
examined. 
With the introduction of game theory in classical decision making models, psychological 
aspect of decision making can be seen. For instance, Barboza (2009) uses game theory 
approach to study micro lending with no physical collateral but social cost that acts as a 
quasi-collateral. In that study, the interplay of trust between lender, borrower and 
consignors is examined. In a regular market setting, using collateral to overcome 
asymmetry of information would be the dominant strategy and if the borrower is unable 
to provide such collaterals, the bank would refuse granting the loan. However, in 
microcredit setting, group-based individual lending contracts where if a person defaults, 
the other group members would need to payoff the balance owing to the lender, 
preventing moral hazard by the borrowers. Under this condition, joint liability among 
borrowers are created, therefore, only those borrowers which the group could trust would 
get loans, thereby decreasing asymmetry of information. In this study, strategic 
interaction among uncollateralised borrowers has been introduced into rational decision 
making model. However, it does not describe the complexity of different levels of 
political, social and cultural relationships. Another limitation in this study is that though it 
incorporates psychological thinking, it does not omit the assumptions of rational choice 
theory. Rational decision making models and economic applications of banks' lending 
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studies can also be seen using game theory which introduces strategic behaviour into 
rational decision theories. It focuses on interdependent decision making process (Shubik 
et a1., 2002). The underlying assumption is that decision makers take into account of other 
people's solutions before choosing an alternative. Jeong and Joh (2010) study banks' risk 
taking behaviour using a game theory framework. They study Korean commercial banks 
using quarterly data on bank lending compiled by the Bank of Korea from 1993 to 2008. 
Their results show that big banks tend to take more risks by lending to high risk 
borrowers as they receive government protections through bail-outs and deposit 
insurances. 
Researchers studying decision making from psychological perspectives are interested in 
the role of intuitions and emotions in arriving a judgement (Agor, 1984, Klein, 2003). 
Intuition is regarded as "vague feeling of knowing something without knowing exactly 
how or why" (Lipshitz and Shulimovitz, 2007a, Hayashi, 2001). Emotion, on the other 
hand, is defined as the feelings of impending decision might be wrong, or that particular 
decision is inappropriate (Lipshitz and Shulimovitz, 2007a). The effects of intuition and 
emotion, in other words, behavioural factors, on banks' lending decisions are widely 
studied (Lipshitz and Shulimovitz, 2007b, Bellucci et a1., 2011, Jankowicz and Hisrich, 
1987, Hensman and Sadler-Smith, 2011). Jankowicz and Hisrich (1987) use personal 
construct theory to explore intuitive factors of banks' loan officers in small business loan 
decisions. Their sample includes 20 commercial loan officers from four banks in Tulsa, 
Oklahom, and Las Cruces, New Mexico. Their results indicate that intuition of loan 
officers plays more important role in business lending than collateral and other financial 
aspects of a prospective loan. 
Prospect theory, for example, is first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), then, 
it is advanced into cumulative prospect theory by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). It 
insists that risk attitude is determined by the outcome's relation to subjective judgement 
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and not the level of outcome. According to prospect theory, individuals tend to be risk 
averse in a domain of gains or when the circumstances are in favour of them, and risk 
seeking in a domain of losses or when they are in the midst of crisis. It has been used by 
Godlewski (2007) to study risk-taking behaviour by banks in emerging markets. The 
author has used accounting data of 894 South-East Asian and South and Latin American 
banks for the period of 1996-2001 from Bankscope database. The results support prospect 
theory's assumptions. Johnson (1994) has also found similar results using 142 banks' 
data from Bank Compustat for the period of 1979-1989. These types of study over 
emphasise individuals' cognitive processes. It fails to take into account of the institutional 
constraints such as regulatory requirements on the banks. When these types of constraints 
exist, even if the loan officers have all the infonnation they need to validate the 
credibility of the borrower, loan applications might be rejected as to institutional 
limitations. 
Psychological studies are oriented towards individual decision making and more or less 
assumed that people are rational when making economic decisions. This approach has 
been further improved by not only focusing on individual (micro) level but also on how 
societal (macro) level affects individual choice in social-psychological judgement theory. 
This is discussed in detail in the next section. 
2.3.3 Social-psychological Judgement and Attitude Theory (Sociocognitive) 
Social-psychological study of risk perception IS interested in the issues of risk 
communications and also termed as 'empiricist psychometric' approach (Taylor-Gooby 
and Zinn, 2006). The studies of risk perceptions using social-psychological judgement 
theory assumes that risk is defined subjectively and influenced by psychological, social, 
institutional and cultural factors (Solvic, 2001). In other words, psychological based 
studies focused only on intuition, personalities, emotions and perceptions, however, in 
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social psychology, it is interested in knowing how social factors influence those 
psychological aspects and final judgements are arrived. McNamara and Bromiley (1997) 
studied influences on risk assessment in commercial lending using behaviour decision 
theories by recognising organisational and cognitive factors. 
Bellucci et a1.(2011) provide a reVIew of literature and examined the theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence on how genders ofloan officers have effects on banks' 
lending practices. They have summarised that male and female loan officers' exhibit 
different risk tolerance levels. This can be the results of other factors such as differences 
in response to incentives (Agarwal and Wang, 2008, Beck et aI., 2009) and career 
concerns (Agarwal and Wang, 2008). 
Risk studies based on psychometric perspective use quantitative measures including 
questionnaire studies, magnitude estimation, numerical scaling, and attitude surveys 
(Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006). Other associated methodologies include Logit Model 
(Agarwal and Wang, 2008, Barasinska, 2009), Probit Model (Ravina, 2008, Bellucci et 
a!., 2009), Tobit Model (Ravina, 2008) and qualitative methodologies such as interviews, 
are also used in association with quantitative measures (Buttner and Rosen, 1988). 
2.3.4 Sociological Theories and Policy Analysis 
By only depending on the behavioural data alone limits the importance of social context 
of choice (Cook et al., 1990). In other words, rational decision makers in a particular 
social context will not be able to make rational decisions as collection preferences cannot 
be obtained due to the constraints imposed from the contextual environment. Sociological 
perspective gives a distinctive contribution to risk analysis as its emphasis is on the role 
of shared ideas and normative frameworks which are formed by cultural and social 
factors (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006). Douglas and Wildvasky (1982) have studied risk 
from sociocultural perspective. They have found a wide range of cultural bases for risk 
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perception and the process of dealing with it. Thus, sociological perspective glves a 
significant contribution to classical risk studies whose assumptions are that individuals 
are rational actors. 
However, sociological theories have not been incorporated extensively in studying banks' 
lending behaviour, except for Lane and Quack (2002) who applied sociological 
institutionalist approach to understand how banks construct and manage risk in SME 
lending. The authors analysed banks financing in Britain and Germany and found 
different approach towards risk assessments despite banks are within EU regulations and 
intemationalisation. This is because banks are deeply embedded in their own institutional 
framework. Therefore, it can be assumed that banks in Myanmar would have different 
approaches to bank lending assessments as their institutional frameworks are different as 
banks operate in highly institutionalised environment. 
Moreover, Lane and Quack (2002) investigate countries in which economic sanctions do 
not exist, therefore, with no barriers to intemationalisation. By looking at this study, 
differences in banks' lending practices can be seen across tvvo different countries. If the 
banks are considered to be rational, no difference wi]] be seen. Hence, banks' operations 
and activities are affected by the institutional environment where they operate in 
(Hemimdez-Oinovas and Koeter-Kant, 2010). Therefore, there requires the need to take 
into account of the context. By referring back to the theoretical studies of perception of 
risks, sociological theory would be the only one that addresses power, institutional 
constraints, social values and pressure groups on risk perception (Otway and 
Vonwinterfeldt, 1982). 
To understand the banks' lending behaviour in Myanmar, one should recognise the fact 
that there is not much of intemationalisation in its business environment. Thus, in order to 
understand banks' risk assessment procedures and policies, it is necessary to consider the 
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institutional environment in which the banks are embedded in. This includes regulative 
effects of state policy, legislation and intermediary organisations on banks' lending 
behaviour which have been highlighted by some of the comparative studies of economic 
organisation in different societies (Whitley, 2003, Lane and Quack, 2002, Klein, 2003) 
and other normative and cognitive effects as suggested by new institutional theory (Scott 
and Meyer, 1994, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
2.4 Analytical Domains 
Previous studies' analytical domains are divided into three different levels of practice in 
sociology, micro, meso and macro levels. 
2.4.1 Micro Level 
The studies in which individual interactions between and within organisations, thus 
having direct effects on decision making processes will be classified under micro level 
studies. For instance, DeYoung et a1.( 1999) study the effects of age, number of branches 
and size of the bank on banks' lending using US commercial bank data and find that there 
are negative relationships between age and size of the banks on lending to small 
businesses. They have also found that banks with higher concentration of banks' branches 
in urban market have positive effect on small business lending. Similar results are also 
found by Berger et a1.(2001) and Zhong and Ying (2009) stating that large banks are less 
likely to engage in small business lending and this is also true for distressed and foreign 
owned banks in Argentina and China respectively. 
Panagopoulos and Spiliotis (1998) and Degryse; and Van Cayseele (2000) study the 
customer relationships and their effects on pledging collaterals and interest rates. The 
former uses bank level data set from Greek banks whereas the latter from Belgian banks. 
However, they have got the same results suggesting that the longer the customers have 
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relationships with a bank, the lower the interest rates and probability of pledging 
collaterals. Sapienza (2004) and Micco and Panizz (2006) study the impact of bank 
ownership on banks' lending. They have found that government-owned banks charge 
lower interest rates than private banks. Similarly, higher risk takings can be found in 
shareholder owned banks as they attempt to increase shareholders' wealth (Seabright et 
aI., 2002). These studies have used data from European transition countries. There is also 
another study of the relationships between internal credit ratings which is derived from 
Basel Accord II and interest premiums (Machauer and Weber, 1998). This study focuses 
on German banks and finds that loan interest premiums are related to borrower credit 
ratings and show no relation to collaterals. 
In summary, these micro level studies focus on the organisational factors such as 
customers, collaterals, bank size, ownership, age and number ofbranches and their effects 
on banks' lending behaviour. 
2.4.2 Meso Level 
Meso level studies are broader than micro level studies in the sense that they provide 
more focus on industrial effects on banks' lending practices. One of the most studied 
meso level factors and its effects on banks' lending is competition. There are significance 
number of studies stating that competition not only decreases cost of borrowing but also 
increases banks to have longer relationships with borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 1995, 
Hauswald and Marquez, 2006, Zhong and Ying, 2009, Ruckes, 2004), thereby creating 
less incentives for banks to acquire information. Liu et a1. (2012) study competition and 
risk taking in regard to South East Asian banking. They have found that concentration of 
banks lead to reduce risk taking. The major flaw of the study is that they have studied 
only four countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam, which are 
listed under top six economies according to GDP data from IMF database. They have 
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generalised the findings based on these four countries and concluded that competition 
decreases banks' risk taking behaviour. They have ignored other smaller economies like 
Myanmar. These findings cannot be extended to Myanmar, as its institutional 
environment is significantly different from these countries and applying these findings to 
such small economies is impossible. 
Collateral laws and creditor protection rights are also found to have effects on banks' 
lending, for instance, Haselmann and Wachtel (2006) study 423 banks in 20 transition 
countries in Europe and found that banks in good legal environment is associated with 
banks acceptance of different types of assets as collaterals and these banks are more 
willing to lend to information opaque borrowers. 
Ely and Robinson (2001) also study the improved in credit scoring models in banking 
industry and its effects on banking industry using US banking data. They have discovered 
that technological change in credit scoring increases large banks' share of small business 
lending and decreases average loan size to small businesses. However, banks in Myanmar 
do not have the privilege of getting borrowers' information from credit bureaus as there is 
none. Thus, it is expected that Myanmar banks would have other techniques in regard to 
detennining borrowers' credibility. The impacts of capital regulations on banks' lending 
are also studied quite extensively by many researchers (Honda, 2004, Yilmaz, 2009, Ben 
Naceur and Kandil, Shrieves and Dahl, 1995). They have found that regulatory practices, 
capital regulation and bank penalties have significant effects on banks' lending. 
In summary, meso level studies focus on the relationships between competitions, 
collateral laws, and technological developments in banking sector, capital regulations and 
banks' lending behaviour. 
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2.4.3 	 Macro Level 
Macro level studies are the broadest of all as it takes into account of all the factors that 
not only affect banking industry as such but the economy as a whole. These studies 
include macroeconomic uncertainties, socio-cultural environment, and so on. For 
instance, Baum et al.(2002) and Ruckes (2004) study of macroeconomic uncertainties 
such as uncertainty in future economic conditions, inflation, and volatility of interest rates 
on banks' lending and found that banks become collectively more conservative in lending 
when there are a lot of pressures of macroeconomic uncertainties using bank level data 
from US. Similar results are found in Italian (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2003) and 
Chilean banks (Micco and Panizz, 2006). On the other hand, Maznevski et al.(2001a) 
have taken a different perspective by studying banks' lending behaviour from social­
cultural environmental perspective. They have used comparative data on cultural 
orientations from Canada, Mexico, Netherlands, Taiwan and USA integrating behavioural 
finance approach to understand how the differences in social cultural environment can 
have an effect on banks' lending practices. Their results indicate that loans are best rated 
when hierarchical information about the borrowers is given and worst when collective 
information is given. 
2.5 	 Rationale for the Study of Interplays between Banks and 
Institutions Using Sociological Approach 
Table 2-1 provides the summary of banking literature. It is divided into influencing 
factors, the underlying assumptions under which the studies are conducted; data sample, 
the context or the research subjects; type of study, methodologies adopted; sources of 
pressures, the task and institutional levels that the studies focus on and the results. From 
the table, it can be concluded that all of these papers study banks' lending by either 
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isolating analytical domains or considering decision making as being rational or at least 
within bounded rational by using quantitative methodologies. In other words, many of the 
research papers in this area usually isolate the factors by studying only one directional 
approach rather than the interconnectedness and reflective actions on influences. In 
addition, none of these studies undertake research on how banks respond to institutional 
environment and how they interact with each other in order to attain efficiency while 
achieving legitimacy. Different levels of studies provide different factors affecting banks' 
lending behaviour. In reality, not only banks' lending but also their other activities 
operate by interacting with the elements from both task and institutional environments. 
Moreover, it is unrealistic to study risk perceptions only at an individual level and also, it 
is inappropriate to assume that individuals are rationa1. The studies with rationality 
assumption are weak in the sense it will not give complete picture of the phenomenon in 
how banks' lending practices are shaped if the events or state of affairs that materialises 
them are excluded (Elster, 1990). In order to choose one of the risks in decision making 
studies for this research, there is the need to understand the type of environments that 
banks operate in. In a country, banking sector receives more policy attention than any 
other sectors. This is because they playa dominant role in the financial system by 
leveraging their balance sheet structure to allocate financial resources for businesses. This 
high leverage implies substantial degree of exposure of capital to liquidity, credit and 
other risks, which can lead to possible bank runs and failures. If these happen, there can 
be disruptive consequences for the economy. As a result, quantitative (capital adequacy 
requirements for risk diversification) and qualitative (protection rules for stakeholders) 
prudential regulations are imposed on banks (Rocha et a1., 1999), therefore, banks 
become highly institutionalised (Soon and Cummings, 1997). In any organisations, in this 
case, banks operating in the industry mean they have claimed memberships to related 
institutions in this industry. Banks as members need to follow rules and norms in the 
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environment along with the industry to become legitimate for their existence and survival. 
Thus, the type of study which integrates 'sociological theories and policy analysis' is 
more suitable for this research. To this date, sociological theories have yet to be widely 
applied in banking research, except for Lane and Quack (2002) and Riaz (2009). The 
former studies banks' lending behaviour in the UK and Germany while the latter applied 
sociological approach to study the global financial crisis. As the research using 
sociological approach is limited, there is no prior framework or model to be followed. 
Therefore, the following chapter will provide the process by which sociological theories 
or approaches can be applied in banking studies. 
Table 2-1: A Summary of Research Papers and their Methods and Aims of Studies 
No. I Authors I Influencing Factors IData Sample Type of Study 	 Sources of I Results 
Pressure 
I Baum et IMacroeconomic IBank level data from US Portfolio Macroeconomic Pressures of macroeconomic 
a1.(2002) Uncertainty and samples of 84 banks' Optimization Pressures uncertainty cause banks to become 
disaggregated loan Model collectively more conservative in 
(uncertainty in future categories and up to 199 	 lending reducing loan-to-asset ratio 
economic conditions, banks' total loans over the 
inflation, volatility of 1981-2000 period 
interest rates) 
2 I Berger et IBank size, distressed Data of 61,295 fimls' Regression Organisational Large banks, foreign owned banks 
a1.(2001) banks, foreign 195,695 total loans from Analysis Level and distressed banks are less likely 
ownership 115 different banks as of to lend to small businesses. 
the end of 1998 in 
(SME Lending) I Argentina. 
3 	 Degryse and ICustomer relationship Data set of 17,776 loans Regression Customers, The longer the customer has 
Van Cayseele with banks given to SMEs given by a Analysis Collaterals relationship with the bank, the 
(2000) Belgian bank lower the interest rates are. 
The length of relationship 
decreases the probability of 
pledging collaterals. 
4 DeYoung 
a1.(1999) 
et I Age, number of 
branches, size of the 
bank 
US commercial banks data IRegression 
from the Federal Analysis 
Development Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) for the 
period of 1993 to 1996 
Organisational 
Level 
There is negative relationship 
between age and small business 
lending. 
Higher concentration of banks' 
branches in urban market has 
positive effect on small business 
lending. 
The size of the bank has a negative 
influence on small business 
lending. 
5 Ely 
Robinson 
(2001) 
and Technological change IUS banking data from 1994 
in Credit Scoring to 1999 
Models in Banking 
Industry 
Statistical 
Analysis 
Technological Average loan size to small 
business lending has declined but 
large banks' share of small 
business lending has increased. 
6 Gambacorta 
and Mistrulli 
(2003) 
(SME Lending) 
Capitalisation, 
monetary 
shocks and 
Data-set of Italian banks IEconometric 
policy lover the period of 1992­ Model 
GDP 2001 
shocks 
Macroeconomic 
shocks induce 
supervisors 
(Central Bank) to 
increase 
(also pointed out that this can be 
because of other regulatory and 
market forces) 
Well-capitalised banks are more 
risk-averse and preserve long-term 
relationships if their borrowers are 
in financial difficulties 
minimum capital 
requirements 
7 Haselmann Collateral Laws, 423 banks' level data from IStatistical Legal Good legal environment is 
and Wachtel Creditor protection 20 transition countries in Analysis Environmental associated with banks acceptance 
(2006) rights Europe of different types of assets as 
collateral and the more willing a 
(SME Lending) bank to lending to information 
opaque borrowers 
8 I Hauswald and ICompetition IEconometric IIndustrial Peers ICompetition decreases interest 
Marquez Model rates 
(2006) 
. It reduces the incentives for banks 
to acquire information, thereby, 
affecting the pricing and loan 
allocation 
9 I Hempell and Access to market 1 118 barUcs in 16 European I Regression IMarket Increase in price of loans and 
S0rensen funding and ability to countries based analysis decrease in loan supply 
(2010) transfer risks 
10 I Khoury (2009) Basel Accord Theoretical Paper Professionals 	 Basel Accord encourages banks' 
risk taking 
11 I Machauer and IInternal Credit ratings IData from five major 
Weber (1998) German banks 
(SME Lending) 
12 I Maznevski et Soc ial-cultural Comparative data on 
al.(2001b) cultural orientations from 
Canada, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Taiwan, USA 
and US Southeast lenders 
13 I Micco and Bank ownership and Bank level balance sheet 
Panizza macroeconomic data 
(2006) shocks 
14 I Panagopoulos Customer Data-set from Greek 
and Spiliotis Relationship Banks, ranging from the 
(1998) actual nominal stock of 
banking lending to 
collateral maturities and the 
repayment period 
Regression 
Analysis 
Statistical 
analysis using 
cultural 
orientation 
scales 
Study from 
behavioural 
finance 
approach 
Regression 
Analysis 
Cointegration 
Approach 
I Customer 
Social-cultural 
Environment 
I Government 
Organisational 
level, Customers 
Loan interest premiums are related 
to borrower credit ratings and 
show no relation with collaterals 
It finds that when the financial 
infonnation, relationship 
information of the borrower affects 
the lender's assessment. 
The loan is rated best when 
hierarchical information about the 
borrower is given and worst when 
collective information is given. 
State-owned banks' lending are 
less responsive to macroeconomic 
shocks than domestically and 
foreign owned banks 
Current loans are detennined by 
previous loans 
Strict controls in upper and lower 
limits of interest rates and reserve 
requirement ratio have no 
statistical importance to lending 
15 I Petersen and ICompetition in credit 
Rajan (1995) market 
(SME Lending) 
Data from the National IEconometric 
Small Business Survey of Model 
Small Business Finance in 
1998 to 1989 in the US 
Industrial 
Customers 
Peers, ICompetition in the market causes 
banks to have long-term 
relationship with banks, decreasing 
cost of borrowing over time 
Competition also increases lending 
to small firms 
16 I Ruckes (2004) IEconomic 
competition 
banks 
outlook, 
among 
Econometric 
Model 
Economy, 
Industry Peers 
Good economic outlook increases 
the banks' competition in loan 
pricing as default probabilities of 
borrowers decline 
(points out that lower credit 
standards in good times is not the 
bankers' carelessness but they are 
rational decisions that serve to 
maximise profits) 
17 Salas and IDeregulation 
Saurina (2003) 
Spanish banks Econometric 
Model 
Regulation Deregulation increases banks risk 
taking behaviour 
V',J"..i':j~:~;;;~j,;; -~wi)a!1lUfYi J-.­
LIterature KeVIew 
18 I Sapienza Government Bank level data set from 90 IRegression 
(2004) Ownership 	 Italian banks and loan data Analysis 
of 50,000 Italian 
companies 
19 I Seabright et I Risk taking and !Data from transition IEconometric 
a1.(2002) shareholder wealth countries from 1994-1999, Model 
maximisation, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
banking reform Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Macedonia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, 
Ukraine 
20 I Zhong 	 and IBank size, lending Panel data constructed Regression 
Ying (2009) 	 authority, incentives from the Ecological Analysis 
of loan officers, bank Enviromnent Survey ill 
competition, 
Organisational 
Level, 
Government 
Shareho lders, 
regulatory 
Organisati onal 
Arrangements 
and Competition 
Interest rates charged by state­
owned banks are lower than 
private banks. 
(raises questions for the motives) 
Banks take risks to maXImIse 
shareholders' wealth 
Average return on equity is lower 
for low substantial and banking 
reform, but those who bear the 
costs are depositors. 
If an institution has more self-loan 
approval right, greater competition 
and if the wage is linked to loan 
quality, lending to SMEs is higher. 
LUCli:lLWC J:'\..CVt<;;W 
institutionaI China Small banks tend to lend more to 
arrangement SMEs as they have more 
competitive advantage in 
(SME Lending) collecting soft information. 
If the local banks greater pressure 
in making profit through 
increasing the weight of profit in 
performance evaluation, the bank 
tends to collect soft information to 
find high-quality customers. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
In summary, the literature studying banks' lending behaviour used statistical probability 
models based on bank level data which are only realised in the future and has ignored the 
fact that these future results are formed by the banks' perceptions and risk attitudes 
towards businesses during their lending decisions. In other words, these financial studies 
focus on market-based judgements of financial risks and the ex-post calibration of 
different factors and bank lending. In contrast, bank lending decisions are strategic 
decision processes (ex-ante) and made depending on their perceptions of borrower's 
credibility and repayment ability. 
Secondly, these studies are limited in the sense that they only identified the significances 
of the relationships between different factors and banks' lending, and failed to explore 
other factors constraining banks from externalising and intemalising risks. By identifying 
the significances of the relationships, these studies isolate the factors in macro, meso and 
micro analyses and fail in one important respect, that is, how these factors influence one 
another, in other words, they fail to provide theoretical links in which these factors 
interact. More importantly, these analyses are based on the countries where transparency 
exists and large amount of data can be gathered through different sources. In Myanmar, 
banks are not as transparent as other countries and banks' data are considered to be highly 
confidential. Only publicly traded banks are required to publish annual reports and there 
only couple of shareholder owned bank while most of them are family or privately-owned. 
Thus, using quantitative research is not feasible to generate required information. 
I 
I 
" 
I 
I 
Thirdly, most of these studies have 'rationality' assumptions in studying decision making 
approach. This causes limitations as it usually simplifies complexities of relationships 
between political and social relationships. Individual level decision making is very 
complex, hence, require an expanded set of concepts about how different institutional 
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arrangements affect and are affected by individual decision making (Cook et aI., 1990). 
Rationality is more concerned with micro level than macro level studies. In Myanmar, 
state control is prevalent and cannot be ignored. In other words, the influence of external 
environments on Myanmar's banking activities must be recognised. This fact has been 
supported by Turnell (2003). Until now, research on Myanmar's banking system is very 
rare. 
MiIIer (1990, p. 343) also makes distinctions between economics and sociology by 
stating that 
"Economics is about how individuals make choices, and sociology is about 

how individuals have no choices to make. The gap between economics and 

sociology has certainly shrunk dramatically as economists have learned to 

accept the possibility that individual choices in coordination games are 

rationally constrained by social conventions and nOTIns. However, 

individuals in social settings constrained by social norms still have important 

choices to make" 

He suggests that there is still a gap in studying banks' lending behaviour in two main 
streams, economic and sociology. Much of the research in banking is dominated by 
.. :i
economists who integrate their rationality models into them. Despite sociological 
approach being recognised to improve banking studies, none of the sociologists have 
taken the steps to integrate their disciplinary assumptions and theories into this area. It is 
needed as banks are similar to individuals living in a community or a society, where they 
have to adapt to the environments that they live in and follow the requirements that their 
societies expected them to. These gaps in literature give a scope for interdisciplinary 
approach to study banks' lending practices. The literature discussed in this section will 
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assist the researcher in building the theoretical framework for forming interview questions 
as well as analysing the data. 
In summary, the need for studying banks' lending behaviour from sociological perspective 
has been justified. Yet, no suitable theory lias been chosen to incorporate in this study. 
There are many related theories available to employ as a theoretical basis for banks' 
lending with respect to their operational environment being uncertain and risky 
environments. The choice of theory or theories will be further discussed in the following 
chapter. 
.. 
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Chapter Three: Development of Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has provided rationale for the use of sociological approach to study 
banks' lending practices. The literature reveals that no sociological approach has been 
found to use any sociological theories to study this area. In order to achieve the first 
objective of this study, a theoretical framework is required to help understand what 
factors influence the decisions to conform, or not to conform institutional pressures in 
structuring their lending practices. 
The chapter provides the justification on the adoption for institutional theory and the 
reasons for banks to respond to different environmental concerns are given along with 
their limitations and suitability with the aims and objectives of the research. Later in this 
chapter, a theoretical framework is developed to study how banks are institutionalised and 
how strategic responses to these institutional pressures are made and what trigger them 
for differing strategic responses. It incorporates institutional theory and Oliver's strategic 
responses in relation to task environment. 
3.2 New Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory has a long and rich history in a range of literatures predominantly 
within sociology and political science. As discussed in the previous chapters, banking 
studies have been studied from macro level and micro level approaches. They neglect the 
social and organisational interactions and their role in field formation and evolution. The 
:'1Hi 
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new institutional theory, on the other hand, is able to tackle each of these issues. 
However, recently, many researchers have incorporated different theoretical perspectives 
to study interplay between organisations and its institutions. Therefore, I start by 
discussing its definition of 'institutions'. 
3.2.1 'Institntions' Defined 
Institutions have been variously defined. Scott (2001) brings all these definitions together 
for what he calls the'omnibus conception of institutions'. Institutions are social structures 
that have attained a high degree of resilience, or change agents and champions (Creed et 
aI, 2002). They have the ability to critically evaluate and motivate cooperation of other 
actors within banks around particular goals. These individuals use their networks and 
credibility within organisation to push for changes around relevant institutions and also 
have the ability to strongly influence the culture and cultural changes within the 
organisation (Sachs et aI, 2005). 
Figure 3-1: Examples of Institutions in Banking Industry 
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Therefore, social structures or institutions are 'dual' in that they are both the 'medium and 
the outcome of the practices that they recursively organise' (Giddens, 1984). As each of 
the actors within the institutional framework responds to and engages in the creation, 
maintenance and change/decline of this framework or its SUbparts. As presented in 
Figure 3-1, banks are agents whose actions can be motivated or changed in regard to the 
institutions' goals. For instance, the central bank would provide guidelines for banks to 
follow to attain the goal of financial stability. Their roles in constraining and enabling 
actors, in this context, banks to certain behaviour are further elaborated in the following 
sections. 
3.2.2 Assumptions of New Institutional Theory 
New institutional theory that will be described here is different from 'old institutional 
theory' which has different views on institutions. It concerns more on description rather 
than explanation or theory building. In both of these theories, irrespective of whether they 
are old or new, the main idea is 'legitimacy'. New institutional theory is less concerned 
with conflict and vested interests. Instead of focusing on the irrationality of the informal 
structure, it uncover irrationality in the formal structure itself (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). 
Legitimacy is the central thrust of institutional theory in organisational analysis. In this 
study, it is investigated in terms of social acceptance, peer acknowledgement and positive 
evaluations from the banks' institutional or external environment. On the other hand, 
efficiency is often hypothesised as the result of resisting to institutional pressures for 
increasing financial performance. This proposition is drawn from contingency theory 
which states that organisations will choose the most appropriate strategy given the 
situation in hand. The need to recognise efficiency or divergence perspective comes from 
the events caused by the banks' non-adherence to the institutional requirements in the 
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institutional environments to their organisational structures and actions (Goodstein, 1994, 
Burns and Wholey, 1993, Fligstein, 1985, Han, 1994, Haunschild, 1993). 
In other words, institutional theorists or researchers who incorporate institutional theory 
in research recognise the narrow presumptions of economic rationality in explaining and 
comprehending individual and organisational behaviour. According to Scott (2009), these 
types of studies focus on phenomenon with some level of resilience. The mechanism in 
which organisations adopt systems and procedures is termed as institutional isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Though there are two types of isomorphism: competitive 
and institutional, the former assumes a system of rationality that emphasises market 
competition, niche change and performance measures. The latter is particularly of interest 
as it focuses on institutional pressures on organisations. Three types of institutional 
isomorphism are distinguished: regulative, normative and cognitive. The mechanisms by 
which these isomorphisms are encouraged upon organisations are through coercive, 
normative and mimetic respectively. 
Table 3-1: Three Pillars oflnstitutions (Scott (2009) 
Varying Emphasis: Three Pillars oflnstitutions 
Regulative Normative Mimetic 
Basis of Expedience Social Obligation Taken for granted 
Compliance 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules, Laws, Certification, Prevalence, 
Sanctions Accredition Isomorphism 
Basis of Legally sanctioned Morally Governed Culturally 
supported,Legitimacy 
conceptually 
correct 
Development of Theoretical Framework 
Table 3-1 presented above is developed by Scott (2009), and explained the elements of 
three pillars supporting institutions. It suggests that institutions provide not only 
normative and contextual constraints which alter individual and organisation perceptions 
but also contribute cultural tenns and cognitive elements. In these three pillars, the factors 
that have been mentioned to influence the decision making process can be grouped 
accordingly. By following this framework, it will allow us to understand how regulative, 
normative and cognitive processes lead to more standardised and rationalised practices 
across banks in different countries. In addition, the researcher will also be able to study 
how coercive, nonnative and mimetic pressures shape an individual's decision making 
process under ambiguities of loan applicants. 
These institutional pressures have the sources by which they are exerted on organisations. 
One cannot analyse institutional pressures without acknowledging their sources. The 
following diagram shows the relationship between sources of institutional pressures and 
their outcome. It is legitimacy, which is needed for the organisations' survival. The 
sources respective to each institutional pressure is explained in detail in the following 
sections. 
I~=~~:~ 1-~!,-__c_o_nf_o_rm_ity_----'~ L"mm'q I 
Figure 3-3: Relationships between Sources and Institutional Pressures according to 
Institutional Theory 
In summary, it provides a very useful perspective on how banks' lending practices are 
shaped by institutional environment to achieve legitimacy, not only because they are 
good, rational and profitable. The notion of 'legitimacy' is particularly relevant to study 
banks as they are considered to be operating in a highly regulated and institutionalised 
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environment, especially in a country where hierarchical culture is embedded in all the 
activities ranging from management in public to private organisations. 
Similar to other theories, it has some limitations. For instance, it does not explain the 
changes in which the institutional pressures occur and does not account for resistance to 
institutional pressures. In other words, there is no recognition for the role of agency or 
organisations within the argumentations and assumptions of institutional theory 
(Lounsbury, 2008). This is not totally true as the cognitive pillar of institutional theory 
does recognise certain aspect of agency, i.e. mimicking the practices of other 
organisations. It would be much clearer to describe agency as the 'conducts of self-
interest'. In such a way, institutional theory can be associated with social constructionism 
which views organisations conform to institutional requirements and not as diffusers. 
However, organisations are also actors who are also active interpreters, 'formulating, 
conforming to, disobeying, and modifying' (Scott, 1994, p. 20). 
One of the advantages of using institutional theory is that in order to complement these 
weaknesses, another theory from the same discipline can be used. It is developed by 
" ii 
1 
Oliver (1991), providing divergent perspectives of institutional theory. It should be noted 
that this research does not disrespect convergent perspective but used as a complement to 
provide a complete picture. 
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Figure 3-4: Diagram of Oliver's (1991) Divergent Perspectives to Institutional 
Theory 
Until now, institutional theory itself has been concerned with how institutions determine 
and homogenise organisational actions through taken for granted rules and norms for 
gaining legitimacy which is a requirement for achieving support needed for their 
survivals. Indeed, through conformity, banks can achieve legitimacy which leads to 
efficiency, however, banks as profit-oriented organisations; efficiency includes not only 
legitimacy but also profitability. This does not indicate that conformity does not affect 
profitability but non-conformity enhances it. Profitability itself is legitimacy, i.e. to be 
achieved for those from task environmene. A full range of institutional strategies are 
given by Oliver (1991). They are acquiescence (conformity), compromise, avoidance, 
defiance and manipulation. In banking literature, institutional theory has not been used to 
study banks' lending behaviour because these studies isolate the factors affecting the 
3 The differences between task and institutional environment is elaborated in the next section. 
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phenomenon and ignore the interactions in arriving judgements in decision makings. As 
this is a sociological theory, the sources of these pressures will be different depending on 
the context being studied. The elements of the pressures will be discussed in details with 
respect to banking industry in the following section. However, the differences between 
institutional and task environments will be explained first to provide the reader to 
understand the role of different factors in banks' institutional and task environments in 
the thesis. 
3.2.3 Differences between Institutional and Task Environment 
For a theoretical framework development, it is needed to differentiate between 
institutional and task environment factors contributing to banks' lending strategies. 
According to Carroll and Huo (1986), institutional environment is used to describe the 
external factors that indirectly affect an organisation through societal nOTInS, resources, 
and constraints whereas task environment is referred to as the areas where negotiation for 
exchange of inputs for outputs take place. The former includes the variables such as 
corporate culture, market structure of the economy, and the political and legal systems. 
Competition and Institutional Regulatory Task Environment Environment Controls 
Figure 3-5: Overlap between Institutional and Task Environments (Developed by 
Author) 
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According to Dill (1958), task environment consists of all the elements that are relevant 
for an organisation's goal setting and goal attainment. Scott (2009) states that task 
environment can be reduced to four major group of actors, customers of the 
organisation's output; suppliers of the organisation's output; competitors of the 
organisation; and regulatory groups. Thus, some of the factors can overlap between the 
task environment and institutional environment, for instance, competition and regulatory 
factors. This is because organisations and institutions exist interdependently. Many 
authors have differentiated the factors included in these two groups in different ways. For 
instance, Scott (1983) classifies task environmental variables through exchange oriented 
model where those external factors which have interdependencies with organisations. 
Therefore, in this case, distinction will be based on the primary theoretical settings, i.e. 
they will be categorised depending on the institutional theorist assumptions for those 
overlapping factors, competitions and regulatory controls. From an institutional theorist 
point of view, these factors are classified into how they can influence organisational 
outcomes. The institutional environment exerts institutional forces for organisations to 
conform to achieve legitimacy by creating homogenised practices. On the other hand, 
task environment are viewed by organisations to be distinctive from their competitors to 
achieve efficiency by increasing profitability or gaining resources. Similarly, such 
classifications are done on regulatory controls. In this case, according to banking 
literature, regulatory controls for banking industry are not dependent upon the task 
environment factors and do not work as part of efficiency criteria but as legitimacy. The 
following Table 3-2 summarise the given arguments. 
72 Development of Theoretical Framework 
Table 3-2: Classification of Overlapping Factors to Respective Environments 
Institutional
Factors/Environment Task Environment Environment 
Affecting Organisation's View of Competitor as Mimicking for legitimacy 
Profitability 
Common Law 
Regulatory Control Banks' Regulatory Controls Enforcement on the 
Lending to Specific Customers Industry 
The task environment is also important in this research because it provides 'technical 
controls' for banks to respond differently to institutional pressures. Applying institutional 
theory would highlight institutional complexities that banks face. In addition, it would 
also provide opportunities for developing the theory further as legitimacy is a requirement 
for any organisation especially banks, where they are highly institutionalised in every 
country (Scott, 2009). At the same time, they would try to achieve maximum competitive 
advantage by utilising organisational capabilities (Kostova and Roth, 2002) since 
efficiency is also required for survival of the organisations. However, when responding to 
these institutional pressures through either of the above strategic responses, banks would 
respond differently depending on different factors which are labelled as 'contingent 
factors' in this thesis instead of 'technical controls'. Unlike the studies which integrate 
institutional theory to study environmental pressures where the role of agency has been 
ignored and conformity of organisations to these pressures are presumed, this research 
has taken steps forward by not only recognising banks responses but also by studying the 
factors that stimulate them to undertake such responses and to understand differing 
responses to these pressures by banks. 
In summary, factors for task environments are usually conceptualised from the 
perspective of an organisation. From the banks' lending behaviour literature, four factors 
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are identified: (1) customers; (2) shareholders; (3) depositors; and (4) competitors. 
Customers or loan applicants are one of the most important factors affecting banks' 
lending decisions. A borrower's serviceability is usually determined by 5 Cs namely, 
Character, Cash Flow, Collateral, Conditions and Capital. In addition, the industry Sector 
(criteria of assessment under condition) where borrowers engage in doing business can 
also affect the lending practices. Banks will have different risk appetites for different 
industry sectors that the borrower is involved in (Andrews and Thompson, 2008). 
Vulnerability and the risk of the industry also affect banks' lending decisions as assessing 
borrower's strategic position includes conducting an overview of the business and risk 
analysis across three dimensions namely lending to a particular industry, the borrower's 
strategic direction in relation to its competition and how the borrower conducts its day to 
day business (George, 1991). These depends on the banks' internal guidelines for I~ 
allocation of credit with respect to their acceptable level of risks which can be derived ii 
'Ii 
from profitability, market potential, elasticity of demand, economic cycles and adverse 
commodity price movements of the products in that industry. Thus, it is expected that 
though banks are institutionalised, depending on their internal policies, banks will 
respond differently. Relationship between customer and banks can induce banks to 
change their risk perceptions. Researchers have studied the effects of bank-borrower 
relationship on banks' lending behaviour (Berger and Udell, 2002, Berger and Udell, 
1995, Petersen and Rajan, 1995). The underlying concept of relationship lending is that 
banks acquire information about the borrower's credibility over time through contact with 
the firm, therefore, would have leniency in requirements by the banks on these firms. As 
a result of long-term customer relationship with banks, these firms would receive lower 
collateral requirements. 
Depositors and shareholders or senior management are crucial in banking as they are the 
suppliers of money creating amounts available for banks to lend. Competitors also have 
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effects in banks' decision making as increased competition can be associated with 
providing loans to customers as not doing so would cause banks to lose customers, 
thereby affecting profitability (Olivero et al., 2009). The following section will provide 
detailed explanations for choosing different sources of institutional pressures and their 
importance for the study. 
3.2.4 Institutional Pressures 
It has been identified that there are three types of institutional pressures namely coercive, 
mimetic and normative which cause organisations to become homogeneous, limiting their 
opportunities and actions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). These concepts are described 
more extensively in the text below. 
.:in 
3.2.4.1 Coercive Pressures 
Coercive pressure refers to the pressure that is exerted on organisations by others to 
conform to the rules and practices that are considered important within an industry 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). These forces come from external entities external to a 
population of firms and they can be in the form of persuasion, force or collusion 
(Hoffman and Ventresca, 2002). Dacin (1997) identified government regulation, public 
opinion, or lawsuits as coercive pressures. 
According to Scott (2001) it can take two forms: formal and informal. The formal rules 
include written down rules and regulations while informal rules are code of conducts for 
institutions operating in that industry. These coercive pressures control the institutions by 
rewarding and punishing the actors. Thus, they are important in such a way that they 
confer legitimacy allowing them to exist and operate. In relation to banks' lending, prior 
research highlights the coercive influence exerted on banks are through the central bank's 
regulatory control, financial regulations, and socioeconomic-political situations. 
-
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Sources: Social-political Institutions 
Hoque et al. (1994) identify a number of overall socioeconomic factors such as 
uncertainty, resource scarcity, political instability, and the tendency towards 
organisational disorder. In most of the research using institutional theory, socioeconomic­
political institutions' pressures are not considered to be a part of coercive pressure by 
assuming uncertainty in terms of the technical environment such as economic input, 
market functions, and technological factors (Alam, 1997). These results are gathered 
through studying state-owned enterprises in developing countries. 
However, it cannot be ignored that other organisations are also operating in the same 
institutional and technical environments; therefore, commercial banks are also exposed to 
these socioeconomic and political institutional pressures to certain extent. Especially in 
developing countries, in spite of striving for rapid social-economic development over past 
decades, the performances of these operations fall short of expectations. In theory, 
organisations in every country are managed rationally and centrally through national 
economic plans. In reality, these institutions do not operate as they should, partly due to 
the systems of accountability and controls are complicated by the turbulent and changing 
political, economic and social environment and external events that overwhelm them 
(Hoque et al., 1994). 
Sources: Central Bank and Financial Regulatory Bodies 
In most of the countries, banks are required to operate under the Central Bank's 
regulations and guidelines. In these types of institutional structure, the central bank is not 
only responsible for setting monetary policy but also banking supervision. However, in 
some countries, banking supervision is carried out by a government department, such as 
HM Treasury or an independent government agency FSA in the UK. Therefore, banks 
operating in this type of environment need to follow rules and regulations set by different 
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institutions. These regulatory bodies seek to improve the rules and procedures by aligning 
capital requirements more closely to underlying risks that banks face. The Basel Accord 
is also used by regulators as a guideline but is not strictly followed. For instance, UK and 
Singapore are developed countries employing Basel II, however, Singapore sets capital 
adequacy ratio of 10%4 whereas, Basel II stated that it only needs 8%. Thus, banks must 
follow the capital adequacy of 10% even ifthey think it's high. Not conforming to these 
rules, banks will lose its legitimacy in that environment. In the worst case, it can lead to 
the tennination of organisations. 
In summary, banks are required to shape their risk management practices in accordance 
with regulatory pressures, which affect their lending behaviour. 
3.2.4.2 Normative Pressures 
A normative isomorphism stems from professionalism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). It 
is understood as the collective struggle of members of an occupation, shared educational 
and professional experience and infrastructure that establish norms of behaviour and 
express those norms of the management who make up the institutions. Scott (2001) 
argues that it can be considered as the sharing of norms and values through relational 
channels among members of a network conditional to the organisational behaviour. 
Similarly, Kostova and Roth (2002) refers values, beliefs, nonns and assumptions 
existing in the institutional environment that captures prescriptive, evaluative and 
obligatory dimensions in social life to normative pillar. Normative pressure focuses on 
the moral aspect of legitimacy. It states appropriate means that could be used to reach 
appropriate goals. For a bank, an example of an appropriate goal is shareholder wealth 
maximisation and an appropriate way to generate this is through risk taking as high risks 
are associated with high interest premium. Normative isomorphism stems from the 
4 This data is provided on the website of Monetary Authority of Singapore. 
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willingness of an individual to comply with authority to fit into the organisation, and 
society. The incentive for complying with normative element is prominence. Behaving 
accordingly gives an individual or corporation positive feedbacks and increases it 
prominence. Organisations that are perceived to be working in great consistency with the 
normative pressure may get more recognition for their effort. This could be in terms of 
financial and non-financial forms of rewards. 
On the other hand, Hussain and Gunasekaran (2010) identify "management's 
competence" as a normative pressure in studying the practice of non-fmancial 
management accounting measures in banks and financial institutions. Instead of providing 
the source of the pressure (e.g. values and norms), the authors have justified by stating 
that the management of banks and financial institutions is 'social men' with, probably, 
professional networks they are likely to be influenced by normative behaviours/sources. 
Additionally, they have incorporated "corporate culture" into normative pillar stating that 
human beings are cultural product operating within in its cultural and institutional 
context, therefore, "corporate culture" is considered to be made up of their aims and 
beliefs consistent with external societal or cultural influences. In other words, the authors 
have used micro-level factors as normative influence in contrast to the perspectives taken 
by other institutional theorists. These institutional theorists have taken broader level into 
considerations, ranging from professionals within the industry, best practices, 
conventional wisdoms and the standards set by the networks (Hoffman and Ventresca, 
2002). Similar to coercive pressure, there is no prior research on how these pressures 
have effects on banks' lending behaviour, I take into consideration of different nonnative 
relational channels such as Professionals, Corporate Culture, Guidelines and External 
Verifiers in which banks are required to conform to when lending to businesses as not 
conforming to these will lose its legitimacy. 
I 
i
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Sources: Professional Associations 
Professionalism has been a centre focus of normative isomorphism in many research 
papers integrating institutional theory (Braunscheidel et a!., 2011, Etherington and 
Richardson, 1994). In every industry, there is always a set of guidelines needed to be 
followed by the organisations operating within. For instance, in medicine, there are 
medical guidelines for health care practitioners to follow and in computer programming, 
there are also sets of rules or guidelines used by the programmers in writing the source 
code for a computer program. 
In the UK, professional associations for bankers such as British Bankers' Associations 
exist. By becoming a member of the association, there are a set of rules and guidelines 
that bankers must adhere to do achieve legitimacy. These organisations act as the Ii! 
disseminators of suitable organisational patterns which are then adopted by organisations 
that are under the influence of the professional organisations. This is done through 
trainings, seminars, certifications, etc. The limited professional associations can induce 
greater monopolisation and control of the knowledge base which in turn control bankers' 
practices in the industry. 
Sources: Guidelines 
These rules and guidelines may be issued by governmental or private organisations. 
Similarly, in banking, there are a set of guidelines issued by national and international 
regulators. These guidelines are not enforced; however, they are expected to be followed 
to achieve legitimacy. Unlike any industries, banking is one of the most regulated 
industries in the world. At international level, Basel Accord introduce capital adequacy 
regulations for banks, however, Myanmar does not have any capital market, the 
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guidelines written by the Central Bank do not implement Basel Accord lIs. Thus, banks in 
Myanmar are not required to implement the proposed regulatory guidelines from 
international regulators but instead, have to follow the guidelines set by the national 
regulator. However, the guidelines are not limited to national and international, they can 
also be set by the banks themselves. 
In some countries, for instance, in Africa, there are a set of guidelines issued by the 
Central Bank to the commercial banks stipulating them to minimum and maximum 
percentage of shares of a bank's total assets to be allocated to particular sectors and to 
indigenous businesses and also minimum level to lend to small businesses (Brownbridge 
et aI., 1998). The banks are also required to ensure that their loan portfolios are made up 
of both medium and long-term lending. Therefore, these guidelines channel credit to 
different sectors affecting banks' lending behaviour to different sectors. These types of 
guidelines are also prevalent in European countries, for example, in the UK, there are 
some set of guidelines required the banks to promote SME lending. Nevertheless, these 
guidelines are not effectively implemented as banks' guidelines and credit standards 
change according to the market environment. Thus, not only the regulatory but also the 
bank itself has their own specific guidelines in regards to lending to small businesses 
which again reflects on the specific institutional environment. 
Sources: External Verfiers 
In well-established banking systems, credit rating agencies are the important source of 
determining borrowers' credibility. They assign credit ratings to sovereign and private 
sector borrowers throughout the world (Ferri et aI., 1999). These ratings provide financial 
institutions an estimate of the probabilities that the borrowers will default. In other words, 
5 The researcher has interviewed a manager from the Central Bank ofMyanmar, and the person 
has stated that there is no need for Basel Accord II has the country has no capital market, 
therefore, other additional risks prescribed in Basel Accord II are not applicable. 
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they assess the probability that the borrowers will not fulfil its obligations as specified if 
the contract is given. Almost all the banks in European countries use credit ratings 
provided by these agencies to finalise their lending decisions. They set interest rates 
beside different ranges of credit ratings. If the borrower has lower credit rating, they tend 
to externalise risks by setting higher interest rates and vice versa, creating credit rationing 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). There are different rating agencies operating in the world. 
However, their reliability has been questioned as they have failed to warn the markets 
against the East Asian Crisis in 1997 and 1998 (Ferri et aI., 1999) as well as in 2007 and 
2008 subprime mortgage crisis. Their ratings tend to be pro cyclical and they tend to vary 
with the economic climate. Windhoff-Heritier (2002) states that credit rating agencies 
transform the uncertainties of credit relationships into calculable risks. However, if the 
factors influencing banks' lending practices are to be looked at, credit rating agencies are 
not to be concerned of as there is no culture of credit rating agencies exists in Myanmar 
despite these agencies being used as external verifiers in established financial markets. 
Nevertheless, banks in Myanmar have their own practices of verifying the credibility of 
borrowers since the banks have no privilege to transfer risks to capital markets as well as 
credit rating agencies for acquiring information about the borrowers. Since there are no 
intermediary organisations such as banking groups and central banking organisations as 
in Germany where banks can draw on a large and valuable body of information about the 
businesses, barlks have to search for their own external verifiers. They have to rely on 
professionals such as accountants, private companies and others who can give assurance 
of the creditworthiness of the borrowers. 
Sources: Corporate Culture 
The effects of corporate culture on banks' lending practices cannot be ignored if lending 
practices are to be studied from sociological perspective as individuals are restrained by 
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external environments. Since the effect of culture on banks' lending practices cannot be 
measured directly as "culture" is a broad term including different factors. From these 
statements, it can be induced that one can understand the overall culture from 
organisational level. 
Giddens (1991) states that normative influences are important in homogenisation of 
organisational operations, however, national and corporate cultures play significant role 
in the divergence of organisational practices in micro level. Human beings are viewed as 
cultural products influenced by and functioning in an evolving cultural process (Gruchy, 
", 
1984). Professionals also need to rely on normative andlor mimetic influences to create 
I'
':ii 
cultural forms consistent with their own beliefs and aims (Scott, 2001). Thus, cultural ::1 
::1 
influence, irrespective of the kind and type of organisation, needs to be (Schein, 1985, 
Scott, 2001) incorporated into organisational practices. For the survival within the 
national context, organisations need to cope with the problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration, which would be considered well enough for validity and to be taught 
to members as a correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. 
This is termed as "corporate culture" by Schein (1985). O'Reilly and Chatman (1996) 
defme corporate culture as "a system of shared values and norms that define appropriate 
attitudes and behaviour for organisational members". 
Corporate culture also involves with social expectations and standards as well as the 
values and beliefs that individuals hold central and that bind organisational groups 
(Lawson and Shen, 1998). Hence, it reflects not only how things work around within an 
organisation but also how its attitude and behaviour are the reflections of the national 
culture. In this perspective, corporate culture is influenced by national culture, in tum, 
organisations' practices are produced by corporate culture. In new institutional theory, 
organisational practices are adopted for legitimacy as opposed to efficiency reasons 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Thus, employees must conform to those core values, 
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beliefs, and basic assumptions that management expect them to share for legitimacy 
regardless whether they are positive or negative. Moreover, the importance of studying 
corporate culture increases as there is no vertical disintegration of banking industry in 
Myanmar and also due to the lack of credit risk transfer market, which in turn, creates a 
firm-based governance system instead of market-based governance. 
An organisation's corporate culture cannot be easily determined as it is embedded deeply 
in the organisation and in the behaviour of the people within. Therefore, in order to 
understand its culture, the mechanisms in which banks' lending practices take forms 
should be analysed. However, one has to establish categories that are needed to identify 
themes and patterns around how a corporate culture is constructed. Glaser et al. (1987) 
examine six components of corporate culture such as climate-atmosphere, involvement, 
teamwork, supervision, communication-information flow, and meeting. Melewar (2003) 
suggests that corporate culture is made up of corporate philosophy, values, mission, 
principles, guidelines, history, the founder of the company, the country of origin and sub 
cultures. Some other authors have also stated that an organisation's corporate culture can 
be seen from its mission and vision statements stated in the brochures or web sites (Wit 
and Meyer, 2010, Abratt, 1989). Their studies are grounded in management and 
communication research; hence, these concepts cannot be applied directly to study the 
influence of corporate culture on banks' lending decision making. For instance, the 
reward system, decision approval process and the authority given to loan officers within 
the organisation should be explored. 
In summary, understanding corporate culture goes beyond studying the overall culture 
and entails investigations on the influences on practices and behaviour. 
'III '" 
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3.2.4.3 Mimetic Pressures 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that in an uncertain environment, organisations will 
imitate others in determining appropriate behaviour. They will model themselves on other 
organisations for overcoming uncertainties. In the example of banks, patterning their own 
lending practices or decision making processes on those implemented by those seen in the 
industry leaders are seen as a means for not only reducing uncertainties but also 
increasing legitimacy. In relation to banking, following the banking reform and 
deregulations under environmental uncertainty, it is likely that banks will adapt the 
perceptions of risks towards businesses and imitate risk mitigation strategies implemented 
by reputed banks in the industry. 
3.2.5 Banks' Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures 
To understand risk behaviour, a combined consideration of these factors should be given. 
Therefore, the paper will draw on institutional theory, specifically, DiMaggio and 
Powell's (1983) notion of isomorphism to study banks' lending behaviour in Myanmar. 
Lane and Quack's study of banks' lending behaviour still fails to explain how banks 
respond to these institutional pressures in that social setting. Homogeneity among banks 
has been the focal point of institutional theory. The studies employing institutional theory 
has been focusing only on convergent view. As banking sector is a highly 
institutionalised industry, it is acceptable to assume that banks will conform to 
institutional pressures exerted upon them to attain legitimacy and are allowed low degree 
of autonomy in terms of lending practices. However, it omits the fact that conformity to 
institutionalised rules, policies, programs and functions conflict with efficiency criteria, 
therefore, over emphasising on banks' conformity to institutional pressures would deny 
the role of agency and their strategic responses to institutional pressures. In other words, 
institutional theory does not attempt to explain different responses by individual 
" J'; 
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organisations and the conditions under which they resist institutional pressures. Similarly, 
in business management literature, decision making processes are studied from the 
perspective that institutional environment constrain choices (Clemens and Douglas, 
2005). It is important to study banks as agencies or actors who reposition or refrarne their 
lending practices in the light of different conditions and institutional environment. 
Oliver (1991) identifies five situations in which organisations resist institutional 
demands. They are: 
1. There is no economic or social gain from compliance 
2. The pressure for change is diffuse or external agents do not control resources 
3. The demands are inconsistent with the goals of the actor 
4. The pressures can be legal coercion or voluntary 
5. The environmental uncertainty and interconnectedness is low 
On the basis of these situations, strategic responses to institutional pressure has been 
recognised by Oliver (1991). According to the author, organisations' strategic responses 
to institutional pressures can be divided into Acquiescence, a strategy taken by a finn to 
conform to institutional pressures; Compromise, a strategy where a firm tries to reduce 
the extent to which conformity is necessary; Avoidance, a strategy in which a firm 
attempts to prevent the necessity to conform to institutional pressures; Defiance, a 
strategy in which a firm nonconformity to institutional pressure is openly admitted; and 
Manipulation, a strategy in which a firm actively respond to an institutional pressure 
where change of the institution is the goal. 
-
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Table 3-3: Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures (Oliver, 1991, Etherington 
and Richardson, 1994) 
trateg:aes 
Adiv<e 
Defiant 
Challenge 
Negative Attack Assaulting 1he sources of institutional 
pressures 
A,"oidance Loosening institu:tional attachments 
Changing goals, activities, Of domains 
Passn--e nonns 
Acquiescence 
Imitate M1miclcing institutional models 
Comply Obeying rules and accepti:ng nonns 
Compromise Pacify Placating and accommodating mstitutional 
elements 
Bargain Negotiating wi1h institutional stakeholders 
constttuents 
Manipulation 
Influence 
Control 
Shaping values and criteria 
Dominating institutional constitnents and 
proces.ses 
In addition to these five strategic responses, Etherington and Richardson (1994) have 
ordered these responses again as a continuum based on two dimensions namely 
passive/active responses and positive/negative responses. They state that active response 
results in behaviours that differ from those demanded by the institutional agent while 
passive response reflects the demands as presented. Similarly, a positive response is 
intended to alter the nature of the demands in a manner that is acceptable to the actor and 
the institutional agent while a negative response maintains conflict between the actor and 
the institutional agent. 
d!! 
• 

86
Development of Theoretical Framework 
I decided to use Etherington and Richardson's (1994) continuum as it identifies which 
strategic responses are acceptable and have positive impacts on institutions. For example, 
by identifying 'compromise' as an active/positive strategic response in the data, 
interpretations can be done in such a way that though banks do not accept institutional 
constraints or pressures on them, they do not react in an unacceptable manner by 
institutions. In other words, I can conclude that banks are not taking the risk of losing 
legitimacy by positively reacting to institutional pressures. The summary of divergence 
perspective is given in the above Table 3-3. 
3.2.5.1 Defiance (Active/Negative) 
Defiance is an active and negative form of resistance. According to Oliver (1991), there 
are three types of tactics for defiance. They are dismiss, challenge and attack. Due to the 
nature of the negative response, it creates conflicts between actor and institutional agent. 
There are certain conditions in which these tactics will take place. Dismissal is to totally 
ignore institutional pressures. It is possible if the bank's survival is not at risk for non­
conforming to the risk is low. Another possibility is when the institutional enforcement is 
low. Challenge means active departure from rules, norms, or expectations than dismissal. 
It is more negative response than dismissal. Organisations will challenge institutional 
pressures if they think their structure and behaviour are more efficient than those 
advocated by the environment. Attack is more of an active and negative response than the 
other mentioned before. Organisations choose this response if their perceived likelihood 
of being exposed is low or due to the lack or inadequate knowledge of consequences of 
non-conformity by the management. In summary, a defiant strategy rejects the 
institutional requirements and expectations and more likely to occur when the perceived 
costs of departure are low and divergence of interests between external and organisational 
values are high. 
-
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3.2.5.2 Avoidance (Active/Negative) 
A voidance is an organisation's strategy to attempt to impede the necessity of conformity. 
There are three tactics for avoidance. Firstly, it may avoid institutional pressures by 
exiting the context in which rules and expectations are imposed. Secondly, it may attempt 
to reduce the extent to which it is externally inspected, scrutinised, or evaluated by 
partially detaching its activities. Thirdly, it may conceal the nonconformities behind a 
fayade of acquiescence, in other words, window dressing. Organisations attempt 
avoidance when they are motivated by the desire to evade the conditions that make 
conforming behaviour necessary. 
3.2.5.3 Acquiescence (Passive) 
This is the primary assumption of institutional theory, i.e. convergent perspective. 
According to Oliver (1991), there are three tactics in conforming to institutional 
pressures, habit, imitate and comply. Habit means organisations' unconscious adherence 
to taken for granted rules, value, norms and expectations. Imitation refers to either 
conscious or unconscious emulate the successful organisational models in the industry. 
Compliance refers to the conscious conformity or incorporation of values, norms and 
institutional requirements. Its key antecedents are high authority, high consistency with 
organisational goals, high levels of control and high uncertainty in environment. 
3.2.5.4 Compromise (Active/Positive) 
The conditions under which organisations will attempt to compromise when there are 
inconsistent institutional demands or conflicts of interests between legitimacy and 
efficiency. Similar to other strategies, there are three tactics. Firstly, organisations may 
try to balance by playing institutional sources against each other. It will then balance the 
expectations of multiple constituents. Secondly, organisations may conform partially with 
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the expectations of one or more constituents with the hope to sufficiently pacify any 
threatening actions. Thirdly, organisations attempt to bargain some of the institutional 
elements while negotiating with institutional sources. These tactics are employed with the 
intention of conforming to and accommodating institutional rules, norms or values , 
however, unlike acquiescence, it is more active in promoting self-interests. 
3.2.5.5 Manipulation (ActivelPositive) 
Manipulation is the most active form among the five strategic responses. This is 
attempted by organisations with the intention to influence or control the institutionalised 
norms and values. Influence is used to change the institutionalised criteria of acceptable 
practices. Controlling tactic is used to create power and dominate the external 
constituents. Co-opt refers to the tactic to neutralise institutional opposition and enhance 
legitimacy. In these three tactics, pressures and tactics are not taken for granted to be 
obeyed and defied. In other words, they are actively attempted to be altered, re-created, or 
controlled by the organisations. 
3.3 Developed Theoretical Framework 
The following Figure 3-6 shows preliminary theoretical framework, which is derived 
from using institutional theory and strategic responses to institutional pressures as 
explained in the previous sections. The model goes further by including 'stimuli' to 
uncover the conditions under which banks will respond differently rather than 
acquiescence. Some forms of stimuli are predicted to influence banks' responses to 
institutional pressures. There has been no research in studying the banks' responses to 
institutional pressures depending on different mediating stimuli; banks' risk taking 
behaviour has been associated with many internal organisation factors. As not 
conforming to institutional pressures in regard to lending can also be seen as a risk taking 
behaviour since non-conformity itself is putting banks at risk for losing legitimacy in the 
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industry. Thus, it has been proposed that banks will not conform to all the institutional 
pressures into their lending practices but would respond differently depending on other 
stimuli such as the relationship between customers and banks and the type of businesses 
that borrowers engage in. These factors are derived from banks' lending literature. 
However, the researcher has also kept open for uncovering other factors that might 
contribute to the banks' strategic responses. 
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Figure 3-6: Proposed Theoretical Model for Factors Influencing Banks' Lending 
Practices 
This framework allows the researcher to create interview questions and to determine that 
relevant research questions and areas of concerns for this research. Based on the findings 
generated from this theoretical framework, Myanmar banks' lending practices can be 
categorised as explained in the following section. 
3.4 Banks' Lending Practices 
Though banks consider soft factors such as character and ability of the borrower are 
important in making credit decisions, margin, requested loan amount and repayment 
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abilities weighs higher than the former two factors. Similarly, the researchers also 
distinguish banks' lending behaviour depending on how bankers give importance to hard 
information into different types. Primarily, these differentiations are based on how banks 
use collaterals and interest rates as a basic for determining credibility of the borrowers. 
They are elaborated further in the following sections. 
For instance, Berry et a1.(2004) categorise banks' lending practices into 'Going Concern' 
and 'Gone Concern' approaches. The going concern approach is future oriented with 
emphasis being placed on future cash-generating ability, with the present asset base being 
seen as a touchstone for arriving at a judgement about the future rather than as the basis 
of potential repayment. On the other hand, the gone concern approach places emphasis on 
collateral with the intention of securing the repayment of any borrowing from the sale of 
the assets and through other security taken in the form of fixed and floating charges, 
guarantees and restrictive covenants. Douglas and Wildvasky (1982) identify the former 
as a risk internalisation and the latter as risk externalisation. In other words, how banks 
handle and manage risks is reflected in their lending practices. These lending practices 
were explained in details in Chapter 2. 
From the institutional theoretical perspective, these lending practices are formed by 
institutional pressures rather than by the bankers themselves due to the ontological view 
of risk, i.e. socially constructed. 
3.5 Conclusions 
After discussing the suitability of a sociological approach suitability for this research due 
to the unrealistic assumptions of consistency and to focus on lending practices or risk 
perceptions at the individual level, in this chapter, justifications for the chosen theories 
are provided. Then, theoretical framework has been developed using sociological theories 
such as institutional Theory (Scott, 2001) and Strategic Responses to Institutional 
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Pressures (Oliver, 1991; Etherington and Richardson, 1994) with some modifications 
made by incorporating stimuli to uncover the conditions under which banks employ 
different strategic responses. 
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Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the chosen research methodology in relation to the context, 
literature gaps, research questions, aims and objectives, and theoretical framework. The 
detailed explanations of the latter five elements have been discussed previously, however, 
their influences on choosing the research methodology has not been justified. Therefore, 
this chapter aims to provide to fulfil this purpose as shown in Figure 4-1. 
Research Paradigms 

Critical Realism 
 11 
J IResearch Methodology and Research Methods 

Qualitative Critical Realist Research and Interviewing 

Data Collection 
•Semi-structured In-depth Interviews and documents 
, 
Categorical and Thematic Analysis (Theorise) I
, 

Reliability and Validity I I I I 
:...... --I 
Figure 4-1: Elements of the Research Covered in this Chapter 
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The chapter begins with setting out the methodology and method adopted to fulfil the 
objectives of the research and provide the assumptions behind adopting critical realist 
paradigm and qualitative research methods. The processes of coding and data analyses are 
also given in addition to providing reliability and validity checks along with the ethical 
framework that had been followed for this research. 
4.2 Research Paradigms 
Within the literature reView (see Chapters 2 and 3), research paradigms and 
methodologies were discussed from different perspectives. The actual number of research 
paradigms and tenninologies used for them are hard to be distinguished. For instance, 
Stage and Manning (2003) have stated that there are two main research paradigms namely 
positivism and constructivism. The latter is sometimes tenned as interpretivism by some 
authors (for example, Neuman (2000)). However, in this thesis, the term 'interpretivism' 
will be used instead. Some authors further divide the paradigms into more specific 
categories depending on their assumptions and underlying philosophies. For example, 
Neuman (2000) identifies three approaches namely positivism, interpretivism and critical 
social science, whereas, Guba and Lincoln (2000) have divided into five paradigms, 
positivism, critical theory, participatory, constructivism and postpositivism. The 
discussions over the postpositivism or critical realist paradigm will also be based on their 
classifications of paradigms as they are able to provide more details in relation to 
qualitative research. Through only identifying positivism and interpretivism does not give 
broad assumption and does not provide social reality. It is also appropriate to discuss 
different research paradigms and their epistemological as well as ontological assumptions 
briefly to provide rationale for 'critical realism' being the most suitable research 
paradigm. 
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4.2.1 Positivism 
The ontological assumption of positivism is that the world is made of up discrete and 
observable events (Blaikie, 2009). According to Cohen et al. (2007), positivism should be 
understood in the framework of principles and assumptions and these assumptions are 
determinism, empiricism, parsimony and generality. 'Determinism' means events are not 
independent; therefore, positivists attempt to explore the existence of causal relationships 
for these events. 'Empiricism' suggests that there should be verifiable empirical evidence 
to support the claims, for instance, hypotheses. In this paradigm, hypotheses are first 
developed for empirical testing by the researcher. These hypotheses are established 
between the variables deducted from theory forming relationships using causal laws. 
'Parsimony' means the research is done in the most economic possible way. FinalIy, 
'generalisability' refers that the results from the sample population should be able to 
generalise for the larger population with minimum errors. The researched individuals are 
studied on the basis that the social reality is independent and exists regardless ofwhether 
we are aware of it. The research methodology in this paradigm is primarily quantitative 
where the researchers seek measures and "objective" research (Neuman, 2000). 
Experiments, surveys and statistical methods are used extensively by positivists. 
4.2.2 Critical Theory 
Max Borkheimer was the first to introduce critical theory in social research (Horkheimer, 
1975). Critical theorists view the world as a virtual reality shaped by social, political, 
cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values, crystallised over time (Guba and Lincoln, 
2000). Thus, not only assumptions are subjective in nature but also knowledge is 
grounded in social and historical routines which results in value dependent judgements. 
Guba (1990) states that critical theory is a combination of 'realist' ontology similar to 
positivism and critical realism, and 'subjectivist' epistemology as the values of the 
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researcher mediate the inquiry. Research enquiries based on this paradigm are "long-tenn, 
ethnographic and historical studies of organisational processes and structures" (Perry et 
aI., 1998). "Dialogic Approach" of methodology is used by critical theorists as to 
eliminate false consciousness and to get participants to support a common point of view 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994, Guba, 1990). The goal of critical theory is 'transformation'. 
4.2.3 Participatory Paradigm 
Participatory is a 'new' paradigm developed by Guba and Lincoln (2000). It is based on 
the idea of subjective-objective reality in which participants and the researcher actively 
participates. Heron and Reason (1997) state that the researcher participates in the research 
being studied and express a world in four interdependent ways namely, experiential 
knowing, in which the researcher becomes responsive to the reality through participation 
and empathetic towards the participants; presentational knowing, in which the researcher 
is able to symbolise significance of the responsive reality and the image of its world; 
propositional knowing, in which knowledge gained is expressed in statements and 
theories; and the practical knowing, in which the researcher is able to demonstrate a skill 
or competence through the prior knowings. 'Co-operative' inquiry which is a 
collaborative form of action inquiry of methodology is used. It is two participatory 
principles namely epistemic and political participations. The former means that any 
propositional knowledge results from the research is grounded by the researcher's own 
experiential knowledge. The latter states that the participants have the rights to fully 
participate in the design of the research. In other words, as asserted by Heron and Reason 
(1997), "the research is done by people with each other, not by researchers on other 
people or about them" . 
-
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4.2.4 Interpretivist and Constructivist or Naturalistic 
The term 'interpretivism', 'constructivism' and 'phenomenology' are used 
interchangeably by some authors (Neuman, 2000, Saunders et aI., 2009, Guba and 
Lincoln, 2000, Howe, 2003). On the other hand, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) identify 
constructivism as a part of interpretative paradigms. According to them, there are seven 
interpretive paradigms namely, positivist/postpositivist, constructivist, feminist, ethnic, 
Marxist, cultural studies and queer theory. Their underlying principle is that 'all research 
is interpretive; it is guided by a set of beliefs that guides actions' (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2000). The main difference between constructivism and interpretivism is that the latter is 
usually seen as a paradigm (Stahl, 2008). Constructionists hold the view that reality is 
constructed by the observer. Its underlying assumptions are relativist ontology which 
means there are multiple realities, subjective epistemology where knower and respondent 
cocreate understandings and naturalistic set of methodological procedures (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000). This follows the interpretivist position that 'it is necessary to explore the 
subjective meanings motivating people's actions in order to be able to understand the 
reality working behind them' (Saunders et aI., 2009). Constructivist paradigm is divided 
into two: 'radical' and 'social' constructivism (Howe, 2003, Stahl, 2008). The former 
focuses on the knowledge construction of individuals and the latter on social groups'. 
4.2.5 Critical Realism / Postposititvism 
According to Guba and Lincoln (2000), critical realism is based on the ontological 
assumption that reality can only be imperfectly and probabilistically apprehendable. 
Critical realists view the objects of knowledge as the structures and mechanisms that 
generate phenomena and the knowledge as the product of social activities (Bhaskar, 
2008). In other words, reality is independent from our knowledge and cannot be 
observed. Critical realists differentiate the world into three domains, the 'real', the 
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'actual' and the 'empirical' (Bhaskar, 2008). The 'real' domain consists of the processes 
that generate events or causal structures and powers exist independently but have 
tendencies to produce events under different constellations. The 'actual' refers to the 
occurrence of events whether they are observed or not. Under the 'empirical' domain, 
experiences are obtained through observation. In summary, according to critical realism, 
what we see is not what really has happened. Depending on different circumstances, 
causal structures can be changed. Thus, the goal of realism research is to explore these 
observable and non-observable structures and mechanisms of the events (Tsoukas, 1989). 
The methodology is primarily quantitative as the researcher attempt to discover, identify 
followed by describe and analyse the structures and generate patterns (Perry et aI., 1998). 
Guba and Lincoln (2000) have claimed that methodologies of critical realism are 
associated with modified experimental or manipulative, critical multiplism, falsification 
of hypotheses, and might also include qualitative methods. Due to its underlying 
assumptions, regression analysis is inappropriate as it assumes that the dependent variable 
has zero measurement error. Thus, critical realists also include qualitative methods such 
as interviews and case studies to triangulate several perceptions of realities in order to 
understand a phenomenon. Qualitative methodology has only been seen as a supplement 
for other quantitative methodologies in critical realist research. The relatively small 
popUlation does not allow the researcher to conduct quantitative research which is used 
for the purpose of triangulation. However, this does not mean that qualitative 
methodology being used as the main methodology for data collection. There are other 
triangulation methods which can be done within the qualitative research. For example, 
triangulation of different sources of data can also uncover the 'real' and 'actual' accounts. 
Thus, this paradigm is appropriate within which to conduct research. 
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4.2.6 The Paradigm for this Research 
The definitions of five paradigms have been described in previous sections. However, not 
all of these paradigms were suitable for this research. For instance, positivist paradigm 
was not considered as an appropriate paradigm for three reasons. Firstly, the number of 
banks operating in Myanmar was so limited that it did not facilitate quantitative research 
which required large samples. Secondly, it was due to the epistemological assumptions of 
the paradigm. Positivists limited themselves by looking only at small portion of a reality 
constructing questionnaires which did not allow new questions to emerge during the 
course of collecting data. Moreover, it was not well suited to answer the question 'why' 
or the conditions under which the relationships were significant. Thirdly, the research 
questions were not used to test hypotheses but rather as exploratory purpose. 
The paradigm, critical theory was also irrelevant as the research was neither concerned 
with transforming individuals by eliminating false consciousness nor ethnographic and 
long-tenn study. The underlying theoretical framework was 'institutionalism', which was 
based on 'new institutionalism' and not 'historical institutionalism' which processes and 
patterns constrained the options available in the innovation of institutions across over 
time (Thelen, 1999). If the latter were to use as the basis of the theoretical framework, 
this could account for critical theorists' world view. Similar to the previous two 
paradigms, the researcher was not part of the organisations being researched though 
interview questions were prepared with guidance by an experienced banker who was not 
part of the sample population, this paradigm was not appropriate. In addition the 
researcher was not given an opportunity to engage in the process being studied, which 
was required to fulfil the practical knowing of participatory paradigm. Among the two 
types of constructivist paradigms, radical constructivism was also not suitable for 
conducting the research as it did not seek to understand how the barlks' lending behaviour 
was the constructs of the past experiences of the banks with the banks with the borrowers. 
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Instead, this research was based on an institutional theory which relied on social 
constructivist perspective (Karlsson, 2005) and the researcher was interested in exploring 
the participants' perspectives on a given situation. Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997) stated 
that this perspective put little belief in the agency of individuals and organisations. 
Nevertheless, the researcher had taken into account of banks' role in lending behaviour 
by recognising technical controls exerted from task environment in the theoretical 
framework. Since it was an exploratory research and intended to identify the pressures 
and how these affected the banks' lending practices on a relatively small population, it 
suited to the qualitative methodological focus of the social constructivist paradigm. 
Hence, there were two suitable research paradigms. They were social constructionism and 
critical realism. Social constructionism was more closely interrelated to institutional 
theory while critical realism was a new perspective that was used by institutional theorists 
for conducting research. First of all, one of the reasons was the application of institutional 
theory in this research. Social constructionist perspective had usually been associated 
with institutional theory (Nilsson, 2003). It focused on the social processes through which 
how organisations interacted with macro forms of coercive, normative and mimetic 
pressures with the assumptions that organisations' behaviour and processes were shaped 
by these pressures. In other words, both institutional theory and social constructionism 
assumed that there was only one direction of causal mechanism. However, the society 
itself was not the product of institutions developed with logics independent ofthe choices 
of individuals (Edwards, 2006). Critical realism could fulfil this gap as it aimed to 
discover not only empirical regularities but also irregularities with much emphasis on 
under the conditions in which these would take place. Though critical realism did not lend 
to researcher to focus much on external pressures affecting banks' lending behaviour, by 
integrating critical realism and institutional theory, it would allow the researcher to study 
from both directions as the former also gave attention to the role of agency while the 
--
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latter focused on institutional environment. A brief summary of these explanations were 
visualised as in the following Figure 4-2. 
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Figure 4-2: Perspectives from Two Different Competing Paradigms (Developed by 
Author) 
Secondly, the convergent VIew of institutional theory suggested that organisations 
conformed to pressures exerted from institutional environment to gain legitimacy. It had 
not taken into account of banks not conforming to these pressures for attaining 
profitability and efficiency measures. In other words, divergent view had never been 
associated with institutional theory and neither did social constructionist perspective. 
Legitimacy was important, however, it was context dependent (Edwards, 2006). Acharya 
(1999) had also advocated critical realist perspective over constructivism by stating that 
co-operation with institutions depends on calculations of gain and loss. From this view, 
constructivists did not recognise 'strategic interaction'. Banks in any circumstances 
would have their own ways of attaining efficiency, therefore, by only concerning that 
banks would conforo1 to these pressures just to achieve legitimacy would be misleading. 
By applying institutional theory to study banks' lending behaviour from critical realist 
perspective, the researcher might study from multi-level view of reality by recognising 
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complexities of banks' lending and the inter-play between banks and institutions. In this 
thesis, strategic responses of banks to institutional pressures were studied to provide 
understanding of whether their lending practices were the result of obtaining legitimacy 
or efficiency, in other words, to know if agency existed. 
4.3 Exploratory and Qualitative Research 
After considering critical realism as the most appropriate paradigm for this research, the 
research methodology that would be used to conduct the research needed to be identified. 
Depending on the purpose of the research (Neuman, 2000), there were four different 
types of research. They were exploratory research, conducted into a research problem or 
issue when there were very few or no earlier studies to which we could refer for 
information about the issue or problem; descriptive research, conducted to describe 
phenomena as it exists; analytical and explanatory research, a continuation of descriptive 
research which aimed to describe the characteristics, analysed and explained why or how 
the phenomenon being studied was happening; and predictive research, further than 
explanatory research, where an explanation for what was happening in a particular 
situation. 
The aim of this type of study was to look for patterns, ideas or hypotheses, rather than 
testing or confirming a hypothesis, therefore, an exploratory research design was applied. 
Though Myanmar had been undergoing banking sector transformation, the interplay 
between banks and institutions had not been studied before. In other words, effective 
regulatory policies in relation to Myanmar's financial sector had not been explored. In 
addition, in this type of research, it was expected that additional future research would be 
conducted to provide conclusive proof of the phenomenon. Therefore, in accordance with 
the purpose of this research and its focus was on resolving a problem that had not been 
the subject. It was also undertaken to provide greater understanding of a concept or to 
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clarify issues. It had three pnmary purposes, diagnosing a situation, screening 
alternatives; and discovering new ideas (Zikmund et al., 2009). 
Such types of exploratory research may be more suitable with qualitative research 
because qualitative researchers were more interested in studying people not as objects but 
as creative and compassionate living beings, taken from 'transcendent perspective'. They 
aimed to gain deeper understanding of people's emotional responses with rich and 
detailed descriptions than measurement. Qualitative inquiry was associated with 
answering 'what', 'how' and 'why' questions (Holstein and Gubrium, 2005, McGivern, 
2005). One of the strengths of qualitative approach was being able to reflect on the whole 
research process and on specific steps from the outcome resulting from other steps (Flick, 
2009). In other words, a researcher's interpretation of the data collected was tested by 
further examination and checking as required while examining his role in the construction 
of meaning (Pyett, 2003). In other words, the researcher was more involved in qualitative 
research than in quantitative research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, Neuman, 2000). In both 
of these research methods, although the researcher's individual attributes and 
perspectives, such as theoretical position, interests and political perspective would have 
effects in detennining research questions, the methodological approach, and data analysis 
and interpretations (Finlay, 2002), these remain unstated or hidden in quantitative 
research and acknowledged in qualitative research (Pyett, 2003). Therefore, the 
researcher's skills, insights and capabilities play crucial roles in this approach. 
Another method advocated by critical realists was 'mixed methods' as they believed that 
reality could not be known unless they were gathered using different sources or methods. 
These advocated try to use both methods to complement each weakness through another's 
strengths. Bryman (2012) mentions different purposes of doing mixed methods research. 
The main six rationales are triangulation, for greater validity; offset, to complement each 
method's weakness with another's strengths; completeness, to provide comprehensive 
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account of the area of enquiry; process, to provide both elements of quantitative 
research's account of structures in social life and qualitative research's ability to provide 
sense of process; to answer different research questions as all of them cannot be solved 
using one method; explanation, to explain fmdings generated from one research method 
by another; and unexpected results, surprising outcomes from the research could be 
explained by another research method. According to Bryman (2012), triangulation was 
the main purpose for using mixed methods research. It could differentiate into data, 
observer and methodological triangulation (Robson, 2011). 
Some of the advantages for using mixed methods were it gave more comprehensive 
account of the thing being researched, clearer links between different methods and the 
different kinds of data, and a practical problem driven approach (Denscombe, 2007). 
However, it was also attached with some disadvantages. The combination of these two 
methods required the researcher to collect extensive data collection. As a result, 
significant amount of time was needed to be devoted to analyse both numeric and text­
based data. Therefore, the time, and costs of the research project increased. As it required 
the researcher to be proficient in more than one research method to conduct mixed 
methods, it created the possibility of researcher missing the expertise in both of them 
(Denscombe, 2007). Another limitation was the conflicts in philosophical basis. 
The factors needed to be considered apart from methodological complexities according to 
Mason (2006) were power, status and inequalities within and between teams, and for 
individual researchers and between disciplines and fields of interests; constraints and 
opportunities of research funding; responsibilities to and expectations of funders and 
other stakeholders; access to an ownership of data; opportunities for collaboration, for 
sole working, for authorship; and different purposes and audiences. 
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Though all the above discussed methods could be used in exploratory studies and under 
critical realist paradigm, this research had chosen qualitative research method. First of all, 
statistical models were used to test theories in contrast to qualitative research which tends 
to be inductive. Thus, it was constrained within the framework tested and gives little 
scope for new concepts to be emerged. To gain wider understanding of the relation 
between institutional environments and banks' lending behaviour had recently been 
recognised (Lane and Quack, 2002), thus, in addition to the quantitative, correlation 
approach, qualitative inquiries were needed to explore complex phenomenon (Robling et 
al., 1998). 
Secondly, their research papers were based on economic theories which conceptualised 
decision makings of individuals are rational (at least within the limit of 'bounded 
rationality'). They had ignored to study how banks' lending practices were influenced by 
and how credit risks were managed in their decision making. In addition, most of the 
research in finance had implicitly assume that individual decisions were made without 
interaction and are accomplished without any other individuals' influences (Schindler, 
2007). However, from sociological perspective, "risk" was not something objective that 
could be measured using statistical models, instead, it was a subjective fact created by 
banks themselves within institutional environments, thus, different forms of risk 
assessments exist in different institutional environment (Lane and Quack, 2002). A 
researcher could achieve critical realist requirements through gathering information from 
different sources regardless of whether they are qualitative or quantitative in nature. The 
types of data used in this research would be explained more in details in the following 
section. 
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4.4 Criteria for Research Quality 
The main issue of social research is to evaluate the research process due to two main 
concerns. The first one being whether the findings of the study were valid and reliable 
and the second one was the extent to which the findings were useful to understand similar 
process in other situations and organisations than those previously studied. Qualitative 
research usually confronted the issues of validity and reliability in the findings (Barrett et 
aI., 2002). Unlike quantitative research, qualitative inquiry lacked the certainty of hard 
numbers and values, thus, it had been criticised by many researchers (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Quantitative researchers could address these issues through techniques 
such as random selection of participants and the use of controls. Altheide and Johnson 
(1998) stated that reliability and validity are terms only pertaining to quantitative 
paradigm and could not be extended to qualitative inquiry. On the other hand, some 
suggested means and criteria for determining reliability and validity to ensure rigour in 
qualitative research (Rubin and Rubin, 1995, Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) proposed four alternative constructs namely: credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability. 
Hence, qualitative researchers had incorporated different strategies to attain 
trustworthiness such as peer debriefing, prolonged engagement, audit trails and member 
checks (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). These types of strategies were classified as "post-hoc 
evaluation" by Barrett et al. (2002). They assert that rigour did not depend on special 
procedures external to the research process but were established during the research 
process. They had identified five verification strategies6 to assist the researcher identify 
6 the process of checking, confinning and making sure and being certain or the mechanisms used 
during the process of research to incrementally contribute to ensuring validity, and thus, rigor of 
study BARRETT, M., MAYAN, M., MORSE, J. M., OLSON, K. & SPIERS, J. 2002. Verification 
Strategies for Establishing Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research. International Journal 
ofQualitative Methods, 1,1-19. 
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when to continue, stop or modify the research process in order to achieve reliability and 
validity. 
• 	 Methodological Coherence - the existence of congruence between the research 
question and the components of the method. Thus, the researcher must ensure 
that the method chosen should not only match the question but also the data and 
analytic procedures. For instance, this research was aimed at exploring banks' 
responses to institutional pressures. This could not be identified through assessing 
quantitative data; therefore, qualitative research methodology was applied. 
• 	 Appropriate Sample - selecting the participants who best represented or had 
knowledge of the research topic. For instance, lending decisions were made by 
senior management levels in Myanmar. Therefore, interviewing loan officers as 
suggested in literature was not suitable. Hence, senior managers were chosen as 
the appropriate sample for this study. 
• 	 Collecting and Analysing Data Concurrently - it forms a mutual interaction 
between what was known and what one needed to know. Data were 
systematically checked, the scope of research was maintained, at the same time, 
the fit of data and the conceptual work of analysis and interpretation were 
monitored and confirmed. Thus, the researcher needed to go back and forth 
between design and implementation to ensure that there was congruence m 
question formulation, literature, recruitment, data collection strategies and 
analysis. For example, during the interview, I tried to make sure that necessary 
information was obtained for answering research questions. If not, questions were 
rephrased until, the required information was gathered. 
• 	 Thinking Theoretically - ideas emerging from data were confirmed in new data. 
For example, this research primarily utilised institutional theory, however, after 
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the 	 first stage of interviews, another theory which was Oliver's strategic 
responses to institutional pressures was integrated in the theoretical framework to 
provide comprehensive data analysis. 
• 	 Theory Development - to move with deliberation between a micro perspective of 
data and macro-conceptuaVtheoretical understanding. For instance, though this 
research had a theoretical framework, data analysis was not confined within it. 
New themes were also allowed to emerge for theory development. 
Healy and Perry (2000) stated that the quality of a research was to be judged within its 
own terms according to which paradigm it belonged to as each paradigm due to its own 
ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. As the measurement of 
I ~ quality was concerned, it could not be independent of positivistic criteria and some of these could overlap with qualitative criteria as the former was developed much earlier. 
For example, the concept of dependability is closely corresponded to the notion of 
'reliability' in quantitative research (Golafshani, 2003). Detailed descriptions of 
maintaining quality in the study will be given in the following sections. 
4.4.1 Reliability 
Dependability was used interchangeably as an alternative term to reliability (Holloway, 
1997, Lincoln and Guba, 1985) and consistency (Thantola and Kihn, 2011). Similarly 
Ritchie and Lewis (2003) stated that due to the nature of qualitative research, the tenns 
confirmability, consistency or dependability were often preferred compared to reliability. 
It was generally understood as if another person were to conduct and examine the work; 
he should be able to come to similar conclusions. The key questions to ask are: "Are the 
results believable?" (Pitney and Parker, 2009, p. 63) and "Did we 'accurately' 
capture/represent the phenomenon or attribute under investigation?" (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 2003, p. 694). In other words, it was related to a situation where another 
1 
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researcher conducting the same study by following the same procedure would arrive at 
the same results or findings as in original research. Strauss and Corbin (1998) states that 
it was difficult to reproduce social phenomena in qualitative research was difficult due to 
inability to replicate the original conditions for data collection. 
Therefore, it was suggested that attempts should be made to provide steps of the research 
process transparent by providing the detailed descriptions of the data analysis procedures, 
identifying the archetypes and empirical pattern, as well as providing a chronology of 
research techniques. Many of the researchers had recommended audit trail to establish 
dependability (Tobin and Begley, 2004, Lincoln and Guba, 1985). In audit trail, others 
can examine the researcher's documentation of data, methods, decisions and end product. 
Following this advice, participants were carefully selected, description and application of 
my research instruments, data collection procedures were presented. I also kept the 
original field notes for future reference. Audit trail categories, file types and evidences 
were presented in this thesis according to Lincoln and Guba (1985). They were described 
in the details and also in a rigorous manner to persuade the reader that the study was 
dependable (Creswell, 2009, Lewis, 2009a). 
4.4.2 Validity 
According to Maxwell (2004), there were three types of validity criteria in qualitative 
research: descriptive, interpretive and theoretical validity. Descriptive validity concerned 
over the accuracy of data, the primary aspect of validity, which the other two, interpretive 
and theoretical validities dependent on. In this research, it was achieved through several 
procedures, though interviews were not recorded but as taken as notes, they were 
confirmed with the informants at the end of each interview to make sure that the recorded 
notes reflect their opinions, and then, additional sources were used. Moreover, the 
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research process was made transparent. This is similar to the reliability of the research 
process as mentioned above. 
Interpretive validity means the correspondence of the description of a phenomenon 
studied to the perspective of those experiencing the phenomenon (Maxwell, 2004). In 
order to achieve this interpretive validity, two procedures were to be followed: reflecting 
upon the researcher's role and careful data treatment. Firstly, the researcher's familiarity 
with the context and frame of reference can be considered as both strength and a source 
of bias influencing the analysis. In addition, an initial unfamiliarity with data sources was 
regarded as an advantage and a weakness. The advantage was that the researcher was able 
to go into the field studied with open mind. In contrary, it could also be a weakness as the 
information might be easier to obtain as an insider to the organisation. Secondly, the data 
were treated with prudence, i.e. checking for inconsistencies in coding. Inconsistencies in 
coding over time had been accounted for by using coder consistency test (Richards, 
2009). This was the most suitable method for this research during the data analysis stage 
as there was no possibility of having other researchers coding the same data due to their 
lack of knowledge in the research context and area. 
Theoretical validity meant the validity of the concepts being applied to the phenomena as 
well as the validity of the postulated relationships among the concepts (Maxwell, 2004). 
This was similar to Vaus' (2001) explanation of theoretical generalisation. It was 
accounted for by developing a theoretical model, theoretical sampling and providing 
variations of the research study and the theoretical explanation. Thus, during the research 
process, any disconfirming or other explanations of the phenomenon observed and 
studied were searched for. Thus, it had improved the clarifications for the concepts during 
the course of the study. If the data was consistent with the way the theory predicted, the 
researcher could be confident about the theory. In contrary, if the results did not 
accommodate the way the theory predicted, the theory shall be modified. Hence, in this 
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research, institutional theory had been primarily used to study the institutional pressures 
exerted on the banks' lending process, after the first few interviews, some of the 
contributing factors emerged; therefore, new propositions and concepts from Oliver's 
strategic responses to institutional pressures were incorporated to the framework. It also 
included finding negative evidence by comparing findings with those of other empirical 
findings. They are provided in the discussion chapter of the thesis. 
4.5 Data Generation 
In this section, detail of interviews and written documents used to collect data to be able 
to analyse in-depth at the later stage are provided. Primary data were generated from 
interviews due to the lack of availability of data in written forms. Other written 
documents used in this study are collected from CBM. They were both analysed using the 
framework developed through incorporating two theories, institutional theory and 
Oliver's strategic responses. As mentioned in previous section, having unable to obtain 
data due to the researcher's status and ownership of data, written documents such as their 
policies were unable to be obtained. Moreover, some of the strategic responses employed 
by the bank managers would not be written down in official documents or made publicly 
available since not only banks but also the central bank itself were not transparent. Thus, 
depending on the interview questions and answers, some of the data had to be accepted as 
it was. Nevertheless, the researcher was able to obtain some annual reports from banks 
which enabled to compare the responses given by the participants. 
In this study, from critical realist philosophy, in order to recognise agency, it had used 
theoretical triangulations for analysing data. They were two theoretical perspectives, one 
which gave micro level (Oliver's strategic responses) and macro level (institutional 
theory). 
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4.5.1 Written Documents and Data 
There were some challenges in fulfilling these critical realist requirements. The main 
problem was gathering these written documents. Myanmar banks were opaque and no 
rules or laws were set by the banks to provide transparency to the general public, 
financial statements for limited number of bank were able to be obtained. This had led the 
researcher to gather information from the CBM. At the same time, the data attained were 
cross-sectional and did not reflect the period when the research was conducted. 
Therefore, some official announcements by CBM and the government were also used as 
to fulfil these critical realist conditions. 
Though written sources were not used for primary data collection, they were essential for 
comparison purposes. For instance, it could provide the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the strict regulatory requirements (see Chapter Five). Since the banks did not provide 
annual reports or publish them publicly, the researcher was able to obtain some data on 
sectorial-wise loans provided by the banks over four years from the CBM. They were 
used to identify discrepancies between how the banks lend and their actual lending 
patterns are compared. Other written sources were mainly used to understand the banks. 
Such sources included newspapers and articles. It served as an important role in the 
analysing and providing recommendations. These data from written documents provided 
the basis for understanding the banks' risk taking behaviour, the development of 
interview questions and sample selection criteria. Some of these written documents 
provided the researcher with cross-sectional data on capital adequacy ratios, liquidity 
ratios, non-performing loans, etc. From these types of data, the researcher was able to 
understand banks' risk taking behaviour. 
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4.5.2 Interview 
Patton (2002) identified three main types of research informal conversational interviews 
(unstructured), no predetermined question topics or wordings. Interviews were built on 
and emerge from observations; interview guide approach (semi-structured), the 
interviewer decided the sequence of questions; it had predetermined topics and issues to 
be covered while he/she remained fairly conversational and situational; and standardised 
close-ended interviews (structured) - there were exact wordings and sequence of 
questions which were determined in advance. 
In this research, semi-structured interviews were used to collect data. There were three 
main reasons for choosing this approach. First of all, unlike unstructured interviews, the 
researcher had control over what topics were covered and how the questions were asked. 
In other words, the data collection process was more systematic. Interviews with the 
senior level managements who were involved in constructing lending policies were the 
main method used for collecting data in this qualitative research. It allowed the researcher 
to gather data that could not be observed (Holstein and Gubrium, 2005). This was 
particularly relevant in this study which used critical realist paradigm whose purpose was 
to identify 'actual' event. Hence, due to the nature of participants in this study, who were 
senior level managers and with limited time, it was better to have interview guide make 
the most ofthe time at the researcher's disposal. 
The interview questions were derived from the research questions and themes as provided 
in Table 4-1. The interview questions were presented in a way highlighting the logic 
linking the interview questions to the research questions and the research themes 
suggested by the theoretical framework and the related literature. The interview guide 
contains 30 questions, some ofthem were repeated as to achieve confrrmability (section), 
developed from seven themes. As this is an interdisciplinary study, it might seem 
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appropriate to identify the research themes based on institutional theory and Oliver's 
strategic responses. However, one should not ignore the fact that its main study was on 
banks' lending behaviours and how they were institutionalised and the methods by which 
they were responded by the banks. Hence, the themes should be based on the banks' 
lending practices and not on theories. They could be termed as the step-by-step guide in 
which the lending decisions were made by the banks. The definitions of these themes 
were explained as in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1: Definitions of Research Themes 
Research Themes Meaning 
1. 	 Loan Allocations The theme focuses on the process or the criteria by 
which banks allocate their financial resources in the 
first instance. In other words, the first stage of 
screening loan applications. 
2. 	 Loan Specifications Banks' investment size (size of loans), terms, 
securities, and pricing 
3. 	 Methods of Allocation and The banks' internal policies and criteria for allocating 
Internal Policies financial resources. 
4. Process Symbols 	 The process by which the lending decisions are made. 
S. 	 Examination of the Process This theme is to identify banks' risk taking levels. In 
of Preference and addition, it allows the researcher to assess the type of 
Identification of Lenders lending practices, transactional or relationship lending. 
6. 	 Underlying Values The banks' underlying values and norms for making a 
lending decision. It is also used to identify where and 
how they are created. 
7. 	 Efficiency or Legitimacy This research theme is related to the theoretical 
framework which is developed in chapter three. It is 
used to identify whether the decisions made by the 
banks reflect their efficiency or legitimacy criteria. 
I 
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The purpose of dividing the interview questions into research themes was to ensure 
comprehensive and consistent coverage in each theme under study (Yin, 1994). Through 
the research themes, the questions enabled existing theories and guiding research 
questions as a blueprint, yet it allowed participants to elaborate on issues that they think 
are relevant to the study (see Table 4-1). This design was required to allow specific 
questions and directions of the interviews to evolve contextually. It also helped lay a solid 
foundation to facilitate data collection and analysis of the study. 
The sample selections of interviewees were not as straightforward as it might be seen or 
presented. It required trial and errors during different stages of data collection processes. 
This will be further explained in the following section. 
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Table 4-1: Interview Questions and their Related Research Questions 
Research Themes Interview Questions Research Questions 
1. In your bank, when do businesses apply for loans? (for example, start-up or on-going) 
2. When do you think that it is the most important for businesses to apply for loans? 
3. Does the bank differentiate businesses into sectors? On what basis do you break them up? 
4. Do you regard any of these sectors more important than the other? If so, what are the reasons for 
this? 
5. Does the bank decline to support certain sectors, for example, industry, services or other? Why? 
6. What sorts of documentations are required for businesses to apply? 
Loan Allocation 
7. What are the pre-screening criteria for banks to reject applications in which 
automatically reject applications? If so, could you elaborate and give some examples? 
you would 
RI R2 R3 
8. What is the maximum amount of credit that individual loan applicants can get? How does the 
bank deal with firms that require large amount of credits that exceed limit of the team or individual? 
9. How are the data protected? Is that an internal or external policy? 
10. Does the bank have other external pressures that it has to lend to certain types borrowers and 
business sectors? (Will be questioned in different ways depending on the interviewees and the 
circumstances) 
11. How does the bank market credit for businesses? Is there any government legislation regulatory 
requirements or requirements that require the bank to encourage business growth? Could you 
Research Themes 
Loan Specification 
Methods of Allocation 
and Internal Policies 
expand on these areas? 
Interview Questions 
1. Does the bank have minimum premium charge / service charge on a loan? Can you override the 
standard or is it strictly regulated? 
2. Are you allowed to increase or decrease the interest premium and service charge if you think the 
targets set by the bank may be high for the loan applicants? 
3. Does the bank consider personal decisions of loan officers? 
4. Are there any reward systems for staffs? If so, how do you reward them? 
5. Do you have any independent investigators or other externals to verify the credibility of loan 
applicants? 
1. What information should the borrower bring with them at the initial stages of the interview? Is it 
documentary evidence, history, or bank statements - can you elaborate on the particular bank's 
practices? 
2. How do you determine if the information obtained through evidence is factual? Can false 
documentation arise at initial stages - do you have a filtering policy, or do you accept documents at 
face value? What instances have loans for development or investment has been turned down 
because of limited information? If so, could you elaborate? 
3. Does the bank stick to locality or can anyone from any locality walk into the bank and apply for 
credit? Do you have referral policy to keep businesses in a regional or segmented location? 
4. Does the bank: have to compete for business with sister branches, or is there a policy which keeps 
business banking local? 
5. Does the bank use internal guidelines, or are the guidelines ~riven externally or centrally - could 
Research Questions 
Rl R2 
R1 R2 R3 
Research Themes 
Process Symbols 
Examination of the 
Process of Preference 
and Identification of 
Lenders 
you expand if this is the case? 
6. What is the tax rate? 
7. Do you change some of the internal policy guidelines for some of the borrowers? What are they? 
Interview Questions 
1. Does the bank have teams which are organised and which aim towards the overall bank's aim, for 
example, does the bank have objective meetings? Do you personally agree or disagree with some 
policies? 
2. Can you make personal judgements, a feeling about something, say you simply have a hunch 
about the borrower, do you decide personally? Alternatively, are there procedures, documentation to 
stop your views influencing this process? 
3. Is there conflict amongst the employees? 
4. How would you describe the process oflending in terms of the banks' desires and aims? 
1. How do you identify risky borrowers? Does the bank have pre-determination of sifting risky 
borrowers? If so, what does the bank do to minimise the risk? 
2. Do you have predetermined amount allocated for lending? If this is the case, how do you 
discriminate between borrowers, are there any internal policies for identification? Could you 
elaborate? 
3. How do you determine preference to existing account holders who wish to start their own 
business? 
4. How do you determine preference, do you for example prefer limited organisations, 
proprietorships or others? 
Research Questions 
Rl R2 R3 R4 
RI R2 R3 
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1. Arc you able to exercise influence over credit allocation based on your personal values or do you 
follow the bank's culture (senior staffs, policies, etc)? 
Underlying Values 	 2. Are there any policies in place which exclude certain businesses on moraVethical grounds? If so, Rl R2 
what are they and why? 
3. If there is a new staff, are there any in-house induction? What is the process? 
Research Themes Interview Questions Research Questions 
1. How do you feel about your bank' lending perfonnance? 
2. Do you think you will be able to lend more or to different sectors and different stages of 
businesses (eg. Start-ups) if you were able to set your own policies without much influence from 
external environment? Efficiency or R4Legitimacy 
3. Are there any policies (both external and internal) that you think might be better off for the banks 
if they were changed? What are they and how do you think they could be changed? 
4. Does 2006 fmancial crisis has any effect on the internal and external policies? If yes, how have 
they affected the lending policies? Do you prefer the policies before or after the crisis? 
~, 
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4.5.3 Data Collection Process 
The following diagram Figure 4-1 shows the primary data collection process for this 
research. In order to complete answer the research questions, data were collected mainly 
in two stages. However, initial pilot studies were also made to test the feasibility of the 
interview questions to gather required data. In-depth interviews were the major data 
collection method to capture the influences that the banks had in lending to businesses. 
Pilot studies were done over the period of July - August, 2010. The participants were 
informed that the interviews would not be more than one hour in length. Participants were 
explained the intent and purpose of the study before conducting the interviews. Banking 
literature suggested the research to study loan officers if the processes by which banks' 
lending decisions were taken place. I chose to conduct the first pilot study with a 
professor at the university who had extensive practical experience in banking sector. 
Afterwards, an analysis was done using NVIVO and manual coding. Then, interview 
questions were revised as some of the required information was not captured during the 
interview. 
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Figure 4-1: Summary ofData Collection Process 
Afterwards, another three pilot interviews were conducted in Singapore in order to make 
sure that whether the contextual factors could influence the interviewees in responding to 
the questions. In other words, this is to test the applicability of the interview questions 
and techniques in the different context. In addition, the small number of banks operating 
in Myanmar does not allow the researcher to use them in pilot studies as going back to the 
same bank would be impossible. They were two Singaporean banks and one Taiwanese 
bank operating in Singapore. In all of these cases, the interviews were done with loan 
officers. This step further enhanced me in conducting interviews and improved interview 
questions. As these data were not related to Myanmar, the results were not presented in 
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this thesis. After all these pilot studies were done, I started my field work in Myanmar. 
They were done in two different periods, 2010 and 2011. Written documents were also 
collected during those periods because they could not be obtained all at once. They will 
be elaborated further in the next sections. 
4.5.3.1 First Stage ofData Collection 
It was important to divide the data collection process into two stages as each stage was 
taken place in different periods which had potential impacts on the banks' lending 
decisions. As the main aim of the study was to explore the effects of institutional 
environment on banks, it was necessary to provide descriptions ofthe research context in 
different stages of data collection process. The first stage of data collection was taken 
place in the period of July to August 2010. This was a period where the people were 
anticipating changes in the political and economic environment as Myanmar's first 
general election under new constitutional referendum. Thus, it could be described as the 
period before Myanmar's reform. However, since then, some of the changes such as four 
new banking licenses being issued by the CBM. Therefore, some interview questions 
were added as to study the existing banks' perceptions on the increased competition in the 
banking sector and anticipated effects on their banks' performances. 
At the first stage of the interview in Myanmar, I contacted the banks directly, and they 
declined the request to participate in the research. However, again, the banks were 
contacted through the Central Bank, out of five contacted, four of them agreed to 
participate. They were three private banks and one government-owned banle The 
participants were managers at high level involved in developing lending policies and 
loans decision making. Despite of having requested to interview other loan officers within 
the bank, the researcher finished the interviews only with one participant in each bank. 
1 
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However, this did not have significant effects on quality of the data as these participants 
were extensively engaged in banks' lending decision making processes. 
From the experience of the participant selection in the first stage of interviews, I was able 
to select appropriate participants for the next stage. Primarily, interviewees were selected 
based on the literature suggestions. This showed no issue in the pilot studies both in the 
UK but also in Singapore. However, when the study was replicated in Myanmar, i.e. 
choosing loan officers as research participants, they could not provide required 
infOImation. They were approached by the researcher informally as potential research 
participants. From informal discussions with them, the participant selection criteria must 
be changed if the research aims and objectives were to be accomplished. There were two 
reasons for arriving at this judgment. One of the issues was their lack of involvements in 
lending and policy decision makings. Secondly, they were not ready to give comments on 
the processes within the banks without the approvals from their line managers. Therefore, 
in the end, I concluded that even if these loan officers were allowed to give interviews by 
their managers, it could assure that the responses would not be distorted with the fear and 
bureaucracy. It could be comparable to snowball sampling where research participants 
referred another to the researcher for further interviews. This was a method developed for 
the purpose of this study only, due to the complex contextual environment and 
unavoidable limitation 
4.5.3.2 Second Stage ofData Collection 
The second stage of interviews was conducted in the period of July - August 2011. The 
overall institutional environment has changed with new policies and some restrictions are 
relaxed on the banks, especially with the types of collateral requirements. After reviewing 
the results from the first stage and the changes in the institutional setting, interview 
questions were revised. One of the previously interviewed banks was revisited. This 
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enabled the researcher to compare the differences in perceptions of increased competition 
before and after the start of the four new banks' operations in the late 2010. 
Other pre-existing eight banks were interviewed. Similar to the first stage of interviews, 
only higher level managers were selected as interview participants as they were engaged 
in banks' policy making and lending approval processes. In this stage, ten interviews 
were conducted. The profiles of the participants will be further explained in the next 
section. 
4.5.3.3 Interview Subject Population 
For this research, 14 interviews were undertaken with 12 banks. The sample size might 
seem modest, however, with respect to the population, with only 19 banks operating and 
engaging lending activities, the data collected from 12 banks represent more than half of 
the research population. Despite of being said that the main aim qualitative research is not 
generalisation, the sample size was comprehensive and representative and complies with 
Patton's (2002) sample size tests of usefulness, credibility and availability ofpersonnel. 
Table 1-2: Interview Subject Population 
Type of Banks Population Sample Size 	 Number of 

Interviews 

*Two interviews each for two banks are conducted 
From the above Table 1-2, it could be argued that there were 23 banks; however, the 
sample size was based on 19 banks. It should also be noted that this research is conducted 
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over the period of late 2009 to 2011 while the four new banks had just started their 
operation only in the fourth quarter of 2010. Due to their limited activities not only in 
lending but also in other operations, it was irrelevant to take them in the population being 
studied. Nevertheless, banks' perceptions on expected prospects for higher density of 
competition were being asked during interviews. 
Interviewees' Profiles 
When discussing the subject population, it had two objectives. Primarily, it was to 
maintain the subject anonymity. Secondly, it was to give justification of the relevance of 
population to the research being undertaken. However, at times, these two objectives 
caused some difficulties. For instance, the detailed infonnation regarding the interviewees 
(e.g. their job descriptions) were unable to be provided though it might strengthen the 
analyses and arguments. Similarly, providing the bank sizes would improve the analyses 
of the collected data. On the other hand, inclusion of such infonnation would allow the 
readers to identify the interview subjects. In addition, Myanmar's financial system was 
significantly smaller than other countries', therefore, providing such infonnation did not 
help the researcher to maintain subject anonymity. 
-
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Table 1-3: Abbreviations and Type of Banks 
Type of Banks Abbreviations Frequency of Interviews are 
Interviews for each Conducted in 
Bank 
Government-owned G-A 1 2010 
Banks 
G-B 1 2011 
G-C 1 2011 
Semi-government S-A 1 2011 
Banks 
S-B 1 2011 
S-C 1 2011 
S-D 1 2011 
S-E 1 2011 
Private Banks P-A 2 2010/2011 
P-B 2 participants x 1 2010/2011 
interview each 
P-C 1 2010 
P-D 1 2011 
Government-owned and private banks were denoted with letter 'G' and 'P' respectively 
while those banks with the government's stakes were with'S'. The frequency of 
interviews for each bank was one except P-A and P-B. At P-A bank, the first interview 
took place in 2010 while the second in 2011. Similarly, at P-B, two interviews were 
conducted in both 2010 and 2011, but with different participants. 
As described in Table 1-3 and Table 1-4, the interview population consisted of 13 
individuals. All participants were engaged in developing and implementing lending 
policies in addition to providing lending decisions. An individual profile of each 
...... 
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participant is not provided, as the population was relatively small, and the seniority and 
characteristics varied, such a profile could provide several points of reference for the 
identification of individuals. The following Table 1-4 displays the characteristics of the 
participant group. 
Table 1-4: Characteristics of Interview SUbject Population 
Number of Participants 	 14 
Job Level 	 2 Manager 
5 General Manager 
1 Senior General Manager 
1 Executive Director 
2 Deputy Managing Director 
2 Managing Director 
1 Deputy Chairman 
Job Role 	 6 Strategy/direction of lending policies and 
activities 
6 Management of lending activities 
1 Assist lending activities 
Years of Experience 	 +10 years 
The participants were selected on the basis of the results from pilot interviews. From the 
pilot interviews in Myanmar, it was found that no useful and required data can be 
obtained from lower level managers, therefore, in the data collection stage, only higher 
level managers who are engaged in developing banks' lending policies and decision 
making. The interview subject population had detailed involvement across the policy 
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makings. This includes strategic lending policies and overall decision makings. All 
participants had over ten years of experience in banking activities. From the table, it can 
be seen that the lowest job level ofparticipants is 'manager' while the rest are senior level 
managers. As the industry has a bureaucratic organisational structure, it is only acceptable 
to engage with interviewees at senior levels. Moreover, all these participants had 
significant experiences and technical proficiencies in providing meaningful insights into 
their perceptions and attitudes towards banks' lending practices. 
All the interviews were taken place in the afternoon when they had finished their 
professional duties. The locations were in their respective banks which were main offices 
in Yangon (the commercial centre of the country) where all the lending decisions took 
place though the choice of interview location was left for the participants to decide. This 
was to provide interviewees with comfort and to create appropriate rapport with the 
researcher. Similarly, constant observations on the signs of interviewees' discomfort were 
monitored to prevent them from not disseminating valuable data for the research. This 
was avoided by pausing taking notes and listening only to the interviewees' responses. 
The process by which the note-taking was done will be elaborated in the next section. 
4.5.3.4 Note-taking 
The data collection process comprises of two stages. First interviews were taken place in 
2010, then, in 2011, second set of interviews were made with different set of participants 
except one being repeated again. To encourage interviewees in giving data confidently, I 
had not recorded the interviews. Primarily, it was the interviewees who declined the 
conversation to be recorded. Other factor that had been taken into account is the culture. 
People in Myanmar did not prefer their conversations to be recorded due to 
confidentiality issues. Even if they allowed the researcher to take recording, there was a 
very good chance that some of the important information would not be disseminated since 
.. 
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it could be perceived by the interviewees that it would be later used as evidence against 
them even though if the researcher gave assurance to them stating that everything would 
be kept confidential. After careful considerations of these factors, a decision to take 
extensive notes was made. Even then, at times, I had to stop taking notes as the other 
participant seemed uncomfortable and stopped answering certain questions. Presumably, 
the participant felt that I was recording word by word what was being said. Thus, the 
formality of writing and recording conversations had indicated to divert conversations 
between the researcher and interviewees greatly in the study. Alvesson (2003) also 
supports this by stating that note-taking, especially with tape-recording, could disturb the 
situation and irritate and domesticate participants if the researcher was active in the 
situation which also created detailed notes-taking difficult. Unlike, the author said, the 
methodological reasons for being hesitant about taking notes was not only because the 
researcher was active but also my consideration towards cultural factors that could affect 
interviewees' disseminating sensitive issues and their real feelings. 
It was difficult to conduct interviews and take notes simultaneously. Moreover, data 
analysis was also taken place at the same time. For instance, the interviewees' responses 
were analysed during the conversation whether they provided the information being 
asked. If not, further questions were asked to get the required information. In recorded 
interviews, the researcher could listen to recorded audio and able to refer back at the later 
stage. However, in this study, data could not be referred back, therefore, extensive care 
was required. Moreover, some of the facts were not written down in front of the 
interviewees, depending on situational factors such as the mood of a person is in, the tone 
of the voice, the gestures, etc. In such kind of methodological challenges, a great extent 
relied on the memory of the researcher. Since only one interview was taken place per day 
during the data collection period, I was able to recollect the interviewees' responses. Even 
for recorded interviews, it was suggested to transcribe as soon as possible as the memory 
-
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of the research would stiff be refreshed by hearing the recording, thereby, would assist in 
making sense out of it (Gillham, 2005). 
Before presenting the reader with how the data were analysed, the researched needs to 
provide the descriptions on how these data were transcribed and translated. As the data 
were collected in Myanmar, interview questions were translated into Burmese. Similarly, 
the collected data were in the same language; therefore, the researcher had to translate 
them back into English. The process by which they were conducted for this research 
would be provided first. 
4.5.3.5 Transcribing Data 
With recordings, the researcher could rely on to completeness of the data recorded and 
validate transcripts of interviews with the participants after a period of time. In note 
taking, shorthand method was used, therefore, it relied on the memory of the researcher 
and validation with the participants must be done after the interviews or else, there would 
be no proof or back-up recordings to refer back. 
Thus, in all the interviews in Myanmar, the contents recorded in the notes of the 
researcher were validated with the participants after the interviews. No participant 
expressed concerned with the contents of the notes. In some instances, they even 
recommended or added some more information for clarification of what they had stated. 
This not only validated but also helped the researcher in collecting useful information. 
Seidman (2006) has suggested interview lengths to be 90-minute format as longer than 
that duration is too long for the participant to sit at one time while shorter than this time 
frame would not give participants to reconstruct their experiences. All of my interviews 
lasted at least 90-minutes. Two of the interviews had gone over two hours' time frame. 
From these two interviews, I was able to get very rich information in relation to their 
experiences, and feelings about the regulations. 
I 
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After every interview, all the data were entered into my personal computer and translated 
on the same day. It is advantage to do this process because the researcher's memory was 
still fresh, so that no data was left unrecorded. Moreover, I would not confuse with the 
later interviews in transcriptions. After that they were entered into the Word documents 
which were later imported into NVIVO for data analysis. 
4.5.3.6 Translating Data 
Translations were done for both interview questions (see Appendix 2) and field notes. 
With the translation being done from the field notes, the meanings behind what the 
participants said did not change. In addition, during the 12 out of 14 interviews, another 
person was with me to prevent from losing the underlying meanings. Afterwards, he was 
also involved in helping the researcher to do translation. According to Marshall and 
Rossman (2010), translating and transcribing are not merely technical tasks but entail 
judgement and interpretation. After these two processes are done with the data, they are 
no longer 'raw data'. They should be labelled as 'processed data' (Wengraf, 2001, p. 7). 
Marshall and Rossman (2010) has suggested that attention should be given in handling 
the judgements and interpretation integrated in the process. It has been raised concern by 
Temple and Young (2004) about the inherent limitations in the researcher being the 
translator as well. This point is refuted by Marshall and Rossman (2010) stating that more 
problems in interpretation appear when someone other than the researcher does the 
translations. 
Interviews questions and data are translated by the researcher as Burmese is her mother 
tongue. Being both the researcher and translator pose no problems for this, but offered the 
advantage of constructing the meaning in a consistent way. An example of the translation 
is given below: 
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English: 
What types of businesses does your bank decline to support? 
Burmese: 
For accuracy, the researcher asked a person who has experience in translation to do "back 
translations". He was also involved with the researcher in conducting interviews; 
therefore, he is not an independent person. This created translation more reliable. This 
processed data was then entered into the word documents on the same day to avoid 
missing out important information. After all the data were recorded, they were then put 
into NVNO data analysis software to support inferences to the theoretical model. In the 
next section, data analysis for this study will be described. 
4.6 Data Analysis: Interviews and Documents 
The main sources of data, information from interviews, were coded according to the set 
of theoretical codes that were literature orland theory based. The analysis was based on 
the grounded theory technique whose main idea was that new theory can be generated 
through an accurate and detailed description of a phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990). According to Glaser and Strauss (1980), existing theory was restricted and new 
theory can be created through empirical data. This view was challenged by other authors 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998) stating that theories were tools that helped us to understand 
reality and describe it. These different views were not challenged in this study but 
accepted. In studying a phenomenon from critical realism, both theory and empirical data 
were respected because theories should not be ignored because it helps the researcher to 
gain understanding. At the same time, one should not rely on theories so much that 
'actual' account of reality was discarded. According to Sayer (2000, p.5), 
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" ... critical realism, with its focus on necessity and contingency rather than 
regularity, on open rather than closed systems, on the ways in which causal 
processes could produce quite different results in different contexts, fitted 
comfortably with these developments. Realists expect concrete open systems 
and discourses to be much more messy and ambiguous than our theories of 
them and do not consider that differentiation poses a threat to social science" 
The above statement implied that investigating a phenomenon from critical realism 
enabled the researcher to uncover outcomes different from causal processes that were 
indicated in theories. This is especially true in the context of Myanmar, where no prior 
study was available, one should be open-minded to any phenomenon that could be 
generated from the empirical data and not be restricted to the theories themselves. Since 
the data analysis was a continuous process during data collection process, the responses 
from participants and the nature of phenomenon developed along that process shape the 
overall investigation. The method of analysis done in this research could be termed as 
categorical and thematic analyses. 
4.6.1 Categorical and Thematic Analysis 
Despite of being said that it was both categorical and thematic analysis, the latter was 
much emphasised as the former was used for grouping the themes. Primarily, categories 
were developed using theories and literature. Though these categories were pre-existed, 
when analysing the data, themes were first developed, then were allocated to their 
respective categories. They were as described in theoretical framework. Empirically 
derived codes add theoretical implications. 
Thematic analysis has been defined by Boyatzis (1998, p. 1). 
-
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" ... a way ofseeing. Often, what one sees through thematic analysis does not 
appear to others, even if they are observing the same iriformation, events, or 
situations ... " 
Thematic analysis was used primarily by qualitative researchers. It also facilitated 
statistical analysis as themes and codes could be quantified through counting presence, 
frequency or intensity. Thematic analysis was used to see something that is not evident to 
others (Boyatzis, 1998). 
A theme could be identified in two different levels namely, at manifest level where 
themes could be directly observable and at latent level where they could be found through 
underlying phenomenon. In addition, themes could also be generated deductively using 
prior theory or research, and inductively from the collected data. It also had some 
limitations. Boyatzis (1998) had identified three major obstacles in conducting thematic 
analysis. They were: 
1. 	 Projection - ego defence mechanism where the researcher tried to attribute his or 
her own characteristics, emotion, value or attitude onto the subjects. Hence, in 
this research, I did not force any of the emerging themes to existing categories. 
They were revised several times as to validate that they were coded correctly. 
2. 	 Sampling - there was a possibility that the researcher would use convenience 
sampling which might distort the validity and reliability of data. In this research, 
convenience sampling was not used. It aimed to interview all the Myanmar 
banks. 
3. 	 Mood and Style - due to the subjective nature of qualitative research, the 
researcher's fatigue and/or sensory overload, frustration with raw information or 
concepts, or confusion as to the unit of analysis and unit of coding will have 
-
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effects on thematic analysis. In order to avoid this obstacle, coding was done 
multiple times. 
These potential errors could be minimised using proper validity and reliability criteria at 
all stages of the research process. The following Table 1-5 summarises how the above 
limitations were avoided. Early code development in the preliminary stage allowed the 
researcher to detennine the sample size. The saturation of data was seen after only eight 
interviews. The process of the data analysis done for this research was also provided in 
;
! 
this chapter. 
!
• Table 1-5: Actions taken by the Researcher to Avoid Limitations Arising from 
;~ 
~ Thematic Analysis 
~ 
Limitations 
I• 
Projection Error 
Mood and Style Error 
Actions Taken by the Researcher 
When analysing the interview transcripts, themes were first 
coded as it was without changing any meanings. The 
researcher had coded the data both manually and also through 
NVIVO qualitative data analysis software. Data coding was 
done multiple times to ensure that quotes were coded 
correctly. Examples are provided in chapter five. 
As the coding was done multiple times with documents in 
NVIVO, I was able to re-check my coding process at different 
steps. 
Though the research had prior theoretical framework, it did not limit new themes or codes 
to arrive from the data. Thus, it had some properties similar to 'grounded theory'. The 
researcher did manual coding before computer assisted software as to become more 
familiar with the data. Primarily, the researcher started with manual analysis of the data. 
However, the complexity of the data required organised data storage and significant 
amount of time, to make it much simpler, electronic coding method, which allowed the 
researcher to become familiar with the data set that are again coded in computer assisted 
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software NVNO was used. The rationale for choosing this software is explained in the 
next sections. 
Therefore, in analysing data, the researcher was not restricted to the theoretical 
framework. This did not indicate that the theories are not necessary. They were needed to 
understand a phenomenon but the phenomenon itself did not depend on it. Hence, in this 
study, both theory and data guided the investigation on the interplay between bru.1ks and 
institutions in developing their lending practices. Translation, transcription, note taking 
was done by me, so when doing the data coding, I was already familiar with the data. 
This thesis involved studying complex social processes; therefore, analysing the data 
required extensive care and significant amount of time. Collected data were coded and 
recoded many times to gain consistency in themes and categories assigned. This process 
created data analysis much easier. In addition, in order to minimise the researcher's 
influence over the data set, data from speculative sources were not included. When 
analysing the data, only those collected through interview questions and reliable data sets 
were used. This will be further explained in the following sections. 
4.6.2 Data Coding 
While coding, there was no limitation on how many categories or themes that a sentence 
can belong to. With NVNO, the researcher was able to keep track ofthe coding structure 
and assign each sentence to where it belonged without creating overlapping categories. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) state that codes should relate to each other in coherent study, 
consequently, logical sequence of codes are formed which becomes easier to be revised. 
They have also mentioned about the number of codes that a study should have as too 
many codes create difficulties for the researcher to remember while too few codes 
produce a lack of analytic richness. It is suggested that a list of codes should fit on one 
sheet of paper (Fielding and Lee, 1998). There are two types of codes in this research. 
--------
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They are theoretical codes, which are derived from priori literature and theories; and 
empirical codes that are emerged from the interview data. As mentioned before, 
information that did not fit into priori codes, they were not enforced into them as it was 
perceived that theories were not perfect in explaining the 'actual' phenomenon. 
Theoretical 
~ Analysis of the data ! 

//~/ , 

// 
Review 
assigned to quotes 
Code I Themes are Revise 
coo~='''''gori''''' /
based on coding ~/ Empirically Derived 
definitions and i Codes 
principles 
Figure 1-2: Coding Process 
In summary, before coding the transcripts, they were read a number of times to make the 
researcher familiar with the contents. Then, the quotes were assigned with 'codes' or 
'themes' developed either through theories, i.e. theoretical framework, or empirical data. 
As the objective of this study was not to fit the data into the framework but to arise 
independently through empirics as well, the 'open codes' were created first for further 
revisions. They were interesting findings that did not correspond to the pre-existing 
categories or codes. After coding was done multiple times, the position of empirically 
derived codes changed to theoretically derived codes. In summary, this coding process 
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could be described as a combination of induction and deduction. Deduction arised from 
codes formed through theoretical framework and induction from empirical data. These 
codes were reviewed as required to identify overlapping themes and to establish hierarchy 
in code groups and nodes with the help ofNVNO as the aim was to move from particular 
instances and examples of practice from to more general theoretical codes and 
explanations. The summary of the coding process was described as in Figure 1-2. The 
following Table 1-6 provided a list of codes, including theoretical and empirical, for 
addressing three objectives to make the reader clear with the purpose of the existence of 
the codes. 
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Table 1-6: The Coding Structure (Institutional Pressures and Strategic Responses) 
Hierarchy 
Factors causing homogeneities among banks 
Coercive Pressures 
Central Bank and Financial Regulatory 
Bodies 
Social Political Institutions 
Normative Pressures 
Corporate Culture 
Professional Associations 
Government 
Mimetic Pressures 
Mimicking Industry's Best Practices 
Banks' strategic responses to institutional 
pressures 
Acquiescence Strategy 
Habit / Imitate / Comply 
Compromise Strategy 

Balance / Pacify / Bargain 

Enforced Bargain 

Avoidance Strategy 

Conceal! Buffer / Escape 

Unintentional Avoidance 

Defiance Strategy 

Dismiss / Challenge / Attack 

Manipulation Strategy 

Co-opt / Influence! Control 

Codes 
Theoretical Empirical 
X 
X 
X 

X 

X 

X 

X 
X 

X 

X 

X 

X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Purpose 
To address the 
second 
objective, 
which is to 
identify the 
main 
components of 
institutional 
pressures that 
help shape 
homogeneities 
in banks' 
lending 
practices 
To address the 
third objective, 
which is to 
identify how 
banks shape 
their lending 
strategies in 
response to 
institutional 
pressures 
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Table 1-7: Coding Structure (Heterogeneities in Banks) 

Hierarchy Codes Purpose 

Factors causing heterogeneities in banks Theoretical Empirical To address the 
Task Environment Dependent Contingent 
Response X X 
fourth objective, 
which is to 
understand the 
Reverse Legitimacy X 
factors 
shape 
that help 
banks' 
Heterogenetic Legitimacy X 
isomorphism 
variations 
and 
in 
Institutional Pressure Intensity X 
lending strategies 
The categories described in the above Table 1-6 and Table 1-7 were not limited with how 
many quotes or themes should be assigned. Of the coded sentences, some of them were 
coded in one or two categories (open and/or predetermined codes). Coding such a way 
helps the researcher to become familiar with the data and no interesting data was left 
unrecognised. To achieve consistencies in coding, coding definitions and principles were 
formed prior to this. It is explained in detailed in the next section. 
Coding Definitions and Principles 
The analyses provided in the chapter five consist of two kinds of codes, theoretically and 
empirically derived codes. The former was based on the framework developed in the 
chapter three. Later in this section, the definitions and coding principles of the codes were 
clearly described and exemplified. This process is essential for enabling further 
replication and validity of the study. 
Institutional Pressures 
The coding definitions and principles related to institutional theory, i.e. institutional 
pressures and their sources were described in this part. For instance, if the participants 
referred being enforced to lend certain groups, it was coded under the 'coercive 
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pressures' , and if the source of these pressures raised from the government, they were put 
under the category of 'Central Bank and Financial Regulatory Bodies' as described in the 
chapter one, CBM and other financial institutions were under the control of the 
government. The following table describes the defmitions and coding principles for 
institutional pressures and their sources. 
-
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Table 1-8: Coding Definitions and Principles for Concepts Derived from 
Institutional Pressures 
Concepts 
Coercive Pressures 
Central Bank and 
Financial 
Regulatory Bodies 
Social Political 
Institutions 
Normative 
Pressures 
Corporate Culture 
Professional 
Associations 
Governmental 
Guidelines 
Mimetic Pressures 
Definitions 
Pressures based on enforced rules 
from exogenous providers or 
authorities of resources. 
A regulatory authority acting as a 
lender of last resort exerting rules 
and requirements on banks. 
Institutions that promote 
collective responsibility of social 
protection and development 
Pressures as a result of customary 
and socially accepted and 
responsible discourses 
A set of social expectations and 
standards as well as the values 
and beliefs that individuals hold. 
An association of the same 
professionals that reqUlre 
considerable training and 
specialised study. 
The agency or apparatus through 

! which a governing organisation 

functions and exercises authority 

Pressures based on modelling 
after successful peers. Such 
activity is engaged in reducing 
uncertainty. 
Coding Principles 
Rules, requirements, and 
regulatory forces will be 
coded under the label of 
coercive isomorphism. 
Rules, requirements and 
regulatory enforcement 
exerted on banks from 
CBM will be coded here. 
Requirements exerted by 
such institutions for 
developmental purposes 
and social change. 
Expressed support for 
certain lending behaviour 
among sources in the 
banks' environments will 
be coded under normative 
isomorphism 
The reward system, 
decision approval process 
and the authority given to 
loan officers within the 
organisation. 
Professional norms, 
trainings and qualifications 
will be coded under this 
category. 
Information about 
guidelines provided by the 
government on banks will 
be coded here. 
Mimicking lending 
practices among successful 
competitors, collaborators 
and organisations towards 
which the organisation has 
strong ties will be coded as 
mimetic pressures. 
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Table 1-8 describes the structural codes for the institutional pressures according to (Scott, 
2001), and their sources of pressures being adapted to the banks' lending literature. More 
codes were coded under the 'Coercive Pressures' and 'Central Bank and Financial 
Regulatory Bodies'. This could be implied that banks were highly regulated and these 
pressures come from the government through central banks and other fmancial regulatory 
bodies. 
Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures 
The following Table 	 1-9 provides the structural codes for behavioural response to 
institutional pressures according to Oliver (1991). 
Table 1-9: Coding Definitions and Principles for Concepts Derived from Oliver's 
Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures 
Concepts 	 Definitions Coding Principles 
Acquiescence It is the action taken by a firm to Behaviours, plans, and talks 

Strategy conform to institutional taken to conform to the 

pressures 	 institutional pressures to 
follow lending practices are 
coded here. 
Compromise It is a strategy where the banks Attempts to renegotiate, 

Strategy try to reduce the extent to which reduce, and balance the 

conformity is necessary. 	 extent to which conformity is 
necessary between the bank 
and its external constituents 
are coded here. 
Avoidance It is a bank's attempt to preclude Concealing non-conformity, 

Strategy the necessity to conform to avoiding any event that 

institutional pressures. requires conformity. 

Defiance Strategy 	 It is an active response to an Expressed alienation to non-

institutional pressure where non- conformity to institutional 

conformity is openly admitted. pressures. 

Manipulation It is an active response where Behaviours, plans and talks 

Strategy change of the institution itself is taken to influence different 

the goal. stakeholders not to conform 

to institutional pressures. 


Table 1-11: Example of Analysis - Interview Research 
Categories Coding Principles Themes Illustrative Quotes 
'th~F't:he 
Influences on lending officers from the 
bank, professionals and associations in 
making decisions. 
Central Bank Rules exerted on banks from CBM Restrictions in Type of Collaterals 
Normative 
Pressures 
"Before central banks' regulations, we 
accept apartments and cars as 
collaterals. Now, we have to take only 
mortgages" 
branch" 
I 
,z~ ~____~_ 
Categories Coding Principles Themes Illustrative Quotes 
Empirically Interesting and noteworthy data that fall Lack of· Importance to relationship "It is not necessary for the borrowers 
Derived Codes outside prescribed theoretical codes lending to have bank accounts with us. Those 
who do not have current accounts can 
also borrow from us. 80% of the loan 
applicants do not have previous current 
accounts with us" 
I 
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4.6.3 Hybrid Coding 
Once the coding definitions and principles were fonned, the process by which the 
researcher assigned the codes onto the data are described in this section. The analysis of 
the qualitative data was strenuous task, thus, it was found to be difficult. It was a 
dynamic, intuitive and creative process which required the researcher's both inductive 
and deductive reasoning, thinking and theorising. Throughout this research, the researcher 
had tried different attempts to gain deeper understanding of what was being studied, and 
continuously refining the interpretations. Therefore, coding was done both manually and 
electronically with the assisted with Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis 
Software (CAQDAS). 
4.6.3.1 Manual Coding 
Manual coding means assigning the quotations to a category, cutting and pasting them 
onto different coloured paper and reorganising them into sub-themes. The following 
figure shows some of the researcher's manual coding of interview transcripts. Different 
colours of sticky notes had been used to assign different codes. They were then stapled to 
onto the paper. It is a tedious and time consuming task, and indeed, it was a very messy 
process. However, on top of these disadvantages, it had made the researcher familiar with 
the data and allowed to be revisited the analysis visually. 
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4.7 Ethics 
In carrying out research in a culturally and politically sensitive countries, for example, in 
Myanmar, confidentiality of the research participants are taken extra care to ensure that 
no hann should befall on them. Therefore, some of the actions taken by the researcher to 
comply with general ethical issues are provided in the following section. 
Based on Patton's (2002, pg. 408) ethical issues checklist, the following ethics framework 
(see Table 1-12) was provided with the actions taken by the researcher in response to 
each issue. 
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Table 1-12: Research Ethics 
Issues Actions Taken by Researcher 
1. 	 Legitimacy of Contact details of the University of 
research activity Bedfordshire, and the researcher's 
information were provided to the 
interviewees 
2. 	 Fully informed Interviewees were provided 
interview information with regards to interview 
subjects information verbally, which detailed: 
o 	 Background to the research; 
o 	 Procedures to be followed; 
o 	 Responsibilities of the 
researcher; 
o 	 Responsibilities of the 
interviewees; 
o 	 Freedom of consent; and 
o 	 Researcher's contact details 
3. 	 Accuracy of • Though interviews were not 
Reporting digitally recorded in order to avoid 
Information intimidating the research subjects. 
• 	 However, extensive notes were 
taken while interviewing and 
recorded into NVIVO database on 
the same day as to ensure that all 
the data were not misinterpreted. 
• 	 Translation of the data was also 
done by the researcher who had 
prior experience. In addition, back 
translation was done on selective 
interview transcripts 
4. 	 Anonymity of. All data presented in the research 
the subject and paper, and also source documents 
confidentiality of were kept in a secure location. 
information 
5. 	 Interview • The locations for the interviews to 
subjects comfort take place were decided by the 
interview subjects. 
Reference 
Introductory letter 
with the letter head 
(Appendix 1) 
Interview Guidelines 
(Appendix 2) 
Sample of Interview 
Transcripts 
(Appendix 6) 
Not Applicable 
Not Applicable 
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4.8 Conclusions 
This chapter outlined rationale for critical realist research paradigm, research 
methodologies, strategies including the process of data collection, analyses and credibility 
checks, and ethics followed in this study. In summary, the research was a qualitative 
research, mainly using interviews to collect required data. The next chapter provides the 
contextual analysis of the Myanmar's financial sector and their efficiencies in credit risk 
management using basic descriptive statistics. 
-
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Chapter Five: Overview of Myanmar's Banking Sector 
5.1 Introduction 
As a qualitative study, the context in which the research was conducted should be 
provided in detailed to give the reader a sense of familiarity_ Especially when the role of 
culture was also studied in the banks' lending practices, the historical development of 
national culture on the banks' corporate culture has to be explored. Hence, not only the 
country's banking system but also the political and governance systems over the years 
must be presented along with the socioeconomic environment. In order to study how 
legitimacy was achieved and what legitimacy crises occurred, what legitimisation 
strategies were used, and how banks and institutions reacted, it was necessary to focus on 
the reflections, interpretations and actions of both sides, i.e. banks and institutions in the 
context. 
5.2 Country: Myanmar 
Culture is defined as a "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the 
members of one group from another" (Hofstede, 1984, p.21) which is historically derived 
and transmitted from one generation to another and changed through the process of 
adjustment to the social setting (Oyeneye and Shoremi, 1985). In the cultural 
development process, management has an important role of acting as an organiser, 
enforcer, supporter, catalyst and motivator for cultural development (Sariolghalam, 
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1993). In the national framework, the political system of a country has a crucial role in 
creating culture. 
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Figure 5-1: Timeline for Myanmar's Political and Economic Systems (P: Political 
System, E: Economic System) 
Figure 5-1 shows Myanmar's political and economic systems from 1948 (independence 
from British colonial rule) to the present. Immediately after 1948, Myanmar had 
parliamentary governance and market systems until the military takeover in 1962. Since 
then, in whichever governance system the country was under, whether socialism or not, 
there has always been military involvement resulting in having either planned or 
command economic systems with the state control. In 2010, it underwent a dramatic 
reform towards liberal democracy with a mixed economic system; however, state 
involvement was still in existence. Consequently, hierarchical or bureaucratic national 
culture was created over the years continues to affect the banks' regulatory environment. 
I 
-
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Due to the researchers having little interest or inability to gather require infonnation in 
Myanmar, research regarding Myanmar's organisational culture cannot be found. 
However, as a person coming from Myanmar, I can state that the bureaucracy is 
predominant across organisations in the country. In addition to the political system 
affecting organisational culture, it is not deniable that Buddhism, which is embraced by 
80% of the country's popUlation, also has significant effects on everyday lives of people 
by emphasising the importance of respect of authority, obedience and loyalty in the 
society. This is familiar to Confucius teaching in China and Korea. Hence, the lack of 
questioning the seniors at workplace and reluctances in raising questions or issues 
towards them existed. Directions and orders tend to be top-down and there is little or no 
delegation of power of authority is given to lower level staff members. 
Thus, replication of research methodologies suggested in research papers that studied 
banks' lending practices in countries where lower power distance, democratic values, 
equalitarianism and participations were cherished, such as UK, US and Australia, was 
very difficult in Myanmar. Since owners and executives are top of any bureaucratic 
structure in these firms, decision making and controls are centralised rather than 
decentralised among the lower level employees. This was taken into account when 
selecting participants for this research. Detailed descriptions can be referred back to 
section 4.5.2). 
5.2.1 Myanmar's Banking Industry 
A brief overview of Myanmar's banking industry was provided in chapter one. In this 
section, the current situation of the banking industry will be provided with reform process 
that the country's economic and business environment is undergoing. In March 2011, 
Myanmar had finally achieved to fonn democratic government. This was when the 
President of the country stated his intention to build the country on a market-based 
----------- -~...------... 
---
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economic system. Accordingly, the government tried to achieve it politically through 
releasing political prisoners including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in order to build 
democratic institutions. Economically, with the help of IMF, World Bank and other 
financial institutions, Myanmar was trying to change and modernise the fmancial system 
through amending and introducing new laws. For example, the government updated the 
new foreign direct investment law in November 2012. In addition, the microfrnance law 
was developed and approved by the parliament in December, 2011 with a view to 
alleviate and reduce poverty, especially through allowing poor to access fmancial services 
at affordable costs. The government had also allocated more budgets for education, health 
and other social welfare purposes. Hence, the financial sector development had been 
placed in the top of the reform agenda. 
l 
Nevertheless, this was not the first time the Myanmar's banking industry had gone under 
reform. In 1963, there were 14 foreign banks, 10 domestic banks and one government-
owned bank. In those days, Myanmar was considered the most developed in Southeast 
Asia region. However, in 1963, banks were nationalised and until 1988, banks had little 
role under the socialist government. Financial reforms restarted again in the early 1990s. 
In 1993, CBM introduced the foreign exchange certificate (FEC) as an alternative 
I exchange rate arrangement, which enabled the kyats to be indirectly convertible to the US 
l dollars. During those days, civilians were not allowed to have US dollars in hands without the permission of the government. Thus, foreign currencies could only be 
exchanged in the black market. This created two different exchange rates in the country. 
The official rate was pegged around 6.83 kyats while the unofficial exchange rate 
reached1200 kyats per dollar in 2009. Once FEC became more acceptable by the public, 
CBM created a trading floor where they could be traded and freely convertible to US 
dollar. This then created another sets exchange rates, one for US dollar and another for 
FEC. Indeed, the exchange rates for US dollars would be much higher than that of FEC. 
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Some organisations would accept FEC for transactions while some did not. This created 
people to take advantage of buying FEC instead of dollars to make transactions. All in all, 
despite of the small and limited functionality of the Myanmar's financial system, its 
foreign exchange market was very complicated with diverse exchange rates. In 2011, the 
government allowed people to possess US dollars officially. Afterwards, the government 
gave some domestic banks' licenses to exchange foreign currencies. 
Though foreign currencies were exchanged officially with the official rates, which was 
currently floating around 800 kyats, banks did not accept old or worn-out notes. This 
made it possible for people to exchange them into domestic currency. Thus, another 
exchange rate was formed for worn-out notes. The rates for these were again lower than 
the rate in the market. One of the main reasons was that there was not enough of foreign 
currency inflow in the market. These dealers tried to achieve maximum profits through 
playing around by forming different rates. Though these activities needed to be 
controlled, the government had still not taken any initiatives to do so. In addition, due to 
the sanctions imposed by the US government, no remittance could be done in US dollars. 
Thus, it had been difficult for people to carry foreign currencies in and out of the country. 
In addition to being a cash-based economy where there were no credit or debit cards, 
people had to use hawala7 based remittance system. As this is an informal system and not 
regulated officially, there were many incidents in which different parties lost their 
remittances in transit. Though it might seem less costly as there was far lower 
commission than those charged by banks, if the amount of money needed to be 
transferred by one party does not meet the other party's ability to provide in hislher 
country, the first party would have a hard time finding third party to complete the task. 
Hence, the lack of a properly functioning banking system including sanctions intended to 
7 Money is transferred via a network ofhaw ala brokers where the transfer of money takes place 
without the actual money. In general, the funds enter the system in the source country's currency 
and leave the system in the recipient country's currency. As settlements often take place without 
any foreign exchange transactions, they can be made at the rate other than official exchange rates. 
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affect the military government and lack of foreign banks' operations in the country 
created a lot of difficulties for financial transactions. Recently, in 2012, some domestic 
banks started Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) and issued debit cards. Internet 
banking had been started by some of the banks; however, the lack of a proper functioning 
telecommunication infrastructure is not permitting much of 'e-banking' activities since 
many people in the country do not have much access to internet. 
As a member of ASEAN, Myanmar would have to liberalise the economy to 
accommodate the association's road map on free trade area and free investment area 
initiatives to become fully integrated. Therefore, financial system is undergoing a 
dramatic change since 2010. CBM was and still the sole authority to grant licenses to 
domestic financial institutions with foreign capital or as a branch of a foreign bank. There 
were four categories in which foreign banks could be allowed to operate in Myanmar. 
They were: 
• 	 Joint Venture - foreign banks could enter into joint venture banking business 
with any domestic financial institution or bank in Myanmar 
• 	 Offshore Banks - function as a branch of foreign bank was readily acceptable 
with 100% foreign capital. The definition of offshore bank was not clearly 
specified in the existing law. This was still under the process of being amended. 
Strategic Partnership Bank - domestic bank could be permitted to form strategic • 
partnership with foreign banks. In this case, CBM could prescribe the percentage 
of share ownership that foreign banks could own and participate in domestic bank 
share holdings. 
Full branch or subsidiary bank - foreign banks could establish a branch office • 
with 100% ownership or a subsidiary bank which needed to be incorporated 
under the domestic laws. 
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Although there were foreign banks' branches in the country, they were not allowed to 
perform their banking activities. Nevertheless, it was expected that their operations would 
be permitted before 2015, the start date of ASEAN Integration. Hence, despite 
Myanmar's banking system being classified as the most basic in terms of their operations, 
such as taking deposits and providing loans, in reality, it is far more complicated than it 
seems . The CBM issued guidelines on the statutory reserve requirements, capital 
adequacy, liquidity, classification of non-performing loans and provision for bad and 
doubtful debts, lending limits, etc. In addition, they also regulate the upper (caps) and 
lower (floors) limits for deposits and lending rates. They were based on the standards 
prescribed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Due to the lack of stock 
exchanges and limited functioning of the financial markets, these guidelines were based 
on Basel I even though Basel III had already been drafted after 2008 financial crisis. 
CBM was responsible for overseeing both government and private-owned banks. The 
classification of government, semi-government and private banks were not 
straightforward in Myanmar due to their affiliations to the political sector both formally 
and informally. 
For enhancing the data analyses, the responses were divided according to the banks' 
respective ownership structures, government, semi-government and private. Therefore, it 
was needed to define what was meant by them in this thesis. The following definitions for 
banks' categories were used: 
• 	 Government or State-owned banks-financial institutions controlled directly by 
the government as opposed to a private entity. 
• 	 Semi-government Banks - [mandal institutions which had some stakes of the 
government and the management had government authorities overseeing them. 
-
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• 	 Private Banks - financial institutions which did not have official government 

stakes regardless of the ownership being held by any members of the 

governments. 

In addition, banks had been criticised for their engagement in money laundering activities 
(APG, 2008). Similar to many other developing and underdeveloped countries, there was 
a high level of domestic corruption. Myanmar was the second largest opium poppy 
grower in the world after Afghanistan and the banks also had significant roles in 
financing these activities. In Myanmar, at least half of the economic activity was 
officially unacknowledged. It was widely believed that illegal transactions account for 
significant portion of the private banks' activities (Tumell, 2003). As these were very 
sensitive issues, it was impossible to include them in the study. 
5.2.2 	 Assessment of Myanmar Banks' Performance in Lending (Secondary Data 
Analysis) 
In this thesis, only lending activities of the banks has been studied as its main aim is to 
explore the banks and institutions' interplay in lending to businesses. Thus, assessments 
of the banks' performance in lending using secondary data were conducted. Due to the 
country's lack of transparency and reluctance in disseminating information, it was 
difficult to provide comprehensive analysis of the current lending situations in Myanmar. 
Thus, analyses were based on the official data and the responses given by the 
interviewees which are the primary source of information. 
First of all, before conducting research on the banks' internal risk ratings and loan 
assessments, it was needed to understand their performance in terms of their credit 
allocations, loan specifications and efficiencies in managing loans from secondary data 
analyses. The major problem in regard to conducting research in Myanmar was not only 
the accessibility of the right person but also the data availability. Censuses or statistics in 
.. 
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Myanmar were not well maintained and their reliability was questionable. This meant 
data provided by the Myanmar government needed to be handled with care. Thus, it 
became quite impossible to apply econometrics to study banks' lending behaviour. As it 
was mentioned in the methodological chapter, some of the data were obtained from 
internal sources. Since the researcher was not part of the CBM or Myanmar banks, data 
which were considered sensitive by them could not be obtained. For example, at fIrst 
sectorial-wise contribution in percentage ofGDP could be found only for the periods until 
2004 when they were accessed in 2009. However, in 2011, which coincided with the 
political openings, figures after 2004 became available in the same World Bank database. 
Hence, it was quite hard for the researcher to make definite conclusions using quantitative 
data. In summary, data on non-performing loans and loan allocations to different sectors 
were collected from CBM directly whereas data on GDP, sectorial contributions to GDP 
and deposits at different banks were calculated and presented based on IIvlF and W orId 
Bank database. 
5.2.3 Assessment of Myanmar Banks' Loan Allocations 
In this section, loans' growth and allocations by Myanmar banks will be examined. 
Firstly, total loans provided by the banks over the period of 2007-2011 were analysed. 
According to the following Figure 5-2, the number of loans provided in 2010-2011 
signifIcantly increased. This coincided with the establishments of four new banks and the 
democratic refonns in the country. There were several conclusions that could be drawn 
from the trend. However, from banks' lending perspective, the primary reason might be 
that the four new private banks' activities in providing loans had increased and they had 
more customers who demanded loans. Secondly, opening up the economy in 2010 had 
effects on business expansions. This could be viewed as both negative and positive 
signals. If the dramatic increased in the total loans provided by the banks were due to the 
expansion of businesses and increased in business activities, it gave positive signals 
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Overview of Myanmar's Banking Sector 
indicating that the banks were meeting the businesses demands for additional financial 
assistance. On the other hand, they might be overly risk taking in the new economic 
environment or banks might have other political drives in providing more loans as the 
new banks were said to be owned by the country's businessmen who had political ties. 
2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
Year 
Figure 5-2: Total Loans Provided by Banks (in Kyats) over the Period of2007-2011 
The loans provided by the banks were then differentiated again into sectorial wise loans 
in Figure 5-3 to assess the banks' loan allocations to different sectors. From 
Figure 5-4and Figure 5-5, there were positive loan growths in all the sectors except 
services and real estate which had experienced negative loan growths prior to 2010-2011. 
Higher loans provided to businesses also indicated that there was a positive outlook in the 
economy. The significant increment in the overall amount of loans provided by banks 
was the results of loans higher growth in agriculture, manufacturing, trading and service 
sectors in 2010-2011. However, the growths in construction and miscellaneous sectors 
were not as significant as the other four sectors. It also gave a signal that there was no 
loan growth for the real estate sector despite of the increased loans provided to the 
construction sector. 
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2007-2011 
The data provided in the following Figure 5-6, as the changes among the percentages of 
sectorial-wise contribution to GDP was not significant, they would be used as it was to 
compare them with the data provided in the above Figure 5-5. From these two figures, it 
could be seen that though agriculture sector provided the highest contribution to GDP 
than other sectors, manufacturing and service, lesser loans were being provided. This 
might be due to NGOs' and INGOs' role in providing microfinance to the agricultural 
sector. However, their success rate was also criticised by the senior authorities of the 
country. Similarly, these microfinance institutions criticised these authorities for the low 
success rate and also for the lack of micro finance law. It was only been drafted and 
implemented in the end of 2011 though such activities were in existence for many years 
before. Interestingly, although the smallest contribution sector to overall GDP was 
'manufacturing', it had the higher proportion loans being allocated. This resulted to low 
domestic credit provided by the banking sector to GDP as shown in Figure 5-11. The 
figures for the other sectors contribution towards GDP were not available. All in all, the 
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demands for loans were not met by official financial intermediation. These business 
activities were financed through either savings or other informal loans. 
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Figure 5-6: Sectorial-wise Contribution in Percentage of GDP over the Period of 
2006-2010 
All in all, despite of the high loan growth; much of this growth was contributed by 
increased in trading and manufacturing sectors. Constructions, transportations and real 
estate had lesser percentage of total loans being allocated. The most interesting discovery 
from this analysis was that agricultural sector contributed a larger proportion of the 
country's GDP, but banks' loan allocations to this sector were not significant. After 
examining banks' allocations of loans, the next section will discuss whether banks were 
efficient in managing the loans they provided. 
5.2.4 Assessment of Lending Efficiency 
In order to understand banks' efficiencies in managing their assets in balance sheets, 
especially loans, it was important to analyse their non-performing loans (NPL). Firstly, it 
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was needed to understand how these non-perfonning loans were defined and classified as 
to thoroughly analyse the data. As the fmancial institutions in Myanmar were tightly 
regulated, the CBM provided the guidelines in prescribing provisions for bad loans to the 
banks. Generally, banks were required to hold general provision of at least 2% of total 
outstanding loans and advances. In addition, according to the Section 11, sub-section (d) 
of the Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law also stated that the CBM had the right to 
demand financial institutions to make additional provisions against specific assets. Hence, 
provisions for different classifications of non-performing loans and advances were set by 
CBM as in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1: Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Loans 
Non-performing Loans/ Advances 
1 Sub-standard Loans / Advances 
2 Doubtful Loans / Advances 
3 Bad Loans / Advances 
Provisions on Shortfall in Security 
Value 
Nil 
50% 
100% 
The classifications of non-performing loans and advances were based on the principles 
established by the CBM. They were classified as in Table 5-2. The CBM also provided 
detailed guidelines for treating interest on non-performing loans and advances, 
rescheduling credit facilities, the process by which reclassifications of non-performing 
loans as perfonning, etc. In other words, banks had no flexibilities in rearranging these 
guidelines. Moreover, guidelines on the valuation of securities were also provided to 
them. Banks were provided with the reporting formats for weekly, monthly and annually 
reporting to present not only non-perfonning loans but also liquidity ratios. They are 
provided in Appendix 5. 
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Table 5-2: Classification of Non-perlorming Loans and Advances 
Principal or Interest in Classification of Non-performing Loans! 
Default for 	 Advances 
1 	 6 months but less than 12 Sub-standard 

months 

2 	 12 months but less than 24 Doubtful 

months 

3 	 24 months and above Bad 
According to the data received from CBM, the reported NFL over the years, from 2007 to 
2011 had increased. Similarly, there were also upward trends if these NPLs were divided 
into different categories, namely sub-standard, doubtful and bad-debts. This did not 
provide a bigger picture on how much in terms of these were contributed in terms of total 
NPL and their management abilities of these NPLs specifically. Thus, in Figure 5-7, these 
different classifications were then measured in terms ofpercentages of NFL. 
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Figure 5-8: Sub-standard, Doubtful and Bad-debts in Percentages of Non­
performing Loans over the Period of 2007-2011 
From the above Figure 5-8, it could be seen that, the banks were able to reduce bad debts 
from 73.86% in 2008-2009 to 42.40% in 2010-2011. In other words, banks were able to 
prevent the previous years' doubtful and sub-standard from becoming bad debts. 
However, there was a dramatic increment in the sub-standard NPL indicating that many 
of their customers might have short-term cash flow problems which affecting their 
abilities to pay principal or interest for six to twelve months. 
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Figure 5-10: Comparison of Total Loans and Net Loans8 
Overall, from Figure 5-10, the total NFL in terms of total loans had decreased in the 
2010-2011 fmancial year, however, banks needed to make sure that the increasing sub­
standard NFL should not become bad-debts in the following years. Nevertheless, by 
looking at NFL in Myanmar without comparing with other countries would not give a 
clear picture ofthe banks' successes in achieving efficiency in managing NPLs. Since the 
liberalisation of the economy as a whole in 2010, large foreign capital inflows were 
expected. Indeed, the entry of foreign banks in the coming years would also test the local 
banks' strength in adapting and operating efficiently in new environment. Therefore, in 
order to analyse the success and efficiency of such type of banking sector, domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector and non-performing loans to GDP ratios were calculated 
for both Singapore and Myanmar. Singapore was used as a comparison or benchmark 
because it was the most developed country in the same geographical region, South East 
Asia and both these countries were members of ASEAN which had the collective goal of 
creating integrated economic area by 2015. 
8 Net Loans represents total loans to customers, reduced by possible default losses and unearned 
interest 
-
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Figure 5-12: Comparisons of Non-performing Loans (NPL) to Total Loans (TL) in 
Singapore9 and Myanmar 
In Figure 5-11, the ftrst ratio, the percentage of credit provided by banking sector to GDP 
indicates that the demand for loans had not been adequately met through offtcial financial 
intermediation. In Myanmar, just over 20% of the demand for loans was provided by the 
banking sector whereas in Singapore, over 80% was met through offtcial fmancial 
intermediation. Therefore, it could be that capital structures of businesses in Myanmar 
9 Data of non-performing loans for Singapore could be found from World Bank database but not 
for Myanmar. It is considered sensitive data by CBM. 
2010 
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might contain debt and equity but the source of these debts were not from banks. Even 
then, by observing the percentage of non-perfonning loans to total loans in comparison 
with Singapore showed banks' inefficiency in managing credit risks with respect to the 
demand of loans not being met (see Figure 5-12). This implied that both banks and 
businesses experienced high costs of obtaining and providing fmance. Indeed, the data 
did not show whether state-owned or private-owned banks contributed more on these 
non-perfonning loans. 
The CBM supervised the banks both on off-site and on-site. As to further enhance the 
regulatory framework and supervision of the banks, limit on banks' deposits, reserve 
requirements, liquidity requirements and capital adequacy requirements were also set for 
the banks to follow. Strict adherence to the additional measures as presented in Table 5-3 
was required by all banks. If CBM detected that a bank fell short of required limits, it 
would be penalised at 5% of the shortfall amount. 
Table 5-3: Additional Measures taken by CBM for Financial Stability 
Measures 	 Requirements 
1. 	 Limit on Deposits A bank's deposits should not exceed 10 
times of its paid-up capital 
2. 	 Reserve Requirements 10% of deposits to be deposited at the CBM 
(cash in hand should not be more than 25% 
of that reserves and deposits with the CBM 
should not be less than 75% 
3. 	 Liquidity Requirements 20% of deposits is to be kept in cash 
balances with the CBM or other banks 
4. 	 Capital Adequacy Ratio Total capital to be 10% of risk-weighted 
assets 
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Though the measures imposed on banks might seem very stringent and coercive, 
weaknesses in some of these measures could be identified. First of all, reserve 
requirements or reserve ratio is used by central banks as a monetary policy tool to 
influence a country's borrowing and interest rates by changing the amount of funds 
available for the banks to lend. In developed countries, central banks do not use reserve 
requirements but open market operations to implement their monetary policies because 
this could affect lower money creation. Compared to UK where there was no reserve 
requirement, 10% could be considered to be a high ratio. Nevertheless, Myanmar banks 
had much higher reserve ratios than they were required to hold by the CBM. Excess 
reserves in the following Figure 5-13, were calculated by deducting 10% from their 
reserve ratios. Due to the confidentiality issues, these data were collected from CBM and 
not from the banks themselves. I was not able to obtain full details of the reserve ratios, 
liquidity ratios and capital adequacy ratios for all the months of 2010 and 2011. These 
data were only for the month of March, 2010. They did not include data for govermnent 
banks. Though giving comprehensive analyses of the banks from only one month's data 
was insufficient, it would still be able to provide some understandings of the banks' 
maintaining and meeting of institutional requirements. 
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Figure 5-13: Excess Reserves of Semi-Government Banks for March, 2010 
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Figure 5-14: Excess Reserves of Private Banks for March, 2010 
From the above two figures, Figure 5-13 and Figure 5-14, banks capital reserves in excess 
of what was required by the CBM. Since banl<s were able to hold maximum of 25% of 
the 10% of the required deposits as cash in hand, it was expected that most of these 
excess reserves would be kept with the CBM. It was preferable to have excess reserves by 
financial finns as they provided extra safety measures in the events of bank runs and 
economic uncertainties. While the CBM did not give any interests on excess reserves as 
Federal Reserve does since 2009, there was no incentive for banks to hold large amounts 
of reserves at the CBM. From these data, proponents of having excess reserves would 
argue that Myanmar by not having a financially developed economy, the costs of 
processing infonnation, evaluating projects and monitoring borrowers were relatively 
higher compared to those of developed economies. Comparing the average excess 
reserves held by semi-government and private banks, the fonner kept much lower 
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reserves. It can indicate that the bank has higher reserves than the amount of deposits that 
it held at the point in time. Theoretically, this could be due to the fact that its balance 
sheet was lesser diversified and more volatile. However, the concrete underlying reasons 
for banks to have large reserves could not be explained from these statistical data itself. 
From the Figure 5-16, unexpectedly, Y oma Bank held much higher excess reserves than 
other private banks. Since the bank did not engage in banking activities and halted its 
operations, it had much higher excess reserves than other banks. 
Liquidity Rao of Semi-Government Banks for March, 2010 
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Figure 5-15: Liquidity Ratios of Semi-Government Banks for March, 2010 
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Figure 5-16: Liquidity Ratios of Private Banks for March, 2010 
Liquidity ratios for banks were calculated by dividing highly liquid assets with total 
liabilities (deposits). Highly liquid assets included vault cash, deposits with CBM and 
other financial institution, net inter-bank lending and borrowing with a remaining 
maturity period up to one month, and readily marketable securities. From Figure 5-15 and 
Figure 5-16, average liquidity ratios of private banks were significantly higher than that 
of semi-government banks'. The definitions of marketable securities and open market 
operations were very limited in Myanmar. There were no investment instruments other 
than government issued treasury bonds in Myanmar's bond markets. The CBM issues 2­
year, 3-year and 5-year government treasury bonds since 1993. They had interest rates of 
10.5%, 11.0% and 11.5% respectively. The treasuring bonds deposited by financial 
institutions in the CBM were treated as cash balance in calculating the reserve 
requirements. According to Win (2010), since the CBM included treasury bonds in 
measuring reserve ratios, private banks maintained their strong liquidity positions by 
purchasing these treasury bonds. Therefore, private banks were the major investors of 
treasury bonds (see Table 5-4). This explained much about high reserve and liquidity 
ratios by the private and semi-government banks. 
-
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Table 5-4: Largest Bond Purchasers and their Shares in Total Bond Ontstanding as 
at June 30,2009 (Source: Win (2010») 
Name of Banks Amount of Bonds Share (%) 
Purchased (Kyat in 
Millions) 
Kanbawza Bank 100,000 29.65% 
Myawaddy Bank 75,300 22.33% 

Myanma Livestock and 43,000 12.75% 

Fisheries Development 

Bank 

Remaining 12 Banks 118,950 35.27% 
Total 337,250 100% 
The maximum interest rate limits set by the CBM on lending and deposits during the 
period in which data was collected were 17% and 12% respectively. As presented in the 
previous section, banks had faced limited lending activities and inefficiencies in loan 
allocations, banks could offset their opportunity costs of high deposits which could not be 
lent to businesses by investing in those treasury bonds which were paying between 10.5 
to 11.5%. In other words, banks could reduce the cost of having high deposits up to 
0.5% 10. Therefore, banks were not only able to maintain strong liquidity position by 
purchasing treasury bonds but also able to offset the cost of having high deposits with the 
income received from these treasury bonds. Consequently, banks did not have the 
pressures to lend to businesses to cover the opportunity costs. 
Capital adequacy ratio, a measure used by financial regulators to assess banks' ability to 
meet risks such as credit risks or the buffer for potential losses to protect depositors and 
lenders, is also studied in this section. According to the regulatory requirements, banks 
10 In Myanmar, banks give deposit rate of 12%. By investing in treasuring bonds, they could pay 
depositors with the interests they receive from the treasury bonds. They can maximise it until they 
only need to pay extra 0.5% from their income. 
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were supposed to maintain capital adequacy ratio of 10%. Similar to reserve requirements 
and liquidity ratios, not only private but also semi-government banks maintained high 
level of capital adequacy ratios. It indicates that banks had large provisions for risk 
management which limited their abilities in expansion of credit or other investments. 
Interestingly, Kanbawza bank, the largest government bonds purchasers had the lowest 
capital adequacy ratio. It was also the largest bank in the country. This indicated that the 
bank's lending to the government required lesser capital to maintain as it was better 
protected than any other borrowers. Contrastingly, Myanmar Citizens Bank, Yoma Bank 
and Yadanabon Bank have much higher ratio. This might indicate that these banks might 
either engage in more risky activities or were risk averse, except Yoma Bank, which 
suspended its banking activities since 2003? All in all, by maintaining high capital 
adequacy ratios than the requirements meant risk adversities could be seen not only with 
regulators but also with banks. Nevertheless, such conclusions were impossible with 
limited data and information. 
Capital Adequacy Rao of Semi-Government Banks for 
March, 2010 
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Figure 5-17: Capital Adequacy Ratios of Semi-Government Banks for March, 2010 
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Capital Adequacy Rao of Private Banks for March, 2010 
II Capital Adequacy Rao 
194.63% 
• 
Figure 5-18: Capital Adequacy Ratios of Private Banks for March, 2010 
Other factors that could provide banks' risk adversities and complying could be observed 
through analysing their securities used in lending to businesses. Since 2003, banks in 
Myanmar were not allowed to provide loans without collaterals. The acceptable 
collaterals were only land and buildings even apartments were not eligible as collaterals 
because there was no law for condominiums and apartments. Therefore it was not 
surprising to see significantly higher percentages of land and buildings as the basis of 
securities for providing loans. Furthermore, the increasing housing prices over the years 
in the country should give banks an advantage in case of the borrowers' default. 
•
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Table 5-5: Percentages of Security-wise Loans over the Period of 2007-2011 
Security-wise Loans 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
Land and Building 89.2070% 93.0531% 93.5093% 84.1586% 
Diamond and Gold 0.1229% 0.1092% 0.0053% 0.0026% 
Fixed Deposit and other Deposit O.oI 13% 0.0063% 0.0033% 0.0011% 
Machinery and Merchandise 3.0204% 1.8466% 1.4054% 1.0311% 
I 
Personal and Organisation 3.4500% 1.8795% 2.0942% 7.5541% 

Guarantee 

Miscellaneous 3.2248% 2.4069% 2.5197% 1.7524% 

Unsecured 0.6072% 0.4070% 0.2589% 5.4147% 

Real Estate 0.3564% 0.2914% 0.2038% 0.0855% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Even though land and buildings were the only acceptable collaterals, there were other 
types of movable collaterals which comprise 6.49% to 15.84% of the securities from the 
period of 2007-2011. Since 2003, CBM reduced the types of acceptable collaterals to 
only land and building. Only in the beginning 2012, CBM announced that it would allow 
banks to take commodities including diamond and gold as collaterals. The presence of 
these items on balance sheet was questionable though their percentage of these items in 
relation to the 'land and building' category was negligible; its composition had increased 
in 2010·2011 fmancial period. Therefore, there was a need to explore the underlying 
assumptions for banks to accept them as securities. Similarly, these data did not provide 
the researcher whether the private, semi-government or government banks contributed to 
the increasing percentages of these types of securities loans. 
Overview ofMyanmar's Banking Sector 181 
18.0000% II Real Estate 
-
2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
16.0000% +---------------------------==~~~--
14.0000% [l Unsecured 
12.0000% 
10.0000% II Miscellaneo 

8.0000% us 

6.0000% 
I11III Personal 
and 
Organisao n 
4.0000% 
2.0000% Guarantee 
II Machinery 

0.0000% and 

Merchandis 

e 
Figure 5-19: Percentages of Security-wise Loans (except Land and Buildings) over 
the Period of 2007-2011 
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Figure 5-20: Loan to Deposit Ratios of Semi-Government Banks for March, 2010 
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Figure 5-21: Loan to Deposit Ratios of Private Banks for March, 2010 
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Figure 5-22: Profit before Tax of the Banking Industry over the Period of 2007-2011 
The global banking sector itself is one of the most highly institutionalised industries in 
the world due to their impact on the economies as a whole. Myanmar's banking industry 
was even more regulated compared to other parts of the world with the presence of 
bureaucratic culture. Theoretically, increased official supervisory power was favourable 
for both the development and the stability of financial system. In fact, tighter regulations 
in capital requirements, collaterals, etc., resulted in banks to underwrite more profitable 
-

-
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banks did not receive much of general public's trusts compare to the government-owned 
banks despite the CBM acting as the lender of last resort. This could also be interpreted as 
people having little access to the banking services in Myanmar. 
--------.------.---.------------------- -----_._._­
III Government-Owned Banks t::l Private Banks 
----.-------.. 
Figure 5-23: Deposits (Saving Deposits, Saving Certificates13 and Time Deposits) in 
State-owned and Private-owned banks 
At the same time, the government-owned banks tended to have larger non-performing 
loans as report in 1996 (Caprio, 2003). Similar to some other data, I could not obtain the 
latest information on the percentages of non-performing loans contributed by the 
government and private banks separately. Thus, private banks did not have sufficient trust 
from the general public compared to the government banks. 
5.3 Conclusions 
In summary, the analyses in the chapter provided that the banks' lending regardless of 
whether they were government or private owned, inefficiencies in sectorial-wise loan 
allocations for economic developments, risk adversities not only at regulatory but also at 
bank levels. These raised some questions on their lending procedures including 
assessments and monitoring in regard to the institutional pressures exerted upon them 
13 Saving certifications are not offered by private banks 
-. 
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from their institutional enviromnent. In order to answer these questions, field work was 
conducted through interviewing with banks. The findings from the interviews will be 
explained in the following Chapter 6. 
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ABSTRACT 

This is an exploratory study which investigated the process by which banks' lending 
behaviour in Myanmar (Bunna) was influenced by the institutional environment and their 
responses towards them. The theoretical framework used in this study was primarily 
drawn upon Scott's new institutional theory. Since the theory focused on the convergent 
perspective rather than divergent perspective, the theory of Oliver's strategic responses to 
these institutional pressures, coercive, normative and mimetic, was incorporated in the 
theoretical framework development. The main method of data collection was interviews. 
NVIVO was used to analyse these interviewed data. However, descriptive statistics were 
also used to provide a comprehensive picture of the context being studied. The findings 
suggest that banks' always attempted to externalise risks to borrowers. Their responses to 
institutional pressures were to conform but a range of other forms of resistance were also 
found. However, strong fonns of resistance were uncommon. I have also identified the 
situations in which the banks would choose either strong or weak fonns of resistance to 
institutional pressures. Such identifications may add understanding to the specific lending 
strategies that are developed in different circumstances. The study also contributed to 
closing the gap in banking literature through conducting research in the context of 
Myanmar, which was previously unexplored. In addition, it suggests areas needed to be 
improved for financial sector development in Myanmar. 
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Chapter Six: Field Work 
6.1 Introduction 
The secondary data analyses, which provided the current circumstances of Myanmar's 
banking industry. They showed that banks were not allocating and managing loans 
efficiently_ These raised concerns on Myanmar banks' internal risk assessment 
procedures and their responses to the tight regulations imposed by the regulatory 
authorities in highly bureaucratic environment. Though it was necessary to understand 
how banks were institutionalised, there was also a requirement to understand the strategic 
responses to institutional pressures as to explore the banks' regulatory arbitrage and under 
what circumstances they took place. This confirmed that through regulatory approach 
alone would not create a functioning stable financial system. 
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Figure 6-1: Summary of the Findings 
Therefore, interviews were conducted in Myanmar to answer these questions. In other 
words, the research aimed to explore institutions and banks' interplays in lending to 
businesses. To achieve this, two theories were used to guide the researcher in data 
collection. They were institutional theory and Oliver's strategic responses to institutional 
pressures. Unlike from social constructionist view of institutionalism, applying 
institutional theory to organisational studies from critical realist perspective allowed the 
researcher to uncover non-conformity by banks to institutional pressures and the stimuli 
creating differing strategic responses. According to the institutional theory, changes in 
institutional environment of organisation might result in homogeneity across banks' 
lending practices in the industry. They were coercive pressure, nonnative pressure, and 
mimetic pressure. 
As it is exploring interplays between banks and institutions, it was appropriate to present 
the findings with different pressures exerted on banks along with their responses to them 
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when they were in the situation of having to attain legitimacy while achieving efficiency 
or increasing profitability. The categories of these strategic responses were developed by 
Oliver (1991). They might employ acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and 
manipulation strategies. Such kinds of behaviours and responses along with the stimuli, 
mediating factors that could deviate from conforming to institutional pressures, for banks 
to engage in these kinds of behaviours were described and analysed along with the 
supporting empirical data. 
6.2 Institutional Theory 
As this study incorporates two theories, the findings can be presented from two 
theoretical perspectives. This section is addressed from institutional theoretical 
perspective. Hence, it will address the research question one: 
RQl: How are banks' lending practices influenced and what sources influence 
them? 
i 
Sources of"I ~~ Types of Institutional rI~, ---~ Banks~InstjtutiO~l Pcess~- ~ _"___pressures J-
Figure 6-2: Graphical Presentation ofRQl 
The above diagram, Figure 6-2 provides graphical presentation of the first research 
question. The institutional theory has been applied to understand how institutional 
pressures influenced banks' lending practices. These pressures are examined through their 
respective sources to understand what institutions the banks are exposed to and how they 
affect them. 
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6.2.1 Coercive Pressures 
6.2.1.1 Central Bank 
Coercive pressures from the central bank can be categorised as formal pressures exerted 
on banks through formal media by the government in order to maintain financial stability. 
These pressures or restrictions arising from CBM enforcement of banks was mentioned 
by the interviewees as follows. 
Collateral requirements imposed by CBM were also mentioned by the 
interviewees in many accounts by both the government and privately affiliated 
banks. 
40% ojthe collateral'sjorce sale value only. We can only lend 20% oj 
paid-up capital and reserve to a single individual. Ifwe can lend the 
amount, we do. We give only short-term loans. 
S-B 
Since we can't take the business as a collateral, we take land and 
building as a security. 
G-B 
The stricter regulations imposed on the banks after 2003 financial crisis were also 
mentioned by the banks during the interviews. 
Before central banks' regulations, we accept apartments and 
cars as colla tera Is. Now, we have to take only mortgages. 
P-A 
Since there is no guideline by the government to accept loans 
without security, all of them are secured loans. In the past, we 
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accept commodities, gold as collateral. After 2003, we can only 
take real estates as collaterals. 
P-B 
The quotes coded under restrictions in interest rates were important in analysing 
banks' lending behaviour. These indicated that banks' lending interest rates were 
not based on the borrowers' business risk or the interbank lending rates as LIB OR 
in the UK but were set by CBM. The following quotes were coded: 
We have no administration charge. But we have restrictions on 
interest charges. They are set by the Central Bank. 
G-C 
The interest premium is regulated by the government, we can 
lend not more than 17% interest rate. But for industrials and 
agricultural businesses, we lend with 15%. Other than that, we 
lend them at 17%. 
P-B 
Strictly regulated. They gave us the benchmark rate. We can charge 
maximum 17% and service charge 1%. So, total 18% It is the highest 
in the world. In Brazil, it's just 12% and in Pakistan, I guess, it's only 
10%. 
S-B 
According to the law, it's priority rate plus 3% for deposits and plus 
6% for lending rate. However, in the end, we were told to lend at 
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17%. There is some unfavourable legislation. 
S-D 
Since we give 12% on deposits, and we are only allowed to lend 80% 

ofthe deposits by the Central Bank, we don" change interest rates. 

S-E 
Along with the restrictions in interest rates, banks also did mention of the restrictions in 
the sizes of loans that would be provided to borrowers. These restrictions could be based 
on the collateral values as well as the maximum amount of loans that could be provided 
to the borrowers. 
The guidelines told us that the loan size should not be 30% if the land 
value and 50% ofthe building. 
G-A 
It depends on the collateral value and the maximum amount that an 
individual applicant can get is stated by the central bank law. 
According to the Law, we can only give 30% of the land value and 
50% ofthe building value. 
G-B 
We look at the business and its liquidity and solvency. We can 
only lend 20% of total capital and reserves. Ifwe can lend the 
amount, we do. 
P-A 
Guidelines are driven based on the law and central bank's 
instructions. We have a policy not to lend more than 70% to 
80% of the deposits. According to the central bank, a lending 
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limit to a single client is 20% ofthe bank's capital and reserve. 
The maximum an applicant can get is the 50% ofthe value ofthe 
collaterals. 
p-c 
Capital + paid-up capital x 20% is the maximum that an individual 
can get (according to the CBM). 
P-D 
Since we give 12% on deposits, and we are only allowed to lend 80% 
ofthe deposits by the Central Bank, we don't change interest rates. 
S-E 
These restrictions were found in all banks irrespective of their ownership 
structures. This indicated that there were homogeneities among banks. 
As mentioned in the literature, providing short-term loans indicated banks' risk 
adversities or externalisation of risks to borrowers because banks could reassess the 
borrowers' risks regularly. CBM imposed restrictions when banks provide loans to the 
businesses indicate its risk adversities. Such attitudes reflected in the banks' risk attitudes 
as well. 
All ofour loans are short-terms. It would be more appropriate to term 
them as overdrafts which can be renewed every once a year. We used 
to have long-term and according to the law, we can give long-term 
loans. 
G-B 
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We only lend short-term loans because our deposits are also 
short-term. If we give long-term loans, there will be a mix­
match. All the loans are one-year and renewed every year. 
P-B 
40% ofthe collateral's force sale value only. We can only lend 20% of 
paid-up capital and reserve to a single individual. If we can lend the 
amount, we do. We give only short-term loans. 
S-B 
Only one year, because CEM does not permit. The loans can be 
renewedfor 6 months or one year depending on the track records. 
s-C 
In summary, collateral requirements, restrictions in interest rates, loan size and terms are 
the most important measurements of banks' lending behaviour. For instance, the 
acceptable collaterals were only immovable properties excluding those that were tied up 
with borrowers' businesses. This indicated CBM's risk adversities. Since personal 
properties were not related to the survival of the businesses, banks were able to recover 
their loan losses in case of the borrowers' bankruptcies. Interest rates being capped at 
certain rates might be seen as some forms of intemalisation of risks. However, if it were 
to be observed along with the banks being restricted to only providing loans with short­
term maturities, risk adversities were still prevalent. The following codes could also 
provide the process by which banks' lending to businesses was constrained within 
different limitations. 
Determining the sectors that banks lend to was based on the CBM guidelines. Though 
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this might not be seen as an important code, however, from the perspective of observing 
the banks from the extent to which the government had control over the banks would 
have on them, this code should not be discarded. It indicated that the government had 
strict control over the basics in which banks conduct lending to businesses. Both the 
government and private banks had mentioned that they had to categorise the businesses 
that they lent to according to the CBM. 
When we lend, we look at the 5Cs. Then, we look at the sectors in 
which the borrowers' conduct their businesses. They are differentiated 
into production, service, construction, transportation, etc. It is 
according to the CBM. 
G-A 
Production, Trading, Transport, Construction, Services and so 
on. They are according to the Central Bank. 
P-C 
Banks' internal loan loss policies were also structured according to the CBM 
requirements. 
If the borrower cannot pay back for three quarters, we consider them 
as loss. This is according to the central bank's policy. Since we have 
checked the business and collaterals thoroughly, we don 'I have losses. 
S-A 
In addition to the loan loss policies, banks would have to face penalties for not 
conforming to the regulatory guidelines. 
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If the lending has exceeded the limit set by the central bank, we 
have to pay penalties. 
P-B 
The question being asked to the interviewees was whether they were allowed to increase 
or decrease the interest premium and service charge if they thought the targets set by the 
bank might be high for the loan applicants. The following responses were given by the 
interviewed banks. 
No, we can't. They are according to the Central Bank's guidelines. 
G-C 
Service charge of1% and commitment charge of1% ofthe remaining 
loan amount with the bank. They are in accordance with CBM 
P-D 
In many developed countries, service charges were determined by the banks themselves. 
However, in Myanmar, service charges were determined by CBM. 
6.2.1.2 Social-political Institutions 
Social-political institutions also exerted coercive pressures on the banks, thereby shaping 
banks' lending practices. 
It depends on case by case basis. If the government said we should 
pay, then we pay. The decision is done by different management 
levels. 
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G-A 
when there was Nargis Cyclone, the government asked us to lend to 
salt businesses. After Nargis, we don 'I lend anymore. In coordination 
with Sibin Tharyaryay bank and co-operative bank, we have also lent 
to Shwe Than L win for converting cars to CNG compatible cars. 
S-A 
Well, for some cases, for instance, during the time ofprivatisations of 
official buildings, with the authority guidelines, we lend at 16% 
interest rates 
s-c 
Sometimes if it's the government policy to lend to certain sectors, for 
example, salt factories, we have to lend without collaterals while the 
guarantor is the salt department in the Minist/y. There, we have to 
lend at 15% This rate is also for Industrial loans. 
S-D 
Indeed, social political institutions could help shape banks' lending to different sectors, 
their roles changed depending on different circumstances. 
6.2.2 Normative 
The literature had identified the sources of nonnative pressures were identified as 
corporate culture, professional associations, external verifiers and the government (its 
developmental guidelines). However, from the interviews with the banks, additional 
source identified was the borrower's affiliated industrial associations which could 
i Findings 197 
determine the borrower's credibility. As with coercive pressures, the normative pressures 
could be identified based on the sources as follows: 
6.2.2.1 Corporate Culture 
Corporate culture was analysed through banks' decision approval process, reward system, 
trainings given to employees, their risk adversities and ethical concerns, etc. It should be 
noted that corporate culture was an alternative analysis of the impact of national culture 
on banks. As it was noted in the literature, bureaucratic culture was prevalent in the 
country. Hence, authority at senior management levels, collective reward systems and 
their types of competitions advocated by the banks would suggest how the banks' lending 
practices were shaped. 
Authority at Senior Level Management 
Decision approval system, where the loan officers were given less or no authorities to 
make decisions, confirm the influence of hierarchical culture on banks. Starting from 
governments to private banks, the ownership structures had no effect on their decision 
making styles, i.e. loan officers had no authority to make any decisions regarding loan 
approvals. 
From 300 million to 20 billion kyats, the decision is made by BOD. 
Larger than that, it/s the minister's decision. 
G-A 
Yes. Loan officers can make personal judgements but they need 
to be approved by the management. 
p-c 
Most of the interviewees had emphasised the importance of BOD members and the senior 
----~-
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level management in providing loans. In some cases where the banks had government 
ownership, ministers of their respective affiliations were also engaged in decision making 
process. 
If the members of board of directors brought them to the bank, we 

lend to them. 

Board of Directors make the decisions on the maximum amount of 

credit to give. They also decide on the percentage ofcollateral value 

that they are going to give to the borrowers. However, for some of the 

borrowers, for instance, Dr. Khin Shwe, the loans given to them are 

more than the value ofhis collaterals. 

The BOD usually market credit for businesses. 

When the borrowers are brought to the bank, they are guaranteed by 

at least one ofthe Board ofDirectors. 

It's the collaterals. The final decision is made by the Board of 

Directors and the Minister. 

S-E 
As described in the interview with S-E bank, BOD members were not only part of 
decision making but also play an important role in marketing for the business and 
assessments of the borrowers' credibility. 
We have loan assessors. Even directors do field study to check 
whether there is real business or not. 
Our rules are based on the CBM law. 55% of the stake is owned by 
the government, so all of them are based on the CBM The trading 
minister is part ofthe management. 
-----_., 
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It is led by the director. There are 12 members in the board and 
managing director is part ofit. Board ofdirectors always overrule. 
the board ofdirectors give approvals. Field inspection is also done by 
one ofthe directors. 
s-c 
In some cases, apart from BOD members, shareholders also played an important 
role in loan approval process. 
We have shareholders and traders in each branch who are 
overseeing the operations. Our way of operating is similar to 
Japanese banks. Final decisions are made in the main branch. 
However, the applications are first evaluated and recommended 
by the committee ofshareholders and traders. 
If the shareholders are able to guarantee, we give priority. 
P-A 
It's the BOD who makes the final decisions. 
S-A 
Though some of the banks had mentioned of decentralising the assessment 
process, the final decisions were made by the management and centralised 
committees. 
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since our bank has different branches, they have their own set 
committees. We have proficiency assessment team in 
headquarter and centralised loan committee. 
P-B 
Loan amount less than three billion kyats are made by credit 
committee and over that has to be done by the board ofdirectors. 
It is easier for us to verify the loan applications if the borrowers 
borrow from their respective branches and then approvals are made 
at the main office in Yangon. 
P-D 
The limited role of loan officers became more prevalent when S-D bank mentioned that 
there were no conflicts among employees in regard to final decisions. 
Yes, we have credit management committee headed by the chairman. 
There is no conflict among employees in regard to making loan 
decisions because they are made by management. 
S-D 
Even with the agricultural bank:, where transparency was appreciated, the loan 
officers were more engaged in administrative work than taking part in loan 
approval process. 
Not really. It's the branches. The applications are sent to the 
main office through Ministry ofAgriculture. Once they reached 
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the bank, all the documents are in place, including, the 
application documents and the stamp of the Ministry. The 
farmers don't come directly. It's the branch manager's decision. 
Then, the applications are sent to the main office for approval. 
We have meeting at the main office. We invite the branch manager. 
These meetings take place within one month of the applications. If the 
applications are made at the end ofMarch, they are given in April. 
G-C 
In summary, the interviews with the banks uncovered the fact loan officers had 
little role in making lending decisions. It was also interesting to find that BOD 
members' engagement in borrowers' credibility assessments by conducting field 
studies 
Lack of Competition among Sister Branches 
Before describing the quotes coded under this main theme, it was important to 
understand why this code was worth studying for exploring banks' lending 
behaviour. In many developed countries, for example, in the UK and US, the 
banks would encourage competition among its branches across the countries, 
which could motivate the staff members to take more risks, thereby; aggressive 
risk taking behaviour was promoted. However, in Myanmar, the lack of 
competition among sister branches indicated that there would be less risk taking 
behaviour. 
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We don't compete with sister branches. All is one and they have to 

work hard together. 

S-D 
No, it depends on the existence of branches and developments, 

we compare quarterly performances. However, the performance 

is always much better than previous years. However, if the 

performance is low, they have to give reasons. 

p-c 
Nevertheless, risk taking behaviour among the banks might change over time as one of 
the interviewees mentioned of the potential of changing it to improve their performance. 
Not now, but we will do in the future if it would improve the bank's 

performance. 

S-c 
Collective or No Reward System 
Similar to the previous code, collective reward system where, employees or loan officers' 
bonuses were paid based on annual profits instead of the number of loans they could 
made in a financial year, indicates that banks' were not encouraged risk taking behaviour. 
However, we give rewards based on profit and loss account of 
each branch. We have reward system but it is not based on the 
amount ofloans but based on the branch. 
P-A 
p-c 
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Depending on profits, we give bonus to staffi. 
We have end of the year bonus system. Depending on the profit, they 

can get 13 or 14 times their salary as bonus. 

S-B 
Bonus is for every staffs, depending on the profit, we give two to three 

times ofthe salary as bonus. 

s-c 
It is based on the profit. Amount of bonus usually is three or four 

times the salary. Depending on the staffperformance (i.e. not taking 

any leaves), in the last six months, they can get promotion. In New 

Year time (between March and April) and full moon day Thadingyut 

(in October) we give them bonuses. 

S-D 
Before the budget closes, they look at the profit and loss account, they 

decide on the bonuses. So, it's only once a year. 

S-E 
As it was mentioned by the banks, the bonuses were not made depending on the number 
of loans provided but based on the end of the year profits; therefore, banks were more 
cautious in providing loans that would reduce the end of the year profit. This affected 
lower level staffs' risk taking behaviour. It went more extreme in some government 
banks where they mentioned that they had neither bonuses given to the staffs nor 
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competition among the branches. 
We have no competition among sister branches and no bonuses are 

given to stcifJ 

G-A 
No. We don't have reward systems for staff. 
G-B 
The central office gives some rewards for collecting loans. The 

rewards are given based on whether the branches can give loans early 

and recollect quickly and it is given to those top 10 branches. 

G-C 
G-C, an agricultural bank, which engaged in microfinance loans, had different operational 
process. However, similar to the other banks, it could be induced that the system did not 
encourage employees to take excessive risks. 
Risk Adversities and Ethical Concerns 
Banks, in general, are risk adverse and would like to transfer risks to the 
customers by charging higher interest premiums or put higher collateral 
requirements. In Myanmar, banks could only provide lower than 50% of the 
collateral value with the assumption that they did not have other methods of risk 
mitigation. Banks' elimination of risks by refusing to lend to businesses without 
transferring risks to the borrowers could also be seen: 
The bank does not support shipping businesses and gems 
businesses because they are risky. Ifwe take ships as collateral, 
we can lose our investment if the ships sunk. 
P-B 
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Mining and Constructions are very risk businesses. According 
the ethics of the bank, it does not lend to those businesses that 
involved in poultry farming. We also decline to support film 
industry. Though we consider constructions to be risky, 
depending on the profitability, we sometimes lend to them. 
However, the rate is not flexible even if the borrower is 
creditworthy. 
p-c 
Burmese culture is predominantly influenced by Buddhism. Therefore, these 
values can be found in the banks' lending practices. For instance, two of the 
interviewed private and one semi-government banks mention that they refuse to 
lend to businesses that engage in alcohol, cigarettes and poultry farming which 
involves 'killing' animals. As these industries themselves are risky businesses, 
their risk adversities could be related to their ethical concerns. 
If the businesses are not in accordance with government policies or 
oppose to government, we don" lend them. We are kind ofstrict with 
alcohol related businesses 
P-D 
Some of the banks also state that they do not lend to construction and gem businesses 
because they are too risky. This is similar to Islamic banking's or sustainability lending'S 
philosophy which is to ensure that banks engage in ethical investing. It is to be noted that 
there is no Islamic banking activities or products in place at the moment in Myanmar. 
Nevertheless, government banks do not have any restrictions. 
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According to Hofstede (1984), it can be termed as "high uncertainty avoidance" 
where people try to minimise the occurrence of unknown and unusual 
circumstances and to proceed with careful changes step by step by implementing 
rules, laws and regulations. 
We decline to support construction, timber and gem industry because 

ofhigh risk involved. 

P-A 
All in all, it shows that there are homogeneities in banks' decision approval processes, 
levels of authority given to loan officers and also their reward systems (though 
government banks have not mentioned any types of rewards given to them). 
6.2.2.2 Industrial Associations 
Though quotes under this category were limited, it should not be discarded as the data 
suggests the role of additional institutions in determining borrowers' credibility. It was 
mentioned by two interviewees that the industrial associations in which borrowers' were 
part of could provide the banks with their reputations and characters in the industry. 
We look at the borrower's character, his reputation, references from 
the industry, 
P-D 
Industrial associations and their members can provide us with the 
borrower's character and their reputations. You see, the numbers of 
businesses engaged in each industry are very limited, so, everyone knows 
each other. 
S-E 
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Since banks only provided loans to large businesses which belong to certain industrial 
associations, it is reasonable for them to use them to determine the perspective borrowers' 
credibility. 
6.2.2.3 Myanmar Bankers' Association 
Professional associations serve as a setting for "intra-professional discourse" regarding 
legitimacy (Dacin et aI., 2002) and disseminate agreed values and norms. These types of 
professional associations are influential in promoting institutional change such as 
responding to market forces, alteration in the political context of banking. Therefore, new 
mechanisms resulting from these changes in power alignments that could delegitimise 
existing normative frameworks, or other forms of control, are communicated in these 
types of professional institutions across the globe. Similar to other countries, Myanmar 
also has its own association for bankers called "Myanmar Bankers' Association" (MBA). 
MBA provides a wide range of courses for the staffs across the banks in Myanmar. It has 
a strong network that links banks and provides extensive training programmes delivered 
by the senior level managers of the banks in the country. For example, the interviewed 
managers mentioned sending their staffs to MBA to continue their studies. Therefore, 
shared beliefs and values are expected to be passed down through these training 
programmes, thereby, creating normative working communities. The two interviews with 
the banks' directors mentioned that they did not look much on whether the prospective 
employee was graduated from the university with either Arts or Science degrees. 
However, for continuous professional development, the staffs were required to attend 
trainings at MBA. 
Yes. We have internal trainings. For different levels ofstaffs, trainings 
are provided by Ministry ofTax and Revenue. For external trainings, 
they are sent to India. Some of the staffs are given on duty leave for a 
G-C 
.... 
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year to study the courses provided by the Myanmar Bankers' 

Associations, 

We have Myanmar Bankers' associations where the trainings are 

given. We also give in-house inductions. 

P-D 
Yes, we give trainings to staffs. On-going trainings are also given by 

Myanmar Bankers' Associations. 

S-A 
We have Myanmar Bankers' associations where the trainings are 

given. We also give in-house inductions as soon as they start working. 

They must be 18 years ofage, graduated to a degree level with major 

in business, finance and accounts. To enter into the bank, they should 

pass written and verbal examinations. 

s-c 
Yes, we do give trainings once they start their work. They mostly learn 

from experiences and colleagues. We also send them to trainings 

provided by Myanmar Bankers' Association and the Central Bank. 

S-E 
These examples show that some of the banks' loan officers have no significant prior 
knowledge of the banking activities, thus, they do not have their own values and norms at 
the beginning of their placement but the desired normative framework within the industry 
is imposed upon them through their work experience and intra-professional trainings. 
Since I was unable to interview loan officers or those who have received these types of 
trainings, I cannot certainly state that this professional association passes shared values 
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and nonns to the employees. Pressures exerted on banks through professional 
associations are not found in particular, however, the banks have a common training 
arena, and it is expected that bankers would share their norms, values and beliefs. All in 
all, it can be implied that similar nonnative framework is established within the banks' 
employees through the same trainings provided by the senior level managers in the 
banking industry. 
6.2.3 Mimetic Pressures 
The conversations with interviewees, they stated that they did not mimic any best 
practices in the industry as all of them were lending under the same standards and criteria. 
The only difference among them was their customer base. They also mentioned that no 
one was creating industry best practices as they were not allowed to. They stated that they 
knew each other's lending practices as they were all the same, same collateral 
requirements, interest rates, etc. 
One of the banks mentioned that they do imitate the process by which foreign banks such 
as Singapore in handling customer services. Another bank stated that their organisational 
decision making process was similar to that of Japanese banks. It is to be noted here that 
Myanmar looks up to Singapore and Japan. The country, itself has a number of different 
relationships and support from these countries. However, none of them had mentioned 
that they imitated each other or had any differences. 
Our practices are similar to that ofJapanese banks 
P-A 
We imitate the oeBe bank's one stop service system 
s-c 
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From the empirics, it can be implied that the decision to mimic best practice in the 
industry is contingent upon the recognition of the importance of other pressures (coercive 
and nonnative). If the other pressures are higher, it would be less likely for the banks to 
mimic other types of banks' lending practices. In addition, when the organisations are 
highly institutionalised, it becomes very difficult or impossible for banks to be innovative 
in their activities, thereby, no opportunities for banks to imitate industry's best practices. 
Therefore, the research would suggest further studies to test the above induction from the 
empirical data in different context. 
6.2.4 Summary 
This study has addressed the first research question by providing how banks' lending 
practices were shaped by the banks' institutional environment. It has identified that the 
CBM was the main source to exert coercive pressures and shape the banks' lending 
practices and it had a great impact on banks' financial resource allocations. Some banks 
were also exposed to coercive pressures from political institutions. The main source of 
normative pressures was the MBA which provided trainings to the staff members, setting 
ethical guidelines and providing continuing professional developments to staffs of the 
Myanmar's banking industry. The government also played a minor role in exerting 
normative pressures on the banks' loan allocations to different industries. Though 
coercive and nonnative pressures could be found explicitly, mimetic pressures could not 
be identified. It can be implied that the decision to mimic best practice in the industry is 
contingent upon the recognition of the importance of other pressures (coercive and 
normati ve). 
6.3 Institutional Strategies 
By focusing on the external environment, an institutional theoretical perspective has paid 
less attention to what happens to banks' own mechanisms of managing such institutional 
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pressures in achieving efficiency. Through the introduction of strategic responses, the 
relationship between agency and institutional forces can be understood. The underlying 
assumption is that banks under different circumstances and situations will approach 
different strategies to achieve their desired outcome or to avoid the need for conformity. 
Though it is necessary to understand how banks are institutionalised, there is also a 
requirement to understand the strategic responses to institutional pressures as to explore 
the banks' regulatory arbitrage and under what circumstances they take place. This is to 
uncover non-confonnity by banks to institutional pressures and the stimuli creating 
differing strategic responses. 
Hence, this section will be able to answer the following three research questions: 
RQ2: How do banks respond to these (institutional) pressures? 
RQ3: What are the influencing (contingent) factors? 
RQ4: How do their chosen strategies affect the end outcome, legitimacy and efficiency? 
r'~ . .I Types ofinslItutlOnal Pressures ~ / 
BanksI~:;;:::::}~l'L ;co~~:~t I 
Pressures Factors I ~---II 
St7tegic ~~s~~nses to Institu~~~ Pressu~ 
Figure 6-3: Graphical Presentation of the Outline of this Section 
The previous section in which institutional pressures faced by the banks were presented, 
it was similar to the banks' strategic response 'acquiescence' or 'conformity' discussions. 
However, the main emphasis here is to present the discussions on contingent factors or 
the circumstances under which the banks can deviate from conforming to institutional 
pressures to achieve efficiency. 
Legi~~acy 
Efficiency 
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6.3.1 Strategic Responses to Coercive Pressures: CBM 
According to institutional theory, the expected strategic response to institutional pressures 
is 'acquiescence' or 'conformity'. As a requirement, banks must conform to rules and 
regulations stated by CBM if they are operating within their jurisdiction. Hence, non­
conformity by banks can be penalised and their licenses can be revoked under their 
authority. Indeed, the country's long history of bureaucracy plays an important role in 
how these coercive pressures are exerted upon the banks. Nevertheless, the research has 
found strategic responses other than 'acquiescence' to coercive pressures. Banks non-
conformities to the institutions' coercive pressures are also contingent upon different 
factors. 
6.3.1.1 Acquiescence: Comply 
There are three tactics for organisations to respond to strategic responses under 
acquiescence. They are 'Habit', 'Imitate' and 'Comply'. In Myanmar, banks' compliance 
to the restrictions imposed on them by CBM is expected. In Myanmar, banks are required 
to confonn to the CBM's rules and regulations as stated. For instance, banks are not 
supposed to exceed the lending and deposit rate caps. With the pressure to assist financial 
stability, banks are required to adhere to prudent financial measures set by the regulatory 
authorities. Though banks in Myanmar did not have to follow the international guidelines 
such as Basel Accord, they have to follow the guidelines set by the national regulator. In 
addition, they also have their own set of guidelines in determining the amount of loans 
given, interest rates charged and credibility and authenticity of the borrowers. 
From the interviews, pressures exerted on banks through the central bank and regulatory 
bodies are very high. All the interviewed banks pointed out that they are supposed to 
follow the regulatory guidelines as not conforn1ing to these rules could result in facing 
penalties. Collateral requirements and interest rates are set by the central bank; therefore, 
.1 
I 
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banks have no unsecured lending and borrowers' characteristics and personalities become 
'~ 'j 
less important in loan approval process. CBM is not an independent institution; therefore, 

the government's influence can be seen. It favours repo-style transaction lending or ~ 

! 
":1 
collateralised lending over relationship lending. 
ICollateral Requirements 
,1 
I 
I 
"Collateral requirements" was one of the themes that were mentioned quite repeatedly by 
J 
the interviewees. These banks mentioned that they were constrained with the collateral 
requirements imposed by CBM, therefore, were not able to lend as much as they could 
before 2003 financial crisis. 
Even if we k'710W that the applicant is trustworthy and his 

serviceability is high, without collaterals, he would not get loans 

P-B 
Borrowers' credibility and serviceability are determined mainly 

through the quality ofcollaterals. 

P-A 
CBM determined collateral requirements specifically by stating that banks can only 
accept real estates and immovable properties. Apartments and other commodities such as 
gold and jewelleries were not acceptable as collaterals. Thus, qualities of collaterals were 
important in determining the amount of loan an applicant could get and they were used to 
mitigate credit risk exposures: 
We look at the type ofbuildings build in the collateralised real estate, 

the location and marketability affect the borrowers' requested amount 

ofloan. If the borrower has no collaterals, guarantors should be there 
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with their deposits account or assets should be collateralised. These 
guarantors must be close relatives, preferably, parents. 
P-A 
They also stated that they had no intention of giving borrowers loans if they could not 
provide collaterals. 
There is no maximum amount of loan an individual loan 
applicant can get. It depends on the collateral. If they have 
enough collateral to cover their loans, we lend to them. If the 
loan applicant needs more, they must give more collateral. But 
we have this guideline that 20% ofour total loans should not be 
for only one business/company. 
P-B 
They mentioned that they had to comply with these restrictions on the types of acceptable 
collaterals which are only land and property. Though they were not happy with not being 
able to take apartments as collaterals, they would have to impose these on the customers 
too. 
It will be better if we can take apartments or condos as collaterals, 
such a way, we will be able to lend more. 
P-A 
Thus, these findings explained the existence of high land and building based 
security loans as shown in Table 6-5. In other words, confonnity to CBM's 
restrictions could lead to increase in loans based on immovable properties. 
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Interest Rate Restrictions 
The theme 'interest rate restrictions' was the second highest theme identified in coding. 
In developed countries, the financial sector is the one which determined the banks' 
interbank lending rates and subsequently, changes the floors and caps ofthe interest rates, 
including borrowing and lending rates. In contrary, CBM is the one that regulate these 
interest rates stating that banks could charge interest rate of more than 17% and deposit 
rates should not be less than 12%. The CBM also encouraged banks to provide industrial 
loans at lower interest rates. Shareholder-owned bank, P-A seems to not lower the 
interest rate from 17% though other banks, such as P-B and P-C sets interest rates lower 
based on their preferences. According the regulatory requirements, all banks are not 
allowed to have long-term loans. 
The management sets lower interest rates for industrials and 
agricultural businesses and lend at the rate of15% and give priority 
to export sector. 
P-B 
The standard interest rate is 17% however, if the production sector 
meets industrial criteria, they would be charged at lower rate of15% 
P-C 
Another factor that banks are forced to comply with is the interest rate restrictions despite 
of them wanting to change these interest ceilings and floors. 
Well, you see, the interest rates set by the CBM have the same 
interest rate spreads of5%, irrespective ofwhether to say they are 
low or high. T¥hat we want is to have that spread higher because it 
is not profitable. 
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P-D 
Hence, the compliance to CBM's interest rate restrictions regardless of their willingness 
to change these restrictions was found among the interviewed banks. Interest rates paid 
on deposits are also regulated by CBM. 
We are also not allowed to give higher deposit interest rate than the 

government. 

P-B 
The Central Bank stated that the interest should not be more than 

17% but can be less than that. The deposit cannot be more than 

12%. It's always 17%. Inflation is 25% but loan rate is less than 

20%. 

P-A 
The above statements given by the banks indicated that despite the unreasonable demands 
placed by CBM on them, they had to conform to those requirements. Therefore, banks 
cannot give loans as they see fit since they have to comply with all the regulatory 
requirements set by CBM, thereby creating obstacles in borrowers getting loans. When 
the banks are limited in accepting deposits, the amount of loans allocated to borrowers get 
lower. This has cyclical effects on banks' lending. 
Loan Maturities 
In this section, banks' conformities to CBM's restrictions on 'loan maturities' were also 
found from the interviewed data. Semi-government and private banks have mentioned 
that their loan maturities were short-term only. In other words, they gave loans that 
I 
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mature in one year's time. Short-term loan maturities were more prevalent with semi­
government and private banks than the government-owned banks. 
We only give short-term loans, however, they can renew every year; 
then, we revalue them again. 
P-A 
All of our loans are short-term. After one year, we reduce the 
collateral value by 10%, that is to reduce the risk, then, we renew 
the loans. 
S-A 
Despite giving only short-term loans, these loans could be renewed every year. Through 
this process, banks could revalue the collaterals. In other words, banks were able to 
reduce the risk of the borrowers' default through assessing their loan application once a 
year in addition to the regular monitoring over the year. 
Loan Size Restrictions 
Banks were also restricted by CBM in the amount of loans that a borrower could be 
given. Similarly, in addition to imposing collateral requirements, interest rate restrictions 
and loan maturities, banks were restricted with the size of loans that they provided to the 
borrowers. It stated that banks could only give 50% of the value of the collateral provided 
to the borrowers. A lending limit to a single client is also imposed on the banks by CBM 
stating that it should not be more than 20% of a bank's capital and reserves. As it was 
provided in the secondary data analysis section, banks were required to have 20% 
liquidity ratio. Consequently, they would only be allowed to lend 80% of the deposits. 
The regulatory requirements directly affect banks' lending practices, but also indirectly 
affect the money multiplication which is one of the roles of financial system. 
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Guidelines are driven based on the law and central bank's 
instructions. We have a policy not to lend more than 70% to 
80% ofthe deposits. 
p-c 
We have night meetings on Mondays and Fridays with the Central 
Bank. If the deposits are high, we have to give some just~fications. 
P-A 
There were strict regulatory requirements for private banks. Nevertheless, government­
owned banks had more flexibility in setting and giving loans with different maturities. 
However, one government-owned bank, G-A mentioned they received more severe 
punishments if any mistakes in giving loans occur: 
We have to endure a lot ofpressures as some mistakes in granting 
loans can be subject to prison sentence as there used to be a case in 
the past 
G-A 
In summary, banks' lending criteria revolved around CBM's rules and regulations. 
Furthermore, banks themselves had higher liquidity and capital adequacy ratios than 
CBM's requirements (see Figure 5-13 to Figure 5-18). 
No Bank Marketing 
This was another theme which emerged from the data. It is an interesting finding because 
unlike in any other countries where banks are allowed to do marketing; Myanmar banks 
were restricted from advertising since 2003 financial crisis. This is to control banks from 
becoming a commercialised operation and attract a lot of people in getting loans. This 
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might sound unusual for people in developed countries. However, it was to control risk 
taking behaviour not only by banks but also by consumers. 
We are not doing any marketing for the bank because we are not 

allowed to. But, we know that some of the banks are doing their 

marketing through giving out pamphlets in the market 

s-C 
Semi-government and private banks mentioned that government pressures playa great 
role their lending practices as no creativity is allowed for them. This caused banks to have 
very similar or near identical established criteria requirements in their judgements. They 
have also mentioned that they incurred high regulatory costs for maintaining financial 
stability. The banks mentioned of the CBM's regulations before 2003 financial crisis 
where they were very much lenient compared to the current ones. This showed that the 
regulators are very cautious of the crisis repeating again. At the same time, looking back 
the 2003 financial crisis, without the pressure to provide financial stability, banks failed 
to acknowledge on cautious lending. 
Changes in Policy Guidelines 
As with the conformity to regulatory requirements, banks had no scope for changing their 
policies as they saw fit. Thus, the frequencies of the occurrences of changes in policy 
guidelines depended upon the CBM. 
The guidelines are made according to the ministry and cabinet 

4ficers. All the policies are provided to the authorities and then, 

they are approved. 

G-C 
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They are driven by Central Bank's direction guidelines and 
Financial Institutions Law. Then, we make our policies 
according to our customers. 
If the Central bank changes rules and regulations, we also have to. 
But sometimes, if the Central Bank doesn't change anything, we 
look at the risk in the market and we change the criteria. But, there 
is no scope for a lot ofpolicy changes, but once the government 
changes policy, we also need to. 
Restrictions in Service Charge 
Other compliance to the regulatory requirements was also found when 
mentioned about their inability to change the service charge. 
We were able to take service charge of up to 3% but now, it's only 
1% 
No, they (loan officers) are not allowed to set interest 
premium. Only board ofdirectors have this privilege. But it's 
always 17%. It's not profitable at 17%. Service charge is 1 % 
It is regulated. 
220 

P-A 
P-B 
the banks 
s-c 
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P-A 
S-D bank mentioned about how other bank, Myawaddy bank had differential treatment by 
CBM due to its affiliation with the military. 
No, because they are regulated by the CBM. We have 1% 
commitment charge and 1% service charge but MWD doesn 'ffake 
commitment charge. 
S-D 
Close Supervision 
Banks were closely supervised by CBM to maintain regulatory requirements. Though 
banks expressed concerns, their conformities were found. 
We have night meetings on Mondays and Fridays with the Central 
Bank. If the deposits are high, we have to give some justifications. 
P-A 
We also have to go for meetings organised by the central bank 
everyday which is quite unusual compared to any other 
countries, there, we need to present our daily activities to the 
authorities. 
P-B 
We have to give daily reports at 6pm. It is for eight years now since 
the last financial crisis in 2003. 
S-D 
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As the regulatory pressures on the banks have increased in interest rate caps, collateral 
requirements, loan maturities and as such, banks have limited freedom to act on their 
own. In regard to deposit rate cap, though banks' can give lower than that cap, all ofthem 
stick with the maximum as to attract depositors. This might be due to the fact that banks 
have no alternative source of finance to supplement the requirements. Therefore, 
homogeneities can be seen among the banks in their lending practices. Similarly, their 
risk adversities could also be compared with the secondary data analyses where banks had 
excess reserves, high capital adequacy requirements and liquidity ratios than required by 
the CBM. It can be implied that although conformity to regulatory pressures were found, 
banks had different strategic responses to enhance their profitability. 
6.3.1.2 Avoidance: Conceal 
Among the possible tactics under strategic response 'avoidance', organisations can 
'conceal' , 'buffer' or 'escape'. In Myanmar, some banks try to conceal their non­
conformity to coercive pressures exerted by CBM through disguising them. As non­
conformity would not be openly admitted by interviewees, there were not a lot of 
evidences for such types of strategic response. However, some evidences are presented as 
follows: 
Contingent Factor: Customers' Trustworthiness and Prospects of the Business 
Banks would choose to apply the 'avoidance' strategic response when they believed that 
the borrower was trustworthy and the businesses that they engaged in had good prospects. I 
This was more prevalent in those loan size and interest rate restrictions imposed by CBM Ias follows: 
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In the Case of Loan Size Restrictions 
It was interesting to fmd out how the banks managed to lend their desired amount to the 
borrower through adjusting the collateral values despite ofthem being risk adverse. 
If the business is good, and the customer is trustworthy, we 

increase the collateral values and on that basis, we give 50% ofthe 

collateral value as loans. 

P-A 
Banks were able to take the risk of adjusting the collateral values, in the case, the land 
and properties because of the increasing property values. They were able to take 
advantage of the increasing property values by liquidating those collaterals at higher price 
at the latter stage. In such a way, banks were able to reduce risk on the balance sheet. 
Thus, by observing Figure 5-12 and Figure 5-22, despite of increasing non-performing 
loans, overall banking industry's profit before tax of the banking industry over the period 
of2007-2011 had increased. 
In the Case of Interest Rate Restrictions 
As with the banks' strategies with loan size restrictions, they could also reduce the 
interest rates that they asked from the borrowers through asking them to make interest 
payments based on certain fraction of the loans. 
Since reducing interest rate is impossible, we sometimes charge it 

only on the certain percentage ofloans, ofcourse, if the borrowers 

are trustworthy and have made regular interest payments before. 

S-D 

I 
I 
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These types of non-conformity to institutional forces depend on the customers' 
trustworthiness and prospects of the businesses. From these evidences, one can conclude 
that banks were able to tackle the tight regulatory environments through concealing their 
resistance in applying different approaches. Such kinds of strategies would not be found 
through analysing the banks' balance sheets or income statements. 
6.3.1.3 Defiance: Dismiss 
Banks that reject or resist institutional pressures for efficiency and better financial 
performance rather than legitimacy were coded here. Similar to the above, defiance or 
dismissal of the regulatory requirements were not openly admitted by the banks. 
However, through asking the same question using different approaches allowed the 
researcher to uncover banks' defiance or dismissing to such pressures. 
Contingent Factor: Customers' Business Prospects 
Banks' decisions to dismiss the CBM's requirements were dependent upon the loan 
applicant's business prospects. Empirical evidence was found in the Joan size restrictions 
and bank marketing. 
Loan Size Restrictions 
Despite of having restrictions on loan size by CBM, P-B dismisses these pressures by: 
Normally, we lend 50% of the wholesale value ofcollaterals 
to businesses, if the prospect is good enough we increase it to 
60%. In the extreme cases, if the prospect is very good, we 
increase it to 70% to 80%. 
P-B 
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According to the regulatory requirements, banks are not supposed to lend more than 50% 
of the collateral's wholesale value. This is similar to the process as above by which P-A 
bank increased the collateral value to However, it seems that P-B bank did not attempt to 
conceal its non-conformity but ignore it. 
Bank Marketing 
According to the CBM regulation, after the 2003 crisis, banks are not allowed to do any 
marketing activities, i.e. promotion and advertising. However, some of the banks use 
different methods to get their brand names to the customers through sponsorships. A 
private bank mentioned that they are not allowed to do marketing but some other banks 
do. Afterwards, the researcher had an interview with S-C bank. To confirm this fact, 
researcher asked the interviewee about its marketing activities. In response, he handed out 
a leaflet advertising its activities and operations that it can provide to the customers. 
Therefore, banks are able to defy these types of restrictions by dismissing the institutional 
forces. 
Collateral Requirements 
When the board ofdirectors brought the borrower to the bank, we 

give them the loans without collaterals because they are trusted by 

the directors. 

S-E 
In addition, these managers or directors are ministers or part of current ruling 
government. The respondent also added that: 
You see, for certain businesses, our given loan amounts are much 

higher than their collaterals given to us and we also have some 
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borrowers which have taken a lot 0/ loans without collaterals and 

they are doing many types a/businesses in the country. 

S-E 
In other words, the dismissals of these requirements is based on the management's power 
and its affiliation with the government induces the banks to dismiss the regulatory 
requirements if the borrowers are perceived to be trustworthy and the prospects of the 
businesses that borrowers engage in are good. Heterogenetic Regulatory Pressures 
'Heterogenetic Regulatory Pressures' was a category emerging from the empirical data. 
In other words, it was not pre-determined categories. One of the reasons for creating this 
new category was due to the identification different pressures exerted on different banks. 
Thus, banks had diverse coercive pressures creating different legitimacy requirements. 
Leniencies in certain regulations on one bank and stringent controls on the others also 
exist. 
Contingent Factor: Ownership Structures and Borrowers' Affiliations 
The results of heterogeneities in regulatory pressures were dependent upon the banks' 
ownership structures. As discussed in the beginning, there were government-owned, I
semi-government and private banks. These banks had different regulatory requirements 
which they needed to fulfil. 
Collateral Requirements 
The ownership structure of banks can have a significant effect on how the institutional 
pressures are exerted upon. In. private banks, collaterals are considered to be the main I 
requirement, however, the government owned bank, G-A sometimes discards this 
requirement: 
I 
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We do not have governmental guarantee scheme, however, 

sometimes, we ignore collateral requirements by giving unsecured 

loans. 

G-A 
Even those banks which were government affiliated, sometimes, did not take collaterals 
and provided loans for start-up businesses. 
When the board ofdirectors brought the borrower to the bank, we 

give them the loans without collaterals because they are tn/sted by 

the directors. 

S-E 
We provide loans for them to acquire agricultural machineries and 

then, they would be used again as collaterals. Only once, they could 

pay back, they would get the ownership rights. 

G-C 
These evidences could be reflected back to Figure 5-5, which shows the existence of 
different types of loans provided based on securities other than 'land and building'. The 
above comments by government affiliated banks supported the fact the fact that there 
were 'unsecured', 'Personal and Organisational Guarantee' and 'Machinery and 
Merchandise' loans. 
Restriction on Deposit Accounts 
In addition, government owned banks have restrictions in deposit account openings. This 
is not surprising as public's trusts in the government banks could be found in Figure 5-23 
For instance, though there were only four government banks, their deposit levels in 
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proportion to the private banks were much higher. Another contributing factor to high 
deposit levels could be the result of these banks offering saving certificates which private 
banks were not allowed to offer. 
If a person wants to open a bank account, saving account or 

current account holder should recommend the person, otherwise, 

he cannot open an account at the bank. Moreover, one person 

cannot have more than one account under his name 

G-A 
With the public's trust in the government banks since 2003 financial crisis and a deposit 
type which could not only be offered by them had also led to increase in deposits at these 
banks. 
Loan Maturities 
Similar to collateral requirements, in loan maturities, I have found that government banks 
had more differing loan maturities compared to those that are private and semi­
government owned banks. For example, compared to private and semi-government banks, 
G-A bank has much more flexibilities in giving tenn loans as they have no restriction in 
giving long-term loans and are able to charge lower interest rates and give unsecured 
loans. 
We give short-term, medium-term and long-term loans. Short-term 

loans at 17% with maturity from one to three years, medium-term 

at 16.5%from three to four years and long-term loans at 16% with 

maturity over five years. 

G-A 
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As discussed above, government banks could offer long-tenn deposits (see figure 6-22); 
they were able to provide long-tenn loans since they would not result in loan maturity 
mismatch. With the government's support, they could absorb more risks than those with 
private ownership. 
Loan Size Restrictions 
Similar to the above themes, some of the government affiliated banks can lend loan 
amounts which are qlUch higher than the CBM allows and no penalty is given to them. 
You see, for certain businessmen, our given loan amounts are much 
higher than their collaterals given to us. 
S-E 
With S-E, the board of directors ofthe bank includes government ministers, thereby; they 
had flexibilities with the CBM's restrictions on the loan sizes. In other words, it also 
indicates that there was a high level of bureaucracy in the banking industry and the 
dominance of government banks over the private banks. Thus, ownership structure is the 
most important determinant for the extent to which how institutional pressures are to be 
exerted on the banks. 
G-A bank also mentioned about the difficulties in valuation of collaterals. The executive 
mentioned that despite of the values of lands and properties were always appreciating in 
the country, they were not allowed to increase the value of the collaterals at the time of 
renewing the loan contracts. 
6.3.2 Strategic Responses to Coercive Pressures: Social-political Institutions 
In developing countries, socio-political institutions play a very important role in 
organisations' activities. According to Becker (1983) and Beck et a1 (2005), if bank 
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supervisory agencies have the power to discipline non-compliant banks, politicians and 
supervisors can induce banks to allocate credit to politically connected firms. As this is a 
very controversial subject, many of the banks do not reveal that they have political 
institutions' pressures to lend to certain businesses. 
6.3.2.1 Acquiescence: Comply 
Yet, one of the interviewed banks indicated that they sometimes get requests from the 
government to lend to politically connected firms without collateral. It is not enforcement 
but banks always tend to satisfy the government's requests. Some of the banks have also 
mentioned that they had to take part in the government's national economic development 
plans. Under these situations, they had to help their financing through providing loans 
with lower interest rates as they are backed by the government guarantees. Often, these 
types of lending were done by a group of banks rather than alone. During the financial 
crisis back in 2003, the banks had to participate in government's bailouts for the failing 
banks by providing financial support. In the event of natural disasters, for instance, after 
the Cyclone Nargis in 2008, the worst disaster natural disaster in the recorded history of 
Myanmar which caused extensive damage to densely populated agricultural activities of 
the Irrawaddy Division, banks were asked to provide financial support to salt businesses 
affected by this. 
Govenunent-related banks receive pressures from social-political institutions forcing 
banks to lend to government-affiliated partners, sometimes without them fulfilling the set 
requirements: 
We sometimes are given orders from the government to give loans 
to certain borrowers, in such kind ofcircumstances; we need to be 
flexible with our requirements 
P-B 
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During cyclone Nargis, we are asked by the authorities to lend to 
salt industry without collaterals. 
S-A 
6.3.2.2 Compromise: Bargain 
Social-political institutions such as government ministries had their own respective 
developmental guidelines. 
when there was Nargis Cyclone, the government asked us to lend to 
salt businesses. After Nargis, we don 'f lend anymore ... In 
coordination with sibin tharyaryay bank and co-operative bank, we 
have also lent to Shwe Than Lwin for converting cars to CNG 
compatible cars. In such circumstances, governments are the 
guarantors 
S-A 
As stated by the bank, they did not lend to those sectors without collaterals. But they 
accepted to lend without collaterals and accepted these institutional pressures through 
bargaining with the government to act as guarantors for them. This shows banks' lack of 
risk appetite and unwillingness to absorb any forms of risks. 
6.3.3 Strategic Responses to Coercive Pressures exerted from Other Sources 
In developing countries, like Myanmar, politically affiliated firms and businesses are not 
uncommon. These firms also use these affiliations to get some advantages from the banks 
to get loans with some concessions. In such cases, banks bargained with CBM to provide 
such borrowers without collaterals. In this regard, they informed CBM of these types of 
lending cases. 
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Ifpolitically affiliated borrowers come and get loans from us, we 
inform the CBM to let them know any concessions that we have to 
give to these borrowers. So that, CBM will not penalise us when 
they come and inspect us 
P-B 
Bargaining is an active form of compromise than pacifying and balancing. In this case, 
banks tried to bargain with CBM to avoid any negative consequences that could befall 
upon them, for example, penalty charges. This shows that firms with no political 
influence were unable to obtain loans without collaterals even if they had high credibility 
and profitability, but those with political connections were able to get loans without 
having to provide collaterals. 
While all the restrictions were imposed on all the banks, banks with different ownership 
structures and borrowers with political affiliations could get leniencies with the 
requirements to adhere to the strict regulations imposed by CBM. Thereby, the banking 
industry did not have much role in the country's GDP growth (see Figure 5-6). Thus, 
efficient credit allocation of bank credit was not achieved and this may discourage 
economic development. 
6.3.4 	 Strategic Responses to Normative Pressures: Corporate Culture (Indirect 
Influence of Coercive Pressure) 
I I :d-d---------1 
Political and Nonnativei ~ I 
I I Pressures
Regulatory ) Coercive Pressures I National Culture c::=; Corporate Culture 
Institutions --VII 	 I I ~ i 	 L _____________ i I 
Figure 6-4: Indirect influence of the political and regulatory institutions on 
corporate culture 
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As stated in coercive pressures, banks' conformities to normative pressures were 
expected. This themes was based on the fact that national culture can be found through 
studying banks' corporate culture (Giddens, 1991, Schein, 1985, Scott, 2001). Culture is 
an institution that exerts normative pressures on banks. The evolution process of 
corporate culture was also identified through analysing the evidences. 
6.3.4.1 Acquiescence: Comply 
As institutional theory stated, compliance to normative pressures were found. 
Decision Approval Process 
The decision approval processes of the banks were studied to explore whether the 
national bureaucratic culture had influenced the overall loan approval processes in banks. 
Hierarchical or top-down decision making style was found. All the final lending decisions 
were made by higher level managers and no authority was given to loan officers, thereby, 
decreasing their importance in the process. It also increased their dependencies on the 
senior managers over time. It has been found that all the banks had their own centralised 
committees in which loan decisions were made despite stating that loan officers' opinions 
are given high importance. Among them, P-C bank gives much higher importance to 
opinions from loan officers and subordinates. However, the interest rates were charged at 
15% to 17% and these rates are not negotiable for private banks. 
Bank managers' opinions and recommendations are important. 
It also depends on assessor's report. They can make personal 
judgments. For example, we consider constructions to be risky, 
depending on the profitability, we sometimes lend to them. 
However, the rate is not flexible even if the borrower is 
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creditworthy. If the subordinates are not happy with the policy, 
we can discuss. 
p-c 
Yes, we do take into account ofpersonal decisions. The bank 
manager should present his findings about the customer to the 
Bank Committee. If his evaluations are strong, the committee 
favour the bank manager's decision. 
P-A 
They (loan officers' opinions) are in the reports given by the loan 
officers. The final decision is made by the board of directors. 
Borrowing amount less than five millions are decided by the 
Managing Director. Until, two billion loans, they are made by the 
minister and those which are over this amount, there is another 
committee and which can be unlimited. 
G-B 
Though coercive pressures from political and regulatory institutions' effects on national 
culture cannot be identified at this stage, it does affect banks' corporate culture especially 
in decision approval processes. However, over the course of the military rules, it can be 
induced that hierarchical and bureaucratic management style can be embedded in the 
national culture over time. Consequently, it also integrates in people's values and norms. 
Due to the tight regulations in credibility assessments and lending criteria, let alone the 
individuals, the banks as a whole are limited in their lending activities. The conformity to 
high uncertainty avoidance corporate culture is found in many of the banks. It can be said 
that it is influenced by the regulatory guidelines and rules enforcements. For instance: 
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People don 'f like to take responsibilities anymore, they just want to ask 
what they should do every time whenever they are given tasks to finish 
s-c 
In summary, the effects of bureaucracy could be found not only at bank level but 
also at individual level. In other words, it has cyclical effects. The lack of 
authority transferred to the individuals led the lower level staffs with inability to 
make decisions by themselves, which in tum caused the higher level managers to 
put trust in them. 
Collective Reward System 
A collectivist rewards system is found in both non-governmental banks (private and semi-
government owned banks). No competition among banks' branches is founds. This might 
be due to the geographical locations of the branches. The most businesses locate in 
Yangon and Mandalay, therefore, the banks' performance in these areas is incompatible 
with others in different areas. Banks in Myanmar do not have individual reward systems 
as often seen in the UK. They have collective form of rewards depend on the end of the 
year profit and loss account. Interestingly, though the government-owned banks stated 
that they did not receive any bonuses for providing loans to businesses, private banks 
accused them by stating that they took bribes in valuation of the collaterals from the loan 
applicants. 
We know that government banks take money from the borrowers as they 
wanted their collaterais to be valued much higher, but we don't do that in 
our bank 
P-B 
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In summary, banks did not have any individual reward based system that would 
encourage these loan officers to take self-interest risks. However, this could not be 
easily said as some stated that bribing existed in government banks. This does not 
mean it does not happen in other banks. 
Risk Adversities and Ethical Concerns 
As mentioned in the previous sections, banks' compliance to the risk adversities 
were found in the following statements given by the interviewed banks. 
We don't lend to alcohol and cigarettes businesses, even if they 

are profitable because it is not ethical. It does not meet our 

policy guidelines. 

p-c 
We always lend lower. We don '{ take risks. 
p-c 
The bank does not support shipping businesses and gems 

businesses because they are risky. Ifwe take ships as collateral, 

we can lose our investment ifthe ships sunk. 

We only lend short-term loans because our deposits are also 

short-term. If we give long-term loans, there will be a mix­

match. All the loans are one-year and renewed every year. 

P-B 
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Every loan is only one year. 1J the borrower gives interest promptly, 
with the MD 's approval as well, we renew the loans but reduce the 
amount by 10% This is a process ofreducing the probability of loan 
loss. 
S-A 
We decline to support Cigarettes and Alcohol sectors because it's in 
our policy. 
S-E 
When the regulations state that we can only lend 80% of the paid up 
capital, reserves, retain earnings are not included. If they are 
included, we can lend more. However, it will still be for working 
capital only, not Jor start-ups. 
S-c 
6.3.4.2 Defiance: Dismiss 
If the banks were to face with having to compromise profitability or efficiency in order to 
gain legitimacy, they would defy some forms of normative pressures, for example, 
defying high uncertainty avoidance culture or ethical concerns. 
Mining and Constructions are very risk businesses. According 
the ethics ofthe bank, it does not lend to those businesses that 
involved in poultry farming. We also decline to support film 
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industry. Though we consider constructions to be risky, 

depending on the profitability, we sometimes lend to them. 

However, the rate is not flexible even if the borrower is 

creditworthy. 
p-c 
We don 'f normally lend to businesses which engage in alcohol or 

tobacco related businesses, however, if they are profitable, we do 

lend to them because ifwe don't, they will go to other government­

owned banks or any other banks. There, they'U lend them. Then, 

we 'illose the customers. 

P-D 
If the businesses are legitimate and not affect the government in 

any way, we lend them. 

S-B 
6.3.5 	 Strategic Responses to Normative Pressures: Developmental Governmental 
Guidelines 
This theme was developed under the assumption that banks get governmental pressures to 
lend to certain business sectors for developmental purpose. These developed policies are 
aimed not only to help borrowers minimise financing costs but also to achieve sustainable 
economic growth. In Myanmar, banks were required to lend to those businesses engaged 
in manufacturing machineries, especially agricultural related ones, at 2% lower interest 
rate than nonnal business loans. It was to encourage the sectorial development. However, 
due to its very limited number of businesses, despite of having these guidelines, they did 
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not have large share of these types of loans. Some of the banks even mentioned that they 
did not have these kinds of loans because the lack of customers from this sector. Only one 
semi-government bank stated that they have started making policies for providing SME 
loans without collaterals, yet not implemented. 
6.3.5.1 Acquiescence: Comply 
According to the CBM, banks categorise their loans into four different categories namely, 
Import/Export, Trading, Production and Service. They mentioned that the government 
favoured and gave guidelines to increase production loans. However, when asked about 
their priorities in giving loans to these sectors, they have mentioned quite contrasting 
opinions with the regulatory guidelines and different banks have different priorities. 
We lend at lower interest rates for industrials and 

agricultural businesses and lend at 15% and give priority to 

export sector. We also support industries such as soft drinks 

and distilled water if they can be exported 

P-B 
Production is the most important sector. If these fall into 

industrial category, the rate is 15%. However, we have more 

trading loans. 

P-c 
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Unintentional Avoidance 
This is a theme emerged from the empirics. It is defined as an unintentional strategic 
response which does concern neither legitimacy nor efficiency. It is a strategic response 
in which banks have no control. 
Contingent Factor: Lack of Borrower 
Banks have the guidelines to lend at the lower rate of 15% for those that fall under certain 
industry category. Nevertheless, banks do not have these types of borrowers come to 
them to apply for loans. For instance: 
Production is the most important sector. If these fall into 

industrial category, the rate is 15%. However, we have more 

trading loans. 

p-c 
Yes, we do have industrial loans but you see, we don 'f have a lot of 

customers coming for industrial loans, therefore, we have more 

trading loans. 

S-D 
Yes, we do give industrial loans at 15% but these customers don't 

come to our banks 

P-A 
As P-A is a shareholder-owned bank:; I was able to get data on its share of loans of 
different sectors. 58.7% of total loans dedicated only to trading and only 25.51 % to 
production sector. Overall, it seems that priority loans are provided at 15% by the banks 
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though the maximum lending rate is 17%. Other semi-government banks also mentioned 
that they don't have a lot of industrials loans. 
We have industrial loans but most of them are lent to service 
sectors 
SOB 
These indicate that those engaged in sectors that were encouraged by the government 
usually borrow more from the government affiliated banks than private banks. 
It can be implied that they received the same guidelines; therefore, homogeneities can be 
seen. Nonetheless, semi-government bank had more guidelines to conform. It also implies 
that normative pressures induced from developmental guidelines were much higher on 
government related banks than on private banks. In addition, it shows that banks do 
conform to institutional requirements. However, those which engage in government 
supported industrial sectors have strong political affiliations. Therefore, they tend to go to 
government banks. 
6.3.6 Strategic Responses to Normative Pressures: External Verifiers 
External verifiers (for instance, credit rating agencies or appraisers) can help shape banks' 
lending practices by affecting banks in choosing prospective borrowers. From analysing 
the interview notes, it was found that internal stakeholders employed by the banks either 
through salary or depending upon the cases were the people who confirn1ed and checked 
borrowers' credibilities. In other words, they are part of the banks' task environment. 
Though external verifiers such as credit rating agencies can influence banks' lending in 
developed countries through providing borrowers' credit histories, external verifiers or 
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value appraisers are hired case by case basis to calculate market values of collaterals. In 
some instances, banks change these values by increasing the market price to take 
advantage of the rising housing prices in the country to increase the loan size by conceal 
their non-conformity of 50% limit. Thus, through compromising with the value appraisers 
for the collateral values, banks conceal their resistance to coercive forces if the borrowers 
are trustworthy and prospects of the businesses are good. 
6.3.7 Summary 
In summary, this section has provided that banks did not necessarily conform to 
institutional pressures to achieve legitimacy if they had to compromise profitability. The 
main contingent factor for the banks to resist coercive pressures was the borrowers' 
business prospects. An interesting finding in this section is that the banks' resistance to 
normative pressures associated with the ethical concern was their fears of losing 
borrowers or customers to the government-owned banks. This implies that the 
government-owned banks have a significant advantage than the private banks. Their 
responses to institutional pressures were mainly to conform. However, there were a range 
of other forms of resistance. However, strong forms of resistance, such as dismissing the 
institutional pressures, were very limited. In other words, Myanmar banks' always 
attempted to externalise risks to borrowers, yet, banks did not openly admit their 
resistance to institutional pressures. 
6.4 Pressures to Gain Legitimacy 
This section will provide the bank managers' opinions on institutional pressures. This 
will enable the reader to understand how different the goals of both institutional and task 
environments in Myanmar's banking industry and how important it is to achieve 
legitimacy from such institutions. 
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6.4.1 Coercive Pressures 
Banks were bounded by coercive pressures and their inability to avoid those pressures 
when making lending decisions were expressed when the researcher asked them about 
their opinions on institutional pressures and what types of improvements should be made 
for them to increase their efficiency to lend more. The main themes presented by the 
banks were as follows: 
Interest Rate Restrictions 
Banks expressed their concerns over interest rate restrictions in various ways. The 
government banks, G-B and G-C did not express strong concern over such restrictions, 
however, the latter raised more concern over having bigger margin between deposit and 
lending (interest rate spreads), which is currently pegged at five percent. 
The rates seem to look very high, however, since the deposit rate is 
12% and lending rate is 17%, it seems quite ok to me. 
G-B 
It's low as we want to have bigger margins between deposit and 

interest rates 

G-C 
Other private banks and semi-government banks raised this as a strong issue by 
comparing themselves with different countries. 
We are very much regulated by the central bank and we have to 

follow their rules and regulations. The interest rate set by the 

central bank is too high which is 17 percent. Probably, it is the 

highest in the world. Our country is one of the highest bean 
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exporters before but recently, its position has been taken over by 
Canada. This is because our cost ofproduction is high because of 
the interest rate. Most ofour domestic products are more expensive 
than imported goods (for example, from Thailand) because of cost 
offinancing. We are also not allowed to give higher deposit interest 
rate than the government. 
P-B 
It's not the interest rate problem. The issue is the margin. Because 

ofthe high interest rates, credit creation is hampered. 

P-D 
Strictly regulated. They gave us the benchmark rate. We can charge 

maximum 17% and service charge 1%. So, total I8%. It is the 

highest in the world In Brazil, it's just 12% and in Pakistan, I 

guess, it's only 10%. 

S-B 
Laws and Regulations 
In addition to interest rate restrictions, some of the banks also raised issues in 
relation to the laws and regulations of the country and how it affected their 
efficiencies in providing loans to customers. 
Business license, Industrial licence, City license, and make sure 

that collaterals are under the borrowers' names, if the photos ofthe 

collateral properties are not good, we do not lend them. The 
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location of the collateral is also important. We have a lot of laws, 

you see. 

S-B 
Our laws are established since the colonial times, for example, 

Partnership Acts are based on Indian Law, which in turn is based 

on the British law. Some of the factors written there are no longer 

applicable at all and they have become meaningless. 

S-D 
There is some unfavourable legislation. If the customer doesn't pay 

interest for six months, we consider them as non-performing loans 

For instance, if the borrowers cannot pay back the loans for two 

years, we make lawsuits and put that amount under non-performing 

loans. We go to the court. There, it reduces the interest rates to 9% 

which currently is 18% (including service charge). 

S-D 
Loan Size Restriction 
This theme 'loan size restriction' is an important theme which could indicate that 
these banks have customers who could borrow more than 20% of the paid-up 
capital, reserves and retained earnings to individual borrowers and higher demand 
for loans. This was presented by the semi-government banks, S-B and S-C as 
follows: 
If the 20% limitation for an individual is not there, we can lend 

more 
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S-B 
When the regulations state that we can only lend 80% of the paid 

up capital, reserves, retain earnings are not included. If they are 

included, we can lend more. However, it will still be for working 

capital only, not for start-ups. 

S-C 
Restriction in Acceptable Collaterals 
Banks were restricted in accepting only 'immovable properties' as collaterals and 
even 'commodities' were not qualified as collaterals to provide loans. 
If they change collateral regulations (i.e. allowing us to take 

commodities) and change the interest rates on deposits. 

S-D 
If there are no collateral requirements, and ifwe can give loans 

based on collective responsibilities, then we will be able to lend 

more. Now, we only accept immovable properties under the names 

ofthe borrower. Ifwe can accept the collaterals under the name of 

different persons, we will be able to lend more. 

S-E 
The regulators are quite slow in changing back to the old 

standards. 

P-D 
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Lack of CBM's Transparency 
CBM's transparency was also raised as a problem in the beginning, i.e. during the 
secondary data analysis section. The lack of transparency in the central bank's data 
had also affected the banks and the ways in which they could put trust on CBM. 
We have no transparency, therefore, there is no accountability. 
S-D 
The Central Bank stated that the interest should not be more 

than 17% but can be less than that. The deposit cannot be 

more than 12%. It's always 17%. Inflation is 25% but loan 

rate is less than 20%. 

P-A 
In summary, banks' concerns and their negative opinions to the coercive pressures 
prove that banks' lending practices were based on achieving legitimacy rather than 
their efficiency as institutional theory stated. 
6.4.2 Normative Pressures 
Banks also expressed their inclination towards accepting the higher level management 
opinions more than the loan officers in making lending decisions. 
During the renewal of loans, even if the collateral values are 

appreciating, we might not revalue the collaterals. It depends on 

the management. 

G-A 
Yes, we do take into account of personal decisions. The bank 

manager should present his findings about the customer to the 
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Bank Committee. If his evaluations are strong, the committee 
favour the bank manager's decision. 
P-A 
The Significant Role of the Government 
The role of the government in banks' loan allocations as well as the borrower's 
repayment patterns was found in the interviews with the banks. For instance, the 
researcher asked S-C about their involvement in micro finance and they replied that they 
could not make loss because their source of funding was the government. 
If the system is good, we will participate. We have to look at 
shareholders. We can't lose and affect our profit. Since the funding 
is also from the government, we can '( lose. 
S-c 
Similar to the above statement, the bank which was involved in micro finance stated that 
they could collect all the debts from the small borrowers because the bank was operated 
by the bank. 
Trust is not the problem here as people always give back 
loans because it's the government and they think of it as a 
duty. It becomes a habit. Due to Nargis and Giri (severe 
storms which have hit the country severely), the government 
has changed some policies. Even then, they only deferred for 
some period. At the end of the day, they are all 100% 
collectible. This is also because if they don't give back, these 
l 
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debts would be passed on to the next generations and the 

group would not allow them to run off. 

G-C 
G-C also mentioned that they were not involved in lending to livestock and 
fisheries because they were operated by the military. This is an interesting quote 
because G-C was a government bank, however, they did not involve in lending to 
those borrowers that were operating under military. 
We don't lend to livestock and fisheries. These types of businesses 

are conducted by the military. 

G-C 
All in all, the pressures to gain legitimacy are quite common across Myanmar banks. 
Though some of these pressures were affecting the banks' perfonnances by limiting them 
to reach more borrowers, they were restricted. In addition, these fmdings suggested that 
the government played a big role in banks' lending behaviour. 
6.S Conclusions 
In summary, this chapter provided the findings from the interviews with banks. As with 
the descriptive statistics provided in the chapter 5, banks were risk-averse and had no 
appetite to absorb any fonns of risks in the lending process. Though banks were confined 
by strict regulations, they had developed their own mechanisms of compromising them to 
maximise their profitability. The next chapter will provide the critical reflections of the 
findings of this research. 
I 
..., 
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Chapter Seven: Discussions 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide discussions on the implications for future 

development in the financial sector of Myanmar drawing upon the results and findings 
... 

1.1\' 
from the thesis. This study was undertaken to investigate the interplays between banks 
and institutions in lending to businesses. The investigation reveals that though banks 
operate under tight regulatory environment, non-conformity is also found. However, non­
conformity is not openly admitted by banks but respond to these pressures by 
active/positive strategic responses. In other words, they put a fayade on non-conformity 
or avoid completely without confronting the institutions. 
After having presented the methodologies used, results and findings in the preceding 
chapters, the effects of the institutional pressures which are meant to maintain financial 
stability have negative effects both the banks and other stakeholders. These will be 
explained in the following sections. In addition to providing theoretical contributions 
towards both institutional theory and Oliver's strategic responses, this study's practical 
implications for the banking sector reform as a part ofpolitical and economic reforms that 
the country has undergone since the election of 2010 will also be discussed. As the study 
has identified areas where developments and improvements are needed, discussions on 
the process by which they could be enhanced will be given. 
When presenting the data, NVIVO was used to generate tables and figures to provide the 
complex qualitative data in such a way that reader would be able to comprehend. 
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Therefore, some numbers were also attached to them. It should be noted that they are not 
provided to give statistical significances but to help the reader as well as the researcher in 
exploring similarities and dissimilarities in relation to the developed theoretical 
framework. The interviewed sample included three government banks, four private banks 
and five semi-government banks. Those numbers represent the sources or interviews 
identified by NVIVO in which the themes were coded. The helped the researcher in 
developing propositions that required further studies. In addition, it allows the researcher 
to establish the significance of the research project, to document the problem and describe 
samples. This is also in accordance with the critical realist perspective that has been taken 
to conduct the research. 
7.2 Discussions of Oliver's Propositions in Relation to the Findings 
This section will relate the findings to the hypotheses developed by Oliver (1991). These 
hypotheses provide some predictors of strategic responses such as the conditions under 
which banks conform or resist to institutional pressures. She states that Organizational 
responses to institutional pressures toward conformity will depend on why these 
pressures are being exerted, who is exerting them, what these pressures are, how 
or by what means they are exerted, and where they occur. 
Under this assumption, she outlines five institutional antecedents, namely, cause, 
constituents, content, control, and context. These are intended to be used as predictors for 
the extent to which organisations would be resistant to institutional pressures. The 
summary of the definitions for them are provided in the following Table 7-1. 
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Table 7-1: Summary ofthe Definitions of Determinants ofInstitutional Pressures 
Determinants of 
Institutional Pressures 
1. Causes 
2. Constituents 
3. Content 
4. Control 
5. Context 
Definition 
I 
The underlying rationale or expectations associated with 
institutional pressures. 
The multiplicity of actors involved in creating pressures on 
organisations, providing conflicting pressures. 
The compatibility of external pressures or expectations 
with organisational goals 
The means by which pressures are imposed on 
organisations, legal coercion or voluntary diffusion. 
The extent to an organisation's environment uncertainty 
and interconnectedness. 
Table 7-2: Summary of the Determinants of Institutional Pressures (Environmental Analysis using Oliver's Hypotheses) 
Institutional Pressures Determinants of Institutional Pressures 
Sources Causes Constituents Content Control Degree of Context 
Control 
Coercive Central Bank and Maintaining Financial Low Multiplicity Low Legal Coercion High High 
Pressures Regulatory Stability Compatibility Interconnectedness 
Authorities 
Social-Political Developmental Low to Medium No Compatibility Legal Coercion High High 
Institutions Objectives Multiplicity Intercollilectedness 
Normative Corporate Culture Cultural Norms Low to Medium N/A Voluntary Diffusion Low High 
Pressures Multiplicity Interconnectedness 
Professional Professionalism Low to Medium N/A Voluntary Diffusion Medium High 
Associations Multiplicity Interconnectedness 
Guidelines ­ Developmental Low Multiplicity No Compatibility Voluntary Diffusion Medium High 
Government Objectives Interconnectedness 
Mimetic 
Pressures 
'----------­
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7.2.1 Cause 
In institutional theory, the bases that underlie the external factors imposing institutional 
pressures are unspecified. Thus, recognising the existence of 'cause' is intended to fill 
this gap of the primary theory. Oliver (1991) states that there are two reasons for 
institutions to exert pressures. They are social fitness, which intends to make 
organisations more socially fit or acceptable, and economic fitness, which intends to have 
economic accountability and rationalisation. 
Oliver (1991) hypothesises that: 
HI: The lower the degree ofsocial legitimacy perceived to be attainable from conformity 
to institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organisational resistance to 
institutional pressures 
H2: The lower the degree ofeconomic gain perceived to be attainable from conformity to 
institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood of organisational resistance to 
institutional pressures 
As discussed in the previous sections, the causes of coercive pressures imposed on banks 
through the CBM whose existence is dependent upon the govenunent are to obtain 
financial stability and to prevent the repeat of financial crisis as in 2003. In other words, it 
is the result of the authorities' lack of trust over the fmancial institutions. In addition, 
non-conformity to these pressures will cause banks to be penalised. For example, not 
meeting the capital adequacy requirements and exceeding loan to deposit ratios are some 
of the conditions under which banks can lose legitimacy. Through meeting these limits, 
banks not only achieve legitimacy but also economic legitimacy by being able to reduce 
risks. 
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Similar phenomenon is also found in regard to nonnative pressure. The degree of social 
legitimacy achievable from conforming to ethical rules of not lending to alcohol or 
tobacco businesses is low, and the degree of economic gain is low which results from 
losing customers to competitors, therefore, banks dismiss such pressures. In summary, 
these two hypotheses are acceptable under Myanmar context. 
7.2.2 Constituents 
The underlying idea here is that it is impossible to meet all the demands imposed by 
different institutions as they have conflicting expectations. It is argued that organisations 
have to confront incompatible and competing demands that make unilateral conformity to 
the environment becomes difficult. In other words, satisfaction of one constituent will 
require the organisations to ignore or defy demands of another. 
Hence, Oliver (1991) hypothesises that: 
H3: The greater the degree ofconstituent multiplicity, the greater the likelihood of 
organisational resistance to institutional pressures. 
This means that when organisations are faced with incompatible and competing demands 
from different constituents, conformity is unlikely because the satisfaction of one 
constituent often requires the organisation to ignore, defy or compromise the demands of 
another. One of the weaknesses of this hypothesis is that the constituents are not 
differentiated into those that are from institutional and task environment. Banks are 
operating in an environment with many stakeholders exerting conflicting pressures, 
generalising all these into one category, 'multiple constituents' is inappropriate because 
we will not be able to identify whether they belong to institutional or task environments. 
Therefore, they will be differentiated into 'institutional-level' and 'task-level' 
constituents which can exert different demands. If the hypothesis is to be explained 
through assuming constituents as those from institutional environment, the only 
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constituent inflicting coercive pressures through different sources on Myanmar banks is 
the government. Therefore, there is a lower degree of constituent multiplicity in 
institutional environment but there are also important constituents, which can have 
significant contribution to banks' goals of increasing profitability. From Oliver's 
hypothesis, it can be induced that the likelihood of organisation's resistance to 
institutional pressure is lower. 
H4: The lower the degree ofexternal dependence on pressuring constituents, the greater 
the likelihood oforganisational resistance to institutional pressures. 
Only two sources of coercive pressures are identified in this research, thus, the 
multiplicity of conflicting pressure is low. However, political institutions are powerful 
constituents which create banks to conform to the pressures imposed by them and 
compromised other institutional pressures such as CBM. Similar to H3, there are some 
weaknesses in the Oliver's hypothesis, H4 in regard to coercive pressures. As it can be 
seen from the above discussions, the sources of these forces, coercive and normative on 
banks originate from the government. The dependence on this pressuring constituent is 
high. This weakness can be explained by the degree of enforcement which is explained in 
chapter 6. Though having only single constituent, different levels of factors to be 
complied with and banks' ownership structures or the management power can affect the 
degree of enforcement on banks. It is not necessarily true to conclude that the greater the 
degree of constituent multiplicity or the external dependence on pressuring constituents, 
banks would be more inclined to resist institutional pressures. 
7.2.3 Content 
It is expected that organisations will acquiesce more readily to pressures that do not 
constrain substantive organisational decisions, such as resource allocation that might 
affect their profitability or imposed them to more risk. 
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Oliver (1991) hypothesises that: 
H5: The lower the degree ofconsistency ofinstitutional norms or requirements with 
organisational goals, the greater the likelihood oforganisational resistance to 
institutional pressures 
H6: The greater the degree ofdiscretionary constraints imposed on the organisation by 
institutional pressures, the greater the likelihood oforganisational resistance to 
institutional pressures. 
For example, banks conform to the collateral requirements imposed by the banks due to 
their lack of risk appetite and unwillingness to share risks. This conformity occurs 
because there is some consistency between institutional norms or requirements with the 
organisational goals of lowering risks. None of the banks mention that changes to these 
restrictions were needed but to add more acceptable types of collaterals. Banks also 
conceal (avoid) the non-conformity to CBM's restrictions on loan sizes because 
conforming to this would decrease banks' profitability. If they give a lesser loan amount, 
the interest payments will also be lower. As this restriction is not compatible with bank's 
objective, they are more resistance to this type of pressure. Though the cause of imposing 
these pressures is to maintain financial stability, banks collectively try to change 
institutional requirements through shaping values and criteria since doing so as a single 
bank is not powerful enough. 
Banks seek a government guarantee for granting loans requested by social political 
institutions without collaterals as not doing so will expose them to higher risks. In such 
cases, banks resist institutional pressures through balancing with the other institutional 
constituent, CBM. 
tt, 
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7.2.4 Control 
Control describes the means by which pressures are exerted on organisations. There are 
two processes by which pressures are imposed. They are legal coercion and voluntary 
diffusion. The former type of control is imposed by legal or government mandates with 
the means of authority. Organisations' acquiescence is most likely because it serves the 
organisation's interest and the consequences of non-conformity are severe. Voluntary 
diffusion refers to the extent to which an institutional expectation or practice has already 
diffused or spread voluntarily through and organisational field. 
Oliver (1991) hypothesises that: 
H7: The lower the degree oflegal coercion behind institutional norms and requirements, 
the greater the likelihood oforganisational resistance to institutional pressures 
H8: The lower the degree ofvoluntary diffusion ofinstitutional norms, values or 
practices, the greater the likelihood oforganisational resistance to institutional pressures 
This is a valid hypothesis as the control can affect banks' degree of conformity. Norms 
and values are diffused through trainings given by Bankers' Associations. Normative 
pressures are more likely to be resisted by banks because they are not legally coerced. 
7.2.5 Context 
This section answers the question of 'what is the environment context within which 
institutional pressures are being exerted?' and the predictive dimensions are 
'environmental uncertainty' or 'environmental interconnectedness'. Environmental 
uncertainty is defined as 'the degree to which future states of the world cannot be 
anticipated and accurately predicted' and interconnectedness refers to 'the density of 
interorganisational relation amount occupants ofan organisational field' . 
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Oliver (1991) hypothesises that: 
H9: The lower the level ofuncertainty in the organisation's environment, the greater the 
likelihood oforganisational resistance to institutional pressures 
H10: The lower the degree ofinterconnectedness in the institutional environment, the 
greater the likelihood oforganisational resistance to institutional pressures 
Due to Myanmar's isolated economy, lack of capital market and foreign banks' 
operations, Myanmar has not been affected much by the 2008 global financial crisis. The 
environment's uncertainty is low, therefore, banks can anticipate the collateral values to 
be rising and the resistance to loan size restrictions is found. There is a high 
interconnectedness between banks in Myanmar's banking context. For instance, their 
activities in professional association prove their collected working system. Trainings in 
the Myanmar Bankers' Associations are provided by the senior managements of the 
domestic banks. Therefore, norms, beliefs and values can be diffused among the 
employees of the banks. This creates more implicit coordination and collectivisation in 
the environment, more consensuses on diffused norms, and greater ubiquity. Moreover, 
under uncertainty and risky situations, in lending, if banks were unsure of whether the 
presented collaterals have been used in other banks or have doubts about the genuinity of 
the contracts, they would contact other banks or local authority for validations. Thus, high 
interconnectedness among banks and institutions exists in Myanmar's banking industry. 
7.3 Cyclical Effects of Institutional Pressures 
First of all, the identification of the cyclical effects on different stakeholders and 
processes due to those institutional pressures exerted on banks as explained in the banks 
will be explained in this section. The consequences of these pressures have negative 
effects on the overall lending process, thereby affecting the efficiency of banks' role of 
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financial intennediation. As discussed before, the empirical study showed that there were 
homogeneities in banks' lending practices. In addition, institutional pressures affect the 
task environment. For instance, the collateral requirements impose on banks affect the 
lending behaviour by requiring customers to provide good quality collaterals as securities 
to mitigate risks. This can be seen very clearly in the graphical presentation presented. As 
the institutional pressures can be classified into three types, coercive, nonnative and 
mimetic, cyclical effects are presented under their respective headings. 
7.3.1 Coercive Pressures 
The role of [mancial intennediaries is to reduce transaction costs and information, 
thereby, creating efficiency in financial resource mobilisation and allocation. 
Subsequently, they will enhance economic growth and long-tenn stability. However, the 
data from the study give a different picture about the existence of Myanmar's banking 
system. It is the result of the coercive pressures exerted from the CBM. As institutional 
theory predicted, there were similarities across the interviewed banks. Unlike in the UK, 
the CBM is not an independent entity but is operating under the government to implement 
governmental policies. The banks in these countries were controlled extensively and 
constrained within rules and regulations set by the government. From the 
Figure 7-1 generated from NVIVO and from Table 5-1 to Table 5-3, banks' lending were 
restricted in terms of loan maturities, interest rates (both deposit and lending), loan size 
based on collateral values, collateral requirements along with the cliteria considered as 
acceptable collaterals and their marketing activities. Though these restrictions are meant 
to maintain financial stability, they have more negative than positive effects on different 
stakeholders. 
Basically, banks are able to transfer risks onto borrowers through high risk premiums or 
high interest rates, the types of collateral requirements, loan sizes and maturities of loans. 
Discussions 261 
However, these are set by CBM rather than the banks themselves. 'Interest rate 
restrictions', for instance, have many consequences attached to them. In general, lending 
interest rates are calculated at risk-free rate plus risk premium. The latter is calculated 
based on the loan applicant's likelihood of default based on usual 5Cs criteria. Interest 
rate spread between deposit and lending over the period of 2000 and 2011 has been 
maintained at 5.5%. Due to the economic conditions of the country where inflation is 
double digit, whereas, banks are only allowed to take maximum of 17% of interest rate. 
Hence, as in table (7-1), real lending rates for most of the years were negative. In addition 
to the high interest rates, banks have a service charge of 1% which was also pegged by 
the CBM, thereby, the fmal interest rate was 18%. Banks were given guidelines by it to 
lend at lower interest rates to sectors when they wanted to direct the financial resources 
for developments. Hence, there were political motives behind these restrictions. These 
can have effects on collateral requirements and the loan size. 
Table 7-3: Deposits and Lending Interest Rates from the Period of 2000 to 2011 
(Source: World Bank Database) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 200S 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Deposit 
interest 9.75 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 11.38 12 12 12 12 
rate (%) 10 
Lending 
interest 15.25 15 15 15 15 15 16.08 17 17 17 17 
rate (%) 15 
Interest 
rate 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 4.71 5 5 5 5 5 
spread 
Real 
Lending 
interest 12.48 -7.89 
-
18.73 -4.56 11.08 -3.56 -4.28 -5.37 2.98 11.55 8.13 N/A 
rate (%) 
In addition to imposing restrictions on interest rates, the CBM prevented banks from 
accepting collaterals other than land and properties. With the limitation on giving 
borrowers no more than 50% of the collateral values, banks require borrowers to give 
more collateral to offset the credit risk as well as the low interest rate in relation to high 
inflation. Banks were also given with loan loss policies and sectorial differentiations that 
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they should abide. They would face penalty charges if they were found not following 
these restrictions including capital adequacy and reserve requirements. Other restrictions 
such as lending and deposit limits also resulted in cyclical effects. It caused banks to be 
very cautious in taking deposits as well as giving loans. They were monitored daily, 
weekly, monthly and yearly. Hence, banks were supervised closely. Some banks 
mentioned that they had to lend to the sectors according to the developmental guidelines 
and engage in connected lending without collaterals. 
As it can be seen in Figure 7-2, though these types of prudential regulations are desirable, 
too many regulations exerted on the banks could be an obstacle for a country's economic 
development because they do not only affect banks' lending processes and efficiencies 
but also the borrowers' accessibilities to finance. In many countries, overdrafts are given 
to customers without collaterals, but in Myanmar, they are backed by collaterals. In 
addition, due to the lack of legal protections and laws for condos and apartment buildings, 
borrowers without land and buildings in possessions would not be able to obtain loans 
from the banks. Banks would only provide loans for working capitals .. In other words, 
start-up businesses or SMEs, which are an integral part of economic development, cannot 
obtain loans without collaterals. 
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The externalisation of risks was promoted by the CBM and the banks had their own 
criteria for doing so. Though the CBM restricted banks from giving more than 50% of the 
collateral values, some banks even gave lower than that by only providing the borrowers 
with 30% of the collateral values. This type risk externalisation needs to be discussed 
further as the banks were only accepting land and properties as collaterals. One can argue 
that lowering the loan size was dependent on the low interest rate in relation to inflation 
in the country. In Myanmar, due to speculations, the changes in prices in the property 
market over the years have been extraordinary as properties are seen as investment tools 
due to the lack of a developed capital market. By giving less than 50% of the collateral 
values would not put the banks at risks if the borrowers were to default because the 
liquidation of these collaterals would yield higher returns for the banks. In other words, 
the banks were involved in speculating on the property prices in addition to risk 
externalisations. Hence, despite non-performing loans at the banks had been increasing 
over the years (see Figure 5-22), profit before tax of the banking industry from the period 
of 2007-2011 also provides a positive trend. The CBM not allowing the banks to engage 
in marketing activities also indicates that credit culture is not promoted. 
Table 7-4: Presence of Coding in Regard to Importance of Qualitative and 
Quantitative Factors in Lending Decisions 
Importance of Quantitative 
Factors 
Importance of Qualitative 
Factors 
Due to the importance given more on the quantitative, rather than qualitative factors such 
as the loan applicants' character, trustworthiness, business prospects and their 
relationships with the banks had become less important in the lending decisions. This can 
be seen when the banks do not give preference to existing account holders and not 
~: 
--'­
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sticking to locality. These themes allow the researcher to distinguish the type of lending 
behaviour that the banks favour. For instance, giving preference to existing account 
holders indicates that banks has established the relationship with the borrower and his/her 
trustworthiness and character can be judged from such relationship. Similarly, banks' 
lending at the local branches indicates that the local managers are more familiar with the 
soft factors of the borrowers. Since none of them are found in the interview data, except 
the agricultural bank which focuses more on providing micro finance to farmers, 
Myanmar banks' lending behaviour can be categorised as transactional or gone concern 
lending opposed to relationship or going concern lending. 
Coercive pressures exerted on banks from sources other than the CBM include social 
political institutions. These are associated with the government's developmental 
guidelines, directing financial resources to those sectors in which development or 
assistance requires. This could be seen as having both positive and negative effects. For 
instance, with the governmental guarantees, banks were required to lend to the salt 
industry which was affected by the Nargis cyclone. Another instance includes the 
government's policy to convert buses to eNG run engines to become more 
environmental. Without governmental assistance, these sectors would not get financial 
supports for development and recover from natural disasters due to the banks' risk 
adversities. The negative effects are the inefficient allocation of resources and high 
dependencies on the governments for risk mitigation. Other type of lending includes 
'connected lending' where the banks were forced to lend to those which had connections 
with the ruling parties. This also creates inefficient allocation of financial resources. 
The measures of deposits are important in Myanmar due to its cash-based economy and 
the loans are based on the amount of deposits that banks received. Unlike in other 
developed countries where banks have other sources of cash inflows, banks' lending are 
dependent upon the deposits they have. In addition, the fmancial stability focuses on the 
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protection of the depositors by imposing reserves and liquidity requirements based on the 
deposits while the CBM limiting banks taking deposits more than ten times of each 
bank's paid-up capital. Since the banks were restricted in lending to customers, they 
encountered difficulties in accepting deposits from the depositors as they would face 
penalties for not meeting the regulatory requirements. With the interest rates on deposits 
being capped at 12% and lending at 17%, the whole system of lending criteria and 
behaviour was affected. 
All in all, banks' lendings in the country were controlled extensively and constrained with 
rules and regulations set by the CBM. Hence, as described in preceding chapter (see 
Figure 5-7 and Figure 5-11), there were inefficiencies in loan allocations and the lack of 
banking sector's contribution to the country's economic growth. In banking, uncertainties 
and risks are unavoidable factors where banks try to mitigate to the minimum as much as 
possible, but in Myanmar, the complete risk transferring to the borrowers by devaluing 
collaterals, providing short-term loans, fixed interest rates, etc. In other words, there is no 
flexibility in all the banks. Due to these guidelines and standards, banks have no 
relationship lending. In addition, it has been over twenty years since the country has 
introduced a market-oriented economic system to abolish planned economic system, 
however, state control is still in place. The country has been taking time to implement 
capital market where companies and banks can have access to capital through other 
financial intermediations. Thus, these banks have no other ways to transfer risks, other 
than to the customers. Through using institutional theory, the sources creating 
homogeneities across banks through coercive pressures were found. Moreover, some big 
banks have political pressures in lending to certain customers. In the case of Myanmar, 
they did not only hinder efficiencies but also created a top-down management approach 
across the sector. This will be explained in detailed in the next section. 
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7.3.2 Normative Pressures 
In this thesis, the sources of nonnative pressures were identified based on the literature. 
They were 'External Verifiers', 'Myanmar Bankers' Association' (Professional 
Association), 'Industrial Association', 'Guidelines' and the most importantly 'Corporate 
Culture'. Since the researcher was unable to identify nOTInS and values specifically from 
the banks, the possible sources where these sources and nOTInS might be created were 
explored first. 
First of all, the most important source of normative pressure was 'culture'. As culture 
could not be explored directly from the banks' interviews themselves, the researcher 
opted to identify the banks' corporate cultures instead. Decision approval processes and 
the reward systems were primarily studied. The banks' lending decisions were found to 
be made by the management. Hence, the role of loan officers was minimal. As it was 
discussed in the previous section, banks had standardised criteria set by the CBM. In 
addition, the decisions to grant loans were made at the banks' headquarters, top 
management levels including Board of Directors and ministers in government affiliated 
banks. Loan officers, independent investigators and lawyers did not have much role in 
influencing those decisions but to perfonn their regular administrative duties such as 
writing reports and investigation of the collaterals and loan applicant's business activities. 
However, the role of collateral value appraiser had increased with the others' roles 
diminished since they could influence the loan size and borrowers' trustworthiness in the 
situation of rising house market prices. They could be employed directly by the banks or 
externally. Similarly, appraisals could be done by the loan officers themselves. Hence, 
though the role of loan officers' role in making lending decisions diminished but their 
role as an assessor could affect the banks' loan sizes given to the borrowers, thereby, 
influencing the lending assessments. 
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Risk adversities and ethical concerns were also found in some of the private and semi­
government banks. They seemed to be influenced by their culture of risk adversities and 
Buddhism. They could be formally or informally set in the banks' internal policies. One 
of the banks refused to lend to poultry farming, liquor and tobacco related businesses 
based on their formally defined internal policies. The other banks were also cautious of 
such businesses which had relatively higher risks compared to other sectors. These could 
include construction businesses as well. However, these banks would consider lending to 
them based on their perceived future profitability. Hence, similar risk adversities and 
ethical concerns across the banks were found from the interview data. Nonetheless, such 
criteria were not found in the government banks. Similarly, collective reward systems and 
the targets to be achieved in a fmancial year were found in private and semi -government 
banks. Those that could influence the banks' lending decisions were the industrial 
associations that the borrowers were attached to since they could provide their reputations 
in their respective industries. The governmental guidelines to favour industry and 
agriculture sectors affect their lending decisions as well. 
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Other sources of normative pressures could be in-house trainings given by the banks 
themselves and the Myanmar Bankers' Associations. It should be an organisation for 
bankers but they are also engaged in monopolisation of knowledge and creating 
management cultures in banks. These were the places where the similarities among the 
banks' employees' perceived values and norms could be created. Since these trainings 
were given by the managing directors and the senior staff members of the banks, it was 
expected that the shared values and norms would be passed over to the other banks. It was 
also interesting to discover the fact that there were no competition among banks' sister 
branches. This could be the result of the locations where the banks' branches were. Thus, 
their performances were incomparable with the main branches such as Yangon and 
Mandalay where most of the commercial activities take place. 
Table 7-5: Sources of Norms and Values in Government, Private and Semi­
Government Banks 
MyanmarAuthority at External In-HouseSources ofNorms and Bankers'Management Trainings TrainingsValues Associations 
Government Banks 
Private Banks 
Semi-Govenunent Banks 
Coercive pressures from the CBM influenced the way in which normative pressures were 
formed. They gave more power to the property value assessors. These banks are very 
hierarchical and bureaucratic. Though loan officers may give opinions regarding the loan 
applicants, due to fixed interest rates and fixed guidelines, soft information regarding the 
loan applicants was unimportant. Hence, the educational background of the job selection 
criteria did not reflect the requirements a bank loan officer should have. 
---
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Figure 7-4: Consequences of Normative Pressures 
For instance, when an interviewee was asked how they selected an employee for th 
bank, they mentioned that one should hold an accountancy or economic degr e . Ilowever, 
when she was asked about the educational backgrounds of the loan officers' portfo lios, 
she mentioned that the bank had history graduates performing the job. While the loan 
decisions were made by the top level management, the staffs become incompetent and the 
fear of taking responsibilities persist. Consequently, all the decisions were again directed 
back to the management. In summary, tbe sources of nonnative pressures were similar 
across the banks and especially, top-down management style, risk adversities and ethical 
concerns. 
7.3.3 Mimetic Pressures 
From the empirical data collected from the interviews with the banks, they did not 
mention of adapting industry best practices or having mimetic pressures exerted from the 
other banks. However, they did identify some of the foreign banks that they wanted to 
imitate or had imitated in their operational activities. Since th CBM had laid out the 
standard lending criteria and the banks having similar sources of normative pressures, 
these banks had no scope for creativities in their lending practices. Banks not being 
allowed to engage in marketing activities also state that credit culture as a whole was not 
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encouraged in the country. Thus, banks did not compete with the number of large 
businesses that they had. However, due to the size and the ownership structures of the 
banks, banks were incomparable. Four new banks started their banking operations in the 
country since late 2010. These empirical data are collected during the summer of 2010. 
Therefore, these new banks could only be potential threats for the existing banks. 
However, when the participants were interviewed about how they felt about these new 
banks, they did not feel they could become threats for their banks as they felt that every 
bank had their own customers. They also stated that every bank operating in the country 
still had to follow the CBM's rules and regulations which did not give them a scope for 
competitions. However, in 2011, some of these banks were interviewed again about their 
feelings of the new banks and they mentioned that their deposits decreased dramatically 
and some of the borrowers went to those new banks. This indicates that many of 
Myanmar nationals are not familiar with banking services and only handful number of 
people are depositing with the banks. 
Table 7-6: Effects of New Entries of Competitors on Banks with Different 
Ownership Structures 
Effects of New Banks' 
Entries A : Government Banks B : Private Banks 
1 : Decreased o 
2: Lose 
3 : None 
In summary, banks did not have pressures from peers due to lack of creativity allowed as 
the coercive and mimetic pressures standardised their lending practises. However, the 
fmdings also suggest that the pressures that banks encountered and how they responded 
to these institutional pressures were also dependent on their ownership structures and 
their associations with the government. These heterogeneities will be discussed in the 
following sections. Banks' ownership structure is another important mediating variable in 
the degree of government pressure as well as a contingent factor in their resistance to 
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institutional pressures. Differences in banks' strategic responses to institutional pressures 
have not been studied before; therefore, there is no literature in regard to this area. Hence, 
it becomes more interesting to explore the banks' ownership structures and their impacts 
on theoretical frameworks. 
7.4 Implications 
This study endeavours to develop a new framework to study banks' lending behaviour 
from sociological perspective by incorporating two theories from the discipline such as 
institutional theory and Oliver's strategic responses. It contributes to the existing body of 
theory on banking and organisational studies by applying these theories to banks in the 
new context, Myanmar. Hence, the study has bridged the literature and theoretical gaps. 
The findings also aim to contribute to the country's current financial sector reform by 
describing those areas that need development. Unexpectedly, the study would provide 
methodological implications for those researchers who are to conduct research in 
Myanmar. 
7.4.1 Theoretical Implications 
As described in chapter three, the thesis incorporates two theories to better understand the 
interplays between banks and institutions in banks' lending decision making. Hence, the 
fmdings have not only confirmed the assumptions underpin theories were created but also 
new propositions are developed for future study in respect to the theories. 
7.4.1.1 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory states that organisations comply with institutional pressures to achieve 
legitimacy rather than efficiency. Since the research identified banks' opinions on 
different institutional pressures that were exerted upon them which have confirmed the 
theory's assumptions of organisations' conformity to such pressures to attain legitimacy. 
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As described in the previous section, banks' lending practice were restricted by the 
CBM, they had expressed their opinions on how their e fficiencies could be improved. 
'Figure 7-5 shows banks' opinions on what factors could be changed to improve their 
performances. The bank managers' expressions and their opinions in regard to the 
coercive pressures can be viewed as the confirmation the assumption by which 
institutional theory is developed. They mentioned their requirements for the regulatory 
change and their unwillingness to conform to these coercive pressures were identified. 
They mentioned that the need for the central bank's transparency, abolishing restrictions 
on criteria of collateral requirements, lending limit, deposit and interest rates, increasing 
margins between these rates, improving laws and regulations. However, due to the high 
degree of legal coercion, they had no choice but to conform. 
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Figure 7-5: Banks' Opinions on the Pressures Exerted from CBM 
Other concerns by banks on top-down management style (figure 7-4) that had influenced 
their activities provided that fact that banks were not achieving their maximum 
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efficiencies but were bounded by the institutional pressures. Although assumptions by 
institutional theories were confirmed, the research has also identified the theoretical gaps 
that will need to be studied further. 
Power ofCoercive Pressures 
Proposition 1: The power of coercive pressures in creating homogeneities is greater 
than normative and mimetic pressures. 
Proposition la: The greater the coercive pressures, the role of normative and 
cognitive pressures diminish as it could influence the sources normative and 
cognitive pressures. 
Most of the research using institutional theory to study a phenomenon usually 'pressures' 
as independent entities and their association with sources from which these pressures 
being emitted are only vaguely explained. However, in discussing institutional theory 
related research, the sources should be explained in detail as the degree of authority each 
source has on organisations, in this case, banks, can have impacts on the normative and 
cognitive pressures. From the findings, the source of the coercive pressures is the 
government, whose regime has been in power for significant amount of time. This in turn 
influences the normative pressures, products of corporate and management culture, and 
banking associations. Due to the high intensity level of coercive pressures, homogeneity 
in lending practices is created by the CBM itself. 
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In other words, the research identified that there three institutional pressures might not be 
needed to create homogeneities in banks' lending practices. Instead, coercive pressures 
along with normative pressures, especially, the coercive pressures are more important in 
creating homogeneities. In other words, the research identifies that three institutional 
pressures are not required to co-exist together and the importance of one pressure, 
coercive, can diminishes or omit the need for mimetic pressures to create homogeneities. 
Heterogenetic Legitimacy 
Proposition 2: Legitimacy requirements are dependent upon the banks' ownership 
structures creating 'heterogenetic legitimacy' 
According to institutional theory, homogeneities in organisations operating in the same 
institutional environment can be found. However, it does not recognise the varying 
degree of institutional pressures on organisations. For example, the fmdings suggest that 
there are institutional pressures are higher on private banks compared to other banks to 
conform to regulatory requirements. On the other hand, government related banks have 
higher degree of pressures to allocate credit for developmental purpose. Therefore, 
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intensity levels of institutional pressures are dependent upon organisational structure and 
'heterogenetic legitimacy' is formed. 
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Table 7-7: Presence of Coding in Heterogenetic Legitimacy across Banks 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
Long-term Loan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Maturities 
Loan Size 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Restrictions 
Table (7-3) is provided to show the presence of coding the theme 'heterogeneities' across 
the interviewed banks. It should be noted that they are not presented with the purpose of 
generalisations but as to analyse how differently legitimacies were achieved with 
respective to ownership structures. From the table, heterogeneities could be found across 
interviewed government and semi-government banks but not with private banks. This 
indicates that banks' ownership structures or affiliations could have leniencies in 
legitimacy requirements. These heterogeneities might have great impacts on the banks' 
lending. It was mentioned by one interviewed government stating that they did not 
require to pay tax. Similarly, a private bank also mentioned that government and semi-
government banks which had great political ties were exempted from paying tax. This 
indicates that these banks had more capacities to lend than those who needed to pay tax. 
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Some of the banks were not restricted in terms of collateral requirements, maturities, 
commitment and service charges. These allowed them to attract more borrowers than 
those whose lending criteria were restricted by the CBM. In other words, such banks took 
more risks than the others. In addition, being able to provide long-term loans mean that 
these banks could provide more investment loans. Hence, despite restricting banks in only 
accepting land and buildings as collaterals, there were also other types of security-wise 
loans were found as provided Figure 5-19. Though it did not provide the fact that 
whether these types of loans were made by government affiliated banks or not, they could 
be created only with 'heterogenetic legitimacy' and 'Compromise Strategy (Bargain), in 
which CBM and the government would be fully informed. 
The theme 'restrictions in deposit accounts' indicates the trust received by the banks from 
the public. As G-A bank mentioned: 
Even ifwe provide bad customer service, there will still be customers 
because they trust government banks more than private banks. 
G-A 
Hence, the government banks having more trust from the public and also having to 
leniencies in terms of restrictions on lending criteria exerted upon banks from the CBM 
they received more deposits. This created more capacities for them to provide more loans 
to the sectors than private banks. In addition, three of the interviewed government 
affiliated banks provided the fact that they did not restrict lending to those businesses 
based on ethical concerns. This confirmed to the fact in which P-D stated as: 
We are not lending based on our strategy and not policy but due to the 
demand. We have no credit priority policy. If the businesses are not in 
accordance with government policies or oppose to government, we don't 
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lend them. We are J..'ind ofstrict with alcohol related businesses but ifwe 
have demand, we lend to them because ifwe don't lend, the government 
banks would. 
P-D 
Interviewed private banks mention that they have close supervision, i.e. having to give 
daily reports at CBM while other government related banks are not required. There are 
homogeneities in banks' lending behaviour, however, the level intensity of these coercive 
pressures on banks create heterogeneities in legitimacy. In other words, some banks have 
lesser requirements or leniencies to conform to in order to achieve legitimacy compared 
to the other banks. In this case, ownership structure plays a great role in creating 
heterogenetic legitimacy. Consequently, it increased the competitive behaviour among 
banks. 
7.4.1.2 Oliver's Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures 
By incorporating strategic responses to institutional theory to study the banking sector in 
Myanmar, both theory and research have contributed one another by not only allowing 
the researcher to identify strategic responses by which banks respond to different 
institutional pressures but also additional factors that should be considered when applying 
the theory in future research. They are contingent factors and Unintentional Avoidance. 
Contingent Factors and Contingent Strategic Response 
Proposition 3: Banks' strategic responses will be dependent upon the contingent 
factors arising from task environment. 
This theoretical contribution arises from the grounded theory coding method when the 
researcher does not restrict the data into the framework but allows them to emerge from 
the data. It was predicted by Oliver (1991) that organisations' strategic responses would 
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be dependent upon cause, constituents, content, control and context. These are the 
predictors to understand the extent to which organisations would be resistant to 
institutional pressures. By incorporating this theory in banking industry, the contingent 
factors related to this specific context were identified. Through observing banks' 
liquidity, capital adequacy and reserve ratios, security wise loans and interviewed data, 
risk adversities not only by the banks but also by the regulatory authorities were found. 
However, banks' risk taking behaviour and resistant to institutional pressures were also 
found through the interviews with the banks. Those influencing factors arise from the 
banks' task environment, thereby, creating 'contingent strategic responses'. 
Institutional Environment 
Coercive Pressures 
Normative Pressures 
1 
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Figure 7-6: Banks' Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures 
In this research context, coercive pressures exerted by regulatory institutions demanding 
financial stability could be compromised by the banks to meet the demand of 
organisational constituents to increase fmancial profitability. For instance, through 
conversations with banks' management, some of the interviewees mentioned that 
depending on the customers' credibility, they would either increase the loan collateral 
values or charge interest rates only on certain fraction of the loan amount. One 
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interviewee also stated that if they were asked by any politically affiliated finns (i.e. 
guaranteed by political actors), they might also compromise these institutional pressures 
by charging lower interest rates or providing loans without collaterals. This creates 
'contingent strategic response', which depends upon the consumer's credibility. 
Similarly, banks also compromise their cultural values of limiting their lending to non­
ethical and risky businesses depending on the borrowers' business prospects and 
competition. Therefore, in this case, the rationale behind banks' strategic responses is not 
entirely due to the higher degree of multiple constituents but depends upon the loan 
applicants, which in turns improve the banks' efficiency, i.e. achieving higher 
profitability. This again also proves the presence of a contingent strategic response to 
institutional pressure. As mimetic pressure is not identified from the research, I was 
unable to deduce the types of strategic responses the banks would take to these pressures. 
Table 7-8: Contingent Factors in Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures 
Semi­
Contingent Factors 
Government 
Banks 
Private Banks Government 
Banks 
Stimuli- Loan Applicant's Trustworthiness and 
Prospects of the Business 
Stimuli- Loan Applicant's Business Prospects 
Condition - CBM's Approval 
Stimuli ;.. Competition 
Stimuli - Profitability 
In summary, the banks' contingent factors to resist institutional pressures depend on task 
environmental factors related to customers' trustworthiness, business prospects and 
profitability, and competitors. In addition, in some cases, conditions were also attached to 
them, i.e. getting the central bank's approval or the awareness by the regulatory 
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authorities. The latter was created the government as the guarantor in case of default to 
protect the banks from loss. 
Unintentional Avoidance 
Proposition 4: Banks' strategic response to institutional pressures dependent on 
'customer demands' would create 'unintentional avoidance' resistance strategy 
This is also related to the banks' task environmental factor affecting their strategic 
responses. The research has identified an emerging theme 'unintentional avoidance' 
whose contingent factor was 'customer demands'. This is a theme that should be noted in 
the study because it allows the researcher identify the different types of customers that 
banks engaged with. According to Oliver (1991), this could be termed as a weak -fonn of 
strategic response to institutional pressures in which banks had no control over the type of 
borrowers that they worked with. Banks have the pressures to lend to industrial 
businesses at a lower interest rate; however, these types of customers did not apply loans 
from the private banks but from the government banks. . Hence, those businesses that 
engaged in sectors that were favoured by the government would borrow from the 
government-affiliated banks and not from private banks. As the credit culture was not 
encouraged by the regulatory authorities and the restrictions were imposed on the lending 
criteria by standardising, banks had limited demands for loans. In other words, banks' 
loan portfolios would be based not by their allocation strategies but by customer 
demands. 
Reverse Legitimacy 
Proposition 5: Under tight regulatory environment, banks' collectively exercise 
'manipulative' strategic response to create 'reverse legitimacy' 
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Under a highly regulated environment, strategic responses to institutional pressures range 
from acquiescence to compromise only. Collectively, banks try to shape values and 
criteria through manipulations while conforming. They are termed as banks' passive 
responses to institutional pressures, i.e. to alter the nature of demands in a manner that is 
acceptable to the action and the institutional agent. Through this process, 'reverse 
legitimacy' can be created. In 2010, four new banks started their operations; therefore, 
these additions make the industry much more competitive. From the conversations with 
the banks both in 2010 and 2011, I discovered that banks have tried to communicate with 
the policy makers to change the guidelines, especially with the restrictions on collateral 
requirements which were amended since 2003. However, they said that it had not been 
successful. After the end of my second stage of data collection, in 2011, CBM published 
a statement indicating that banks could accept commodities and gold as collaterals. They 
might also be the result of their collectivism as a group of banks to influence the CBM t 
(manipulative strategic response, influence tactic). 
Regulatory Authorities 
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Figure 7-7: Graphical Presentations of the Decision Making Patterns at Different 
Levels: Institutional, Industrial and Organisational Levels 
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In order to explain 'reverse legitimacy' from Oliver's (1991) strategic responses view, it 
can be identified as banks manipulating (or constant challenges towards institutional 
pressures). Only when powerful affiliated organisations are present, then, these 
institutions would require legitimacy from them. From this research, reverse legitimacy 
exists and this contributes to institutional theory which gives less importance to the role 
of 'agency' in institutionalisation process and assumes that legitimacy requirements are 
imposed only from one direction, i.e. from institutions. These four new banks were said 
to have strong political ties and the CBM added a list of additional acceptable collaterals 
in 2011. Such change could be categorised as 'reverse legitimacy' according to Riaz 
(2009), which is the result of the emergence of powerful business and fmancial 
organisations. 
Strategic Responses, Ownership Structures and Heterogenetic Legitimacy 
Proposition 7: The more the government has stake in banks, they are less likely to 
engage in strong forms of resistance to institutional pressures. 
Proposition 8: If the banks have heterogeneities in legitimacy requirements, they are 
less likely to engage in strong forms of resistance to institutional pressures 
The above propositions were developed based on different strategic responses identified 
in the following Table 7-7, developed from matrix coding in NVIVO. It has identified 
that strong forms of resistance to institutional pressures could not be found in fully-owned 
government banks but in private and semi-government banks. From the table, it can also 
be seen that normative pressures are more prone to strong forms of strategic responses 
than coercive pressures. Thus, this might indicate that legal coercion is less likely for the 
banks to resist strongly. However, strong resistances were identified in those banks with 
less government stakes. This can also be related back to 'heterogenetic legitimacy' as 
presented in Table 7-7. 
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Table 7-9: Weak Forms of Strategic Responses to Coercive and Normative Pressures 
Identified from Interviewed Banks 
WeakFonn 
Compromise (Bargain) toUnintentional Avoidance to A voidance (Conceal) to Other Sources from Normative Pressures Central Bank's Pressures Coercive Pressures 
Table 7-10: Strong Forms of Strategic Responses to Coercive and Normative 
Pressures Identified from Interviewed Banks 
Defiance (Dismiss) to Central Bank's Defiance (Dismiss) to Normative Pressures Pressures 
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Since government banks were given leniencies in the institutional requirements that they 
needed to conform, they were able to lend with lesser requirements, thereby, were not 
required to resist the institutional limitations. In addition, the government has the power 
to disguise any of the non-confonnities through political motivation such as development 
purpose loans. Politicians can use their power to control fmancial resources much easier 
than open entry barriers in other sectors (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Dine (2005) finds 
political motivations behind lending by government-owned banks in emerging markets, 
that is, increasing lending in election years. Since I am not sure if banks did not fully 
disclose their strategic responses, the propositions should be studied further in the future 
research. 
7.4.2 Practical Implications 
The practical contribution of this research is its recognition of understanding sociological 
factors in studying organisational practices not only in developing but also in developed 
countries, especially in regard to banks' lending practices. Through using institutional 
theory, it has recognised external factors that shape organisational practices, especially in 
banking industry. It has identified the main source of coercive pressures that shape 
homogeneities; therefore, it allows policy makers to recognise the point from which 
financial policy reforms should be made. These findings can be extended towards other 
organisational practices, one of which is the change management practice. In addition, it 
has contributed to cultural understandings in regard to Myanmar through studying 
corporate culture as a part of the normative pressure source in the developed theoretical 
framework for this study. This section is structured in two parts. The first part focuses on 
the implications of the findings to Myanmar banking industry and the change in 
management practice. The second part focuses on the main contribution to cultural 
understandings. 
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It is needed to examine the implications of the findings of the study for a number of 
interested parties, especially, the bankers, policy makers, and businesses. As in reviewing 
the literature, they can be divided into three levels, Macro, Meso and Micro Levels as to 
relate with sociological concepts, which are the basis of the study. However, such type of 
differentiation will not enable the reader to identify the needs of changes. Therefore, the 
impacts will be discussed from the implementation of 'financial liberalisation' for 
economic growth in banking sector during the Myanmar's economic reform. 
7.4.2.1 Financial Liberalisation (From the Banking Sector Perspective) 
It has been well accepted by researchers that there is a relationship between development 
and finance. Here, financial liberalisation is described as a tool due to its use by the 
developmental organisation to enhance economic growth. It argues that financial resource 
mobilisation is suppressed by strict controls on interest rates, insufficient competition, 
high reserve requirements, and government allocation of credit. Therefore, mechanisms 
of financialliberalisation involves deregulating interest rates, privatise and liberalise bank 
licensing as to increase competition, lower reserve requirements, and eliminate credit 
allocation towards preferential or priority sectors or for government borrowing. These are 
made to bring the developing countries in line with the practices of financial institutions 
in advanced capitalist societies such as Anglo Saxon countries as opposed to traditional 
Japanese or German financial systems where strong links between firms and fmancial 
institutions exist. 
After 62 years, in 2010, Myanmar has embarked on reforms not only politically but 
economically through elections under the 2008 Burmese Constitutional Referendum. 
These reforms are assisted by international development organisations such as 
International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the World Bank. As expected in any economic 
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reforms, one of the tools used by these organisations is 'financial liberalisation' to 
promote economic growth. 
Liberalisation of the financial sectors means Myanmar will be exposed to foreign 
competition and globalisation. These financial liberalisation policies have been 
increasingly implemented by many countries for development since the 19805. Due to the 
country's economic isolation in the past, the current financial crisis has little effect on the 
country's financial system. The need for this study comes with the collapse the ideal 
market deregulations of the western nations that financial liberalisation theory is based 
upon and the Myanmar's economic reform. This creates a doubt on the effectiveness of 
fmancial liberalisation. The process requires prudent care as inability to recognise a 
country's institutional structure and the process of banks' interaction with these 
institutions can result in fmancial crises since there are many prior instances. Without 
mentioning the crises resulting from financial liberalisation in other parts of the world, 
even within the South East Asia region, there are several good examples such as 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. In summary, Myanmar banking 
industry can be described as 'over-protected' and not within an ideal properly functioning 
financial system. At the same time, the occurrences of financial crises in what were 
labelled as 'ideal systems' create doubts on the definition ofiL 
The American and UK style financial liberalisations are problematic for many reasons. 
First, it relies on bond and stock markets which tend to be poorly formed in most 
developing countries rather than on bank loans for financing investments. They are used 
more for speCUlative purposes. Currently, the country is undergoing a dramatic economic 
reform from being an isolated economy for many years. Therefore, there are some issues 
that must be considered if transformations are to be done hastily. 
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In this discussion chapter, financial liberalisation is not discouraged. In addition, it is very 
early to conclude that liberalisation of the banking industry would be a failure. However, 
its purpose is to raise some issues to be considered when implementing policies. This 
study is based on my experience, knowledge of the country's economic and financial 
systems as a local Myanmar and interviews with the banks. 
Myanmar's economic transfonnation has tremendous and ambitious agenda. Therefore, it 
requires some analyses on the issues that need to be addressed if financialliberalisation 
process is to be successful. The following sections are described in relation to support the 
need for 'Phase-based Banking Sector Liberalisation' instead of 'Complete Banking 
Sector Liberalisation'. They are constructed based on the researcher's perspective of 
financial sector development as an institutional transformation instead of taking the 
orthodox view of fmancial liberalisation where individuals are assumed to behave in 
predictable manner. 
7.4.2.2 Liberalisation ofRegulations 
Liberalisation process involves relaxing or the removal of capital adequacy requirements, 
interest rate ceilings, collateral requirements, and barriers for new entrants, reserve 
requirements and government allocation of credit. In other words, it is a step for 
modernisation of the fmancial system. 
The discussions on this regard will start with interest rate liberalisation relating to the 
findings. Control of banking activities through imposing ceilings on deposit and lending 
rates and credit allocation are the elements of financial repression. In this paper, the 
fmdings also support the fact that such kinds of financial repressions exist in the country. 
Allowing the removal of interest rate ceilings means they will be determined based on 
supply and demand. Theoretically, it is meant to reduce the interest rate spreads (i.e. 
difference between deposit and lending rates). However, the findings suggest that some of 
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the interviewees recognised the high interest rates but think the spreads between deposit 
and lending rates to be low. This shows that banks are highly profit seekers. This can 
discourage savings in the banks and encourage savings in the fonn ofphysical goods such 
as land and property, and durable goods. As it is with the high interest rates, the prices of 
these goods, land and property have been increasing over the years. Despite these 
increments, banks are limited by the CBM to provide loan size at 50% of wholesale 
collateral values. These allowed collaterals are land and property only. It does not even 
include condos or apartments. 
This is when the roles of value appraisals come into play. Similar to the credit rating 
agencies in the developed countries, in the country where these kinds of institutions do 
not exist, collateral value appraisers are important in providing loans, especially with the 
size of the loans. There are some instances reported by the banks stating that loans 
applicants sometimes interact with these value appraisers to increase their collaterals 
values, thereby increasing the loan size which is limited at 50% by the CBM. This can be 
compared with the developed countries' credit rating agencies which have contributed to 
the global financial crises. Indeed, in Myanmar, the increasing prices of land and property 
has sustained the banks from collapsing, however, the similar incident can also occur in 
the country if the same phenomenon as in the developed nations take place. Some of the 
banks have gone beyond the 50% limit, depending on the prospects of the business. 
Another bank even mentioned that they only charged interests on certain proportion of the 
loan size. This indicates that banks are risk takers irrespective of the regulative pressures 
imposed on them to follow the strict guidelines. Hence, having reserve requirements need 
not be abolished. Treasury bonds 
Thus, even under the long period of financial repressions, the banks have been able to 
recover not only losses but also make profits through liquidating collaterals whose market 
values have been increasing. In other words, the repressions do not have much effect on 
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banks' profitability, instead inadequate enforcement of prudential rules and regulations 
from the regulatory authorities allow them to violate legal lending limits and 
creditworthiness criteria, and the over reliance on collaterals. This prevents banks from 
lending to those without collaterals even if the businesses have good prospects. Hence, 
these types of business owners have to go to alternative sources such as equity or 
informal money lenders, thereby increasing the cost of financing. The CBM does not 
allow banks to provide factoring services, which can significantly affect those in 
export/import businesses. Along with the trade liberalisation, this can hamper the 
businesses' operations. Unlike the overdraft facilities, the banks provide overdrafts to 
their customers with collaterals. As there are no long-term borrowings and the terms of 
the loans are limited to one year renewable depending on the borrowers' performance, 
control on these loans prevent some small and medium sized businesses from accessing 
fmancing from the banks. 
In addition, since 2003 fmancial crisis in Myanmar, resulting from the pyramid scams, 
created public to have more trust on the government banks than on private banks. Though 
there are only four government banks, by observing the size of their deposits, they are 
much higher than those of private or semi-government banks. 
Critiques of financial repressions discourage the government's credit allocation programs. 
As in other underdeveloped and developing countries, from the interviews with the banks, 
the allocation of financial resources to politically connected parties is found. However, 
certain credit allocations programs are encouraged as banks' themselves are reluctant to 
lend without collaterals or assurance from higher authorities. Thus, for certain industries 
to obtain finance for development need government interventions and support. 
Another aspect of that the theoretical ground of financial liberalisation policies is that it 
does not consider the financing culture of Myanmar. This is similar to Modigliani and 
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Miller's (1958) view of financial markets as independent entities from the rest of the 
economy. In other words, it proposes that finance and growth are unrelated. Nevertheless, 
they do not mention of businesses' financing culture. People in the country are not 
familiar with credit culture, therefore, taken for granted view of fmancial liberalisation 
enhances economic growth should be revised. Moreover, with the banks only targeting 
towards large and affluent businesses, economic growth through efficient credit allocation 
would depend on government and policy makers. 
In addition, in 2010, before the start of the new banks' operations, the domestic banks 
believed that their operations would have little impact on them. Nevertheless, when they 
were interviewed again in 2011, some banks said that their deposits reduced. This 
indicates that there are only handfuls of people who have relationships with banks. 
Therefore, instead of using conventional approach of increasing interest rates to 
encourage savings, the government should encourage people from rural areas to become 
familiar with savings. None of the banks other than the government-owned bank, 
Myanma Agricultural and Development Bank is involved in such kind of activities. 
Liberalisation of regulations should also accompany with technological developments by 
establishing database system for banks to check genuineness of loan applicants. 
Moreover, there is no technological development in the country, physical currencies such 
as paper currencies are circulating in the country, instead of electronic money transfer, 
money creation is only done through loans, and bonds issued by the governments. 
In summary, policy makers involved in financial liberalisation should focus on the 
inclusion of small businesses and the general public. Financial liberalisation promotes 
considerable positive effects on banks, i.e. the ability to charge interest rates as they see 
fit, lower reserve requirements which can increase banks' lending, etc. On the other hand, 
the effects of the process on businesses such as small and medium sized ones are still 
IIIiI 
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vague. Indeed, they also need to be accompanied by increased competition in the industry 
for successful implementation. This will be discussed in the next section. 
7.4.2.3 Legal Framework Improvements 
There are many reasons why the Myanmar's legal system should be overhauled. In this 
thesis, only those related to banking operations, specifically for improving lending in 
Myanmar are discussed. One of them is the weak legal system. Some of the delinquent 
borrowers can enjoy some protections under the current legal system. For instance, if the 
borrowers cannot pay back the loans within two years, the banks can make lawsuits, 
however, the court can reduce the interest rate to 9%, when banks are lending at 17%. 
Secondly, the existing company laws and banking regulations are based upon those which 
are established prior to Myanmar's Independence in 1948. This clearly needs to be 
revised. Thirdly, at present, there are no reliable information systems for banks to access 
data of customers' property, land and security registrations as well as credit information. 
If any of this information is to be obtained, banks need to contact the respective ministries 
or institutions or banks to gain such kind of information. This not only increases the 
application processing time, but also can be detrimental to good judgment on loan 
applications. Having such kind of information system, the overreliance of banks on 
collaterals such as land and property is likely to diminish and reduce the high loan 
exposure to asset price inflation or deflation because they can also obtain soft information 
about the borrowers. 
Banking systems are one of the most highly regulated industries in the world. The 
regulatory structure which has been idealised by other countries, UK, has undergone 
significant reforms after 2008 banking crisis. Prior to these reforms, UK. banking system 
is made up of the BoE, FSA and the Treasury. It is named as 'Tripartite' Regulatory 
System. They are independent institutions and many researchers have pointed out that the 
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collapse of financial system is the result of no single institution having the responsibility, 
authority or powers to monitor the system as a whole, identify risks, and respond them 
with coordinated actions. Therefore, in 2010, 'twin-peaks' regulatory structure is 
implemented where only Treasury and BoE are given the task of performing 'financial 
system stability'. This is explained to propose that idealising successful regulatory 
systems needs to be cautious, as countries have different institutions, and their 
interactions are also unique. Thus, the collapse of financial system is inevitable if proper 
regulatory structure does not exist. In contrast to UK's 'twin-peaks' regulatory structure, 
Myanmar banking system has only one institution, i.e. the Government which controls the 
banking system indirectly through Ministry of Finance and Revenue and CBM. Though 
this might not be considered the perfect structure, since 2003, Myanmar has prevented 
any banks from collapsing; indeed, it is also contributed by the lack of capital markets. 
However, with the entry of foreign banks' operations and other financial institutions, 
Myanmar's financial system will be exposed to more risks, therefore some precautionary 
measures needed to be taken as the supervision and monitoring function of CBM will not 
be enough to maintain financial stability. 
If the banks' interest rates are to be floated, the structure of the Central Bank should also 
be changed as to provide more transparency. For instance, inflation targeting would help 
not only banks but also businesses. The interviewed banks mentioned that the real 
inflation rates are not identified by the CBM and contradicts with what the actual 
inflation rate is. CBM has made its progress by developing a website in 2012. However, it 
needs a lot of improvements. 
The concern of transparency has always been associated with the central banks, however, 
the need for banks' transparencies have somehow left unattended by researchers and 
policy makers. Banks' financial statements are not published; therefore, they are not 
available to the general public. The answer given by them on not providing these 
-
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financial data is due to them not being publicly traded. However, as far as the 
stakeholders are concerned, banks have depositors, governments and employees who 
have the rights to know the banks' risk taking activities. Thus, there should be some 
forms of regulations that would make not only the central bank but also the other 
domestic banks to become more transparent. 
7.4.2.4 Human Capital Development 
While conducting my data collections, I have the privilege to interview senior 
managements of the banks. During these visits, I was able to ask their recruitment criteria 
for loan officers. Most of the banks stated that their main selection criterion is that the 
applicants must be graduates. Some of the senior staffs in the banks are not graduates 
from finance, banking or accounting disciplines. They learn through experience and are 
asked to attend some of the programmes organised by Myanmar Bankers' Associations. It 
offers a range of courses starting from certificates to postgraduate level courses including 
Master of Business Administration (MBA). These trainings are delivered by the senior 
managements of the existing banks; therefore, banking norms are shared among the staffs 
across different banks. Some of the large banks send their staffs to overseas countries, 
mostly to the countries in the same region such as Thailand and Singapore. However, 
most of the banks could only provide their staffs with trainings from internal training 
programs, i.e. from the banking association. 
The curriculums provided by the association has been criticised by one of the 
interviewees stating that Basel II is not included in teaching because it is considered to be 
irrelevant with the Myanmar's Banking Context by those who developed the curriculum. 
This indicates that people are not forward looking. As foreign banks are expected to come 
into operations and if the banking structure of developed nations is to be replicated in 
Myanmar, banks should encourage their staffs to understand different credit scoring 
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techniques to increase consistency and objectivity in making lending decisions. As the 
economic development is also contributed by small businesses' development, bankers 
should give more emphasis on prospects based income bearing assessment rather than a 
purely collateral-based lending. In other words, adopting a more 'going concern' lending 
approach in analysing financial information and collaterals would be more advantageous 
to both businesses and banks. This will also require banks to understand credit risk 
assessment procedures for these types of businesses. 
Some of the banks mention that they have hard time recruiting recent graduates because 
of their lack of inability to speak English even though they might be qualified Chartered 
Professional Accountants (CPA). Through my observation as a researcher, the senior 
managements of the banks are in their late 60s or some of them are over 60. This is 
something that needs to be changed where new generations of expertise or professionals 
need to be created. Another bank mentions that the lower level managers are reluctant to 
take any responsibility. Therefore, not only education but also professionalism must be 
infused in the staff developments. These can be the result of the bureaucracy transferred 
from the political environment to the organisations' management structures. 
Throughout the long period of financial repression, the main priority of the banks was to 
engage in traditional banking activities with low credit risk programs. With these tight 
regulations, their objective is to maximise profits from investments while attaining 
legitimacy from the government. In addition, with the close supervisions, banks have no 
chance to make mistakes resulting in all the lending decisions to be made at the senior 
management levels. This requires putting on a fa9ade of convergence to institutional 
pressures in order to achieve their profitability. In addition, some requires extreme care as 
not to lend to any restricted sectors or people who are against the regimes. Any mistakes 
can cause banks to serious punishments. The senior managements of the banks also 
mentioned that their subordinates did not want to take any responsibilities and would 
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want them to make decisions in all regards. Therefore, the roles of lower level staffs have 
diminished and they exist merely as administrative staffs. At the same time, the role of 
collateral value appraisers has increased. This can be compared with the credit rating 
agencies in the west. There are instances in which many of the interviewees identified 
that bribing cases exist. In developing countries, including Myanmar, 'bribing' is a 
cultural issue. Once we view something as a cultural problem, our approach of 
transformation should be taken in different ways. 
To support organisational and regulatory transformation, a sufficient labour force must be 
trained in order to economic growth. In many situations, when new financial entities are 
created or transformed, the due consideration of manpower capacities, developments, 
working culture and top-down management interactions. Banking development for 
economic expansions includes banks to engage in risky loans and the need for banking 
staffs to engage in these types of activities require not only knowledge but also the ability 
to take responsibility. Otherwise, this will create a barrier for banks to replicate 
themselves to the western banking infrastructures. 
7.4.2.5 Liberalisation ofBank Licensing and Foreign Banks' Operations 
In order to fully complete the above financial liberalisation process and efficient resource 
allocation, it is expected to be accompanied by a higher degree of competition. In 2010, 
four new banking licenses were granted, and none of them is foreign bank. In recent 
years, Myanmar has allowed foreign banks' representatives to open their offices in 
Myanmar; however, it has still not granted them the licenses of operation which would 
allow them to engage in their normal banking activities. It is believed that opening up the 
financial sector to foreign banks will break up the oligopolistic banking structure in 
Myanmar. This view is not rejected. Instead, it is to give a note on the events of new 
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domestic banks' operations have considerable reductions on some of the banks in the 
country. This shows that public's engagements with banking activities have not increased. 
In addition, the lack of proper infrastructure, outdated laws and regulations will not only 
hamper the foreign banks but also the domestic banks. In worst cases, it can cause the 
collapse of domestic banks. Myanmar is still lack with those who have professional 
expertise not only at lower level bank staffs but also at mid-level managers. Most of the 
people at these banks are retired banking professions from the government institutions 
such as CBM, new generation of banking professionals are needed to be created in order 
to foster Myanmar's banking sector development. 
7.4.2.6 Contributions to Banking Industry and Change Management Practice 
Recent years, regulators in all over the world have realised the need for institutional 
reform either due to financial crisis, e.g. in Western nations or political reform, e.g. in 
Myanmar. These changes require institutional formation, institutional development, 
deinstitutionalisation and reinstitutionalisation (J epperson, 1991). Hence, the 
understandings of mechanisms of interplay between organisations and institutions are 
needed. Though this study is focused only on Myanmar banking system, it should also be 
noted that it represents the simplest fonn of financial structure. Thus, it gives the basic 
framework for investigating those mechanisms in other institutional context. This can be 
further modified to suit the context being studied. 
This process of interplay gives a fran1ework for the steps which are needed to be taken in 
order to implement successful practices. For instance, tight regulations have always been 
considered as the most desirable factor to maintain banking system stability. However, 
resistance to these pressures from regulative institutions by banks in Myanmar's highly 
bureaucratised banking structure creates doubts on the effectiveness of strict rules and 
regulations. Similar to the credit rating agencies in the developed countries, value 
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appraisers have the most control over the banks' decisions to approve loan applications. 
In other words, this shows that there are power shifts and a controlling institution is 
always created any type of environments whether they are liberalised or bureaucratised. 
These results in bribing by the borrowers to the value appraisers to increase their 
collateral values to get larger loan sizes. This might not create any problem if the housing 
prices continue to rise, but if these prices begin to fall, similar incident that happened in 
2008 financial crisis due to the overreliance on collaterals can occur in Myanmar. These 
regulations also hamper the economic growth of the country by restricting businesses 
without collaterals from gaining financial assistance by the banks. All in all, this study 
provides the fact that strict regulations are not always desirable as it can have shifts in 
power from one institution to another, thereby inducing adverse effects. 
7.4.2.7 Businesses 
Indeed, banks are important sources of finance businesses in Myanmar, especially large 
ones or those with collaterals. This is due to the fact that businesses without collaterals 
cannot obtain loans from the banks. This is the requirement determined by CBM and not 
by the banks themselves. Therefore, in this section, the focus will exclude small and start­
up businesses which cannot provide collaterals. 
Firstly, the fmdings suggest that various criteria are used to determine credibility of loan 
applicants, however, these standards and the requirements are found to be the same 
because they are set by the regulatory authorities, which are imposed on the banks by 
coercive pressures. Therefore, the rejections should be anticipated if the borrowers have 
no collateral. Secondly, the interest rates charged on the loans will be the same unless 
they fall under certain categories such as industrial category, where the government has 
guideline to provide lower interest rate than normal ceilings. Thirdly, borrowers should 
be familiar with the banks that they are approaching as different banks have different 
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sectors that are considered to be risky, therefore, they will have to be check whether their 
types of businesses falls under the banks' restrictive category. 
Fourthly, as banks cannot change the interest rate caps and can only play on the loan size 
provided on the percentage of the collateral values, borrowers can only choose the banks 
which are willing to give larger loans. Thus, business owners must maintain close 
relationships with their bans. Unlike the other studies done in different contexts, where 
the closer the relationship between banks and borrowers, the cheaper the bank financing 
becomes (Petersen and Rajan, 1995, Berger and Udell, 1995), in Myanmar, the closer 
relationship can provide the borrowers with larger loan sizes. Yet, it still depends on the 
prospects of their businesses. 
For the fmancial liberalisation to be successful, the changes of the regulations should be 
passed over to the consumers and businesses. During ICIRD conference in July 2012, 
there was a presented by the fisheries department. Despite of the CBM having reduced 
the interest rate by two percent in the late 2011, these cuts have not been passed down to 
the fisheries farmers. It is not clear whether the banks or the businesses are not passing 
down to them. The government should make sure that their changes in the regulatory 
policies are passed down to the respective stakeholders. Only then, they could prevent 
inflation and boost the economy. They should also need to keep in mind that the changes 
are not for the banks and larger businesses to make profit only. In summary, business 
owners should be aware that banks in Myanmar view collaterals as liquidation purpose in 
case borrowers' default and not with the view of analysing borrowers' commitments in 
the business irrespective of the relationship with the banks. These two methods are 
referred to as 'gone concern' and 'going concern' approaches respectively. 
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7.4.2.8 Contributions to Understanding Organisational Culture 
Many of the researchers have generalised their findings in Asian continents as Asian 
culture, however, these studies have omitted "Myanmar" in their samples. For instance, 
Rarick and Nickerson (2006) provide cultural assessment of Myanmar, which is not 
included in the Hofstede data setI4(Hofstede, 1984) where out of 39 countries studied, 
only eight of them are Asian countries; in addition, they can be categorised as either 
developing or developed nations. They have found very unique characteristics, which are 
very different from the countries in the same Southeast Asian region, Thailand and 
Singapore. It has lower power distance, masculinity, lower long-term orientation; and 
higher uncertainty avoidance and individualism than those two countries. Through this 
study, it has also contributed to the understanding of organisational culture in Myanmar. 
7.4.3 Methodological Implications 
This research provides the needs for developments in Asian epistemologies. Flexibility in 
conducting research is required if the western epistemologies are replicated in Asian 
countries where long tradition of power and bureaucracy plays an important role in 
communication, organisational management and practices. It has been recognised as the 
need for Asian societies such as Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea which have 
Confucius traditions, and also for the Philippines and India by Liu (2011). However, the 
need for the same consideration in Myanmar has not been recognised. This might be due 
to the limited research being done in the country with regard to sensitive issues. The 
protocols of Western methodologies view of conducting interviews and surveys seem to 
be a time consuming process but not consider them to be affected by the participants' 
cultural values and beliefs in responding. Having trained as a researcher in this kind of 
context and replicating the same methodology in Myanmar has given me a hard time 
14 The study includes eight Asian countries out of 39 being studied namely, Philippines, India, 

Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, Iran, Pakistan and Japan 
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obtaining respondents, gathering information and conducting interviews. This is when the 
need for recognising cultural issues comes into play in the researcher's data collection 
process. 
Myanmar is a unique context to conduct research due to the lack of transparency by the 
government, reliability and validity of the data published being questionable and the role 
played by bureaucracy at national and organisational levels. The origins of theories and 
practices in research methodologies in social sciences can be traced back to the Western 
Countries. The replicability of these practices in research methodology in Asian context, 
in Myanmar, requires flexibility with chosen research methodology. In other words, 
adapting the method depending on the context is needed if the desired data or information 
is to be obtained. In this research, culture and familiarity with the context play an 
important role for researcher in developing theoretical framework and choosing 
appropriate research instruments for collecting data. This adaptation also led the 
researcher to choose critical realist epistemology over the social constructionist's. 
Moreover, in conducting this research culture is intrinsically embedded by the researcher 
when interacting with the interviewees. This can be done due to the researcher's 
familiarity with the context. 
In summary, as researchers, conducting research in Asian context should recognise that 
human interactions as being mediated by cultural concepts and layers of institutions of 
societal governance and either qualitative or quantitative methodologies should be treated 
as methods of inquiry but not as gathering actual information. These methodologies have 
their own strengths, for instance, qualitative research is able to answer the 'why' and 
'how' questions of a phenomenon while quantitative method gives answers to 'what', 
'how much', 'how many', and other statistics and causal related questions. Yet, none of 
them solve the issue of controlling the influence of cultural contingency in conducting 
research and obtaining information. Thus, the methodological contribution of this 
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research is the need for recognising culture in different levels of research process as 
necessary. 
7.5 Conclusions 
In summary, this chapter discussed how ownership structures played an important role in 
the means by which banks were institutionalised and responded to those institutional 
pressures. It also highlighted the contributions that it made to knowledge, literature, 
theory, practice and methodology. The following Chapter 8 will summarise the overall 
thesis through revisiting the research and suggest future research. 
I...~· .. 
t 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
This final chapter provides a summary discussion of the [mdings produced by this study. 
First, the research aim and objectives are reviewed and the research process is reflected. 
This is followed by a discussion on the theoretical contributions and practical implication. 
Finally, limitations and suggestions for future research are presented. 
8.2 Reflections on the Research 
The aim of studying the interplay between banks and institutions are achieved using two 
theories. Therefore, in this section, the role of theories in conducting this research 
following by the methodological used in achieving the aim and summary of results and 
findings are given below. 
8.2.1 Research Questions 
As there is a general lack of forming banks' lending practices through studying from 
sociological perspective and their fonnations from banks and institutions, it is required to 
develop a framework which will guide the researcher. Therefore, though there are three 
research questions, the first one act as guidance for the other questions. They are: 
RQl: How are banks' lending practices influenced and what sources influence them? 
RQ2: How do banks respond to these pressures? 
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RQ3: How do these pressures play in banks' risk assessments? 
RQ4: How do their chosen strategies affect the end outcome, legitimacy or efficiency? 
8.2.2 Role of Theories in Achieving the Aim and Objectives of the Research 
Due to the nature of the research, which has been discussed before, two theoretical 
perspectives are utilised to catch both convergent and divergent perspectives. No one 
theory can provide a complete picture. Despite of using two theories, such as institutional 
theory and Oliver's strategic responses, I would like to stress that the framework develop 
from these are used as a guide to remain flexible to allow new factors or themes to 
emerge from interview data. Detailed descriptions of findings and discussions are 
provided in chapter five and six respectively. Institutional theory provides legitimacy and 
Oliver's strategic responses to institutional pressures is based on banks' efficiency 
criteria, for instance, profitability. 
8.2.3 Research Methodology and Methods 
12 banks out of 19 banks which meet the research criteria and requirements participated 
in this study through 14 interviews in all. The primary method of data collection is in-
depth semi-structured interviews which are taken place at the participants' respective 
banks. Other data are collected through reviewing annual reports, CBM data, online 
databases such as IMF and World Bank, and organisational documents. However, due to 
the confidentiality issues, not all of the annual reports and documents for all banks are 
able to be obtained. Instead, the researcher has traded off these limitations in conducting 
interviews. 
The collected interview transcripts are then coded by using Hybrid approach, a 
combination of manual and electronic coding. The former enhances the research to 
become familiar with the data while the latter helps in organising and presenting complex 
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data. The process of coding data involves two main steps. They are assigning themes and 
allocating these themes to their respective categories derived from theoretical framework. 
Those falls outside the theoretical framework are coded as emerging categories which 
complement the entire framework. After reviewing and revising the coding, results and 
findings are provided. 
8.2.4 Research Process 
After conducting the research, it is good to reflect on the process of how the research has 
been done. As a reader, from the thesis structure, it seems as the research is conducted in 
a linear process: theory, method, data, and analysis followed sequentially. However, the 
research is an evolving process, going back and forth with data, theory, literature and 
method. Thus, for the replicability criteria of the research, it is needed to provide the 
detail research process for those who may want to undertake a similar experience or 
research. This will also give the reader to understand the researcher's journey in 
conducting the research. 
This thesis starts with the notion that banks' risk management in lending process is based 
on socially constructed values and beliefs. This notion comes primarily from reading 
Lane and Quack (2002) who have advocated to study contextual approach in studying 
banks' lending behaviour. Their research context is in Britain and Germany. They have 
shown that these two countries have different lending behaviour due to differences in 
institutional structure. Their studies have some limitations. Though it uses sociological 
approach, it has not studied the interplays between banks and institutions and no clear 
framework has been developed for future research. It uses a very generic approach with 
no solid theoretical underpinnings. However, it is interesting to find lending behaviour in 
different institutional context because even banks in the same European context which are 
developed and liberalised nations with established capital market, have two different 
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types of lending approach. It creates a curiosity on how banks' lending behaviour might 
be in the context of underdeveloped and bureaucratised nation with no capital market. At 
the same time, financial crisis in the world has caused regulators around the world to call 
for tighter regulations. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of tighter regulations has not been 
researched yet because it has not been implemented. Thus, Myanmar has been chosen for 
being a unique context which meets the criteria to conduct the research. At first, the 
researcher was being reluctant to conduct research in this country as it has been well­
known for the bureaucratic style working environment and no reliable infonnation would 
be obtained. Its opaque nature also is another reason for having less research on the 
Myanmar's banking system. There are many conceptual papers about it but no empirical 
study has been done, let alone to find papers that study institutional interplay. 
Nonetheless, after contacting a director at the Central Bank of Myanmar, the researcher 
had to opportunities to interview higher level management of 12 banks who were 
involved in lending policies making for their respective banks. Before conducting the 
research, like many people, it was perceived that due to its simple financial structure, 
things would be very straightforward as there was only one directional control, 
Government, and were coerced by different means to do what institutions expect them to 
do. From the first stage of data collection, the need for studying another direction of 
institutionalisation process as patterns of banks' resistance to these pressures emerged. It 
was also believed that the institutional pressure would only be coercive. 
The data was collected in two stages taken place in two years, 2010 and 2011. This type 
of study was also supported by many researchers as it is a fonn of triangulation method 
conducting in two period of time. During these periods, the changes in banking regulatory 
policies with the change in government structure in the country also facilitates the 
researcher to observe another dimension of legitimacy not only from institutions but also 
from banks. Thus, the research is able to contributions on theory, literature and practice. 
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8.3 Lessons Learned 
The main lesson learned from this thesis is the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of tight 
regulations. Due to the government repressions for a long period of time, it has been 
perceived that the conformity to institutional pressures would be found. However, after 
observing the findings, these are some of the misconceptions. With banks' management 
structure comprises of some political affiliations, there are different intensity of 
institutional pressures and the tactics used by the banks to respond to these pressures 
depend on their ownership structures. Hence, the potential consequences of such 
restrictions are on borrowers and businesses but not on banks as they have the capabilities 
of increasing profitability and efficiency under the tight regulatory environment and 
putting on the fa9ade of conformity. 
The country's bureaucratic governance structure has also influenced the organisational 
culture and human resource development. When the culture is considered as a problem, it 
needs different perspective for diagnosing problems, for instance, banking sector 
development. Prior research done in economics, banking and finance have long been 
associated with mathematical models to identify conditions for economic growth and 
little or no emphasis has been given to human emancipation, restraining and resisting 
constraints imposed on them. Idealising and implementing the techniques and processes 
to follow western countries' route to development in developing countries which have 
different culture and established mind-set from long period of working under controlling 
environment need prudent care. In other words, this study suggests that institutional 
approach is needed to be considered in change management practice, i.e. looldng for 
alternative that encourage cooperation and coordination of the banks in development. 
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• 	 Similar to institutional pressures, banks' strategic responses to these 
pressures are contingent upon task environmental factors, such as business 
prospects - Banks' non-conformity to institutional pressures is dependent upon 
task environmental factors such as borrower's business prospects, affiliations, 
etc. 
• 	 Under tight regulatory environment, banks' collectively exercise 
'manipulative' strategic response to create 'reverse legitimacy' - Under the 
highly regulated environment, strategic responses to institutional pressures range 
from acquiescence to compromise only. Collectively, banks try to shape values 
and criteria through manipulations while conforming. They are term as banks' 
passive responses to institutional pressures, i.e. to alter the nature of demands in a 
manner that is acceptable to the action and the institutional agent. Through tms 
process, 'reverse legitimacy' can be created. This is captured from the interviews 
with the banks in 2010 and the regulatory policy changes in 2011, i.e. banks are 
allowed to take commodities as collaterals which they were only restricted to take 
land and property. 
• 	 Unintentional Avoidance - banks have the pressures to lend to industrial 
businesses at lower interest rate, however, these types of customers do not apply 
loans from the private banks but from the government banks, this creates the 
banks having less or no borrowers ofthese types. 
The above two points are the theoretical contributions for institutional theory and the rest 
are for Oliver's strategic responses. The framework developed in this research can be 
used to study in other industries or countries with different institutional context. 
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development in Myanmar through banking sector. Detailed explanations were presented 
in chapter 6. 
8.5 Future Research 
There are some limitations in this thesis that may provide a path for future research. One 
is the results being unable to test out the propositions that were presented in chapter 6. 
This is due to the limited number of banks operating in the country and the difficulties in 
accessing the right person for the interviews. Secondly, if the research could provide 
international comparison with banks in Singapore or in the same region, the findings 
could provide the readers with the extent of different sources of pressures in shaping 
banks' practices were different in Myanmar. Thirdly, if the researcher was able to provide 
the reader on how businesses in Myanmar were affected by the lack of banking industry 
development, it would be able to provide how the policy makers could enhance the 
business and banking sector developments for economic sustainability. 
As this is an exploratory study, there are some areas in which future research can be 
conducted. The following are some examples of future study that could begin from this 
research. 
8.5.1 To Test the Propositions 
There appear to be some forms of support of the findings with quantitative data. Some of 
the findings from this research can be formed into testable hypotheses. They can be tested 
using more quantitative techniques such as econometric analyses. This will be able to 
provide 'generalisability' to the reader. However, due to the data availability, this process 
might be somehow difficult to do so. They can also be replicated by consecutive 
qualitative testing. The propositions were provided in chapter 6. 
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8.5.2 Comparison between Pre and Post Reforms or International Comparison 
As the country is undergoing a significant refonn after many years, this research has 
captured the banks' lending practices, their attitudes and perceptions of risks, therefore, 
future research can be done based on the before and after changes in these areas by banks 
after the refolID. This will enhance the framework on the interplay between banks and 
institutions in policy making, thereby enhancing policy making. 
The study of banks' lending behaviour is not a new research theme, where many other 
research papers can be found for developed and emerging economies. Therefore, cross-
national studies can also be done. They are particularly important as evidence can suggest 
the varying degree and type of institutions have on the banks' fonnation of lending 
practices. As Myanmar has opened up its economy from isolation, intemationalisation 
will have effects on banks. Through comparative studies, it can answer an interesting 
question of how banks in different countries respond differently to institutional pressures 
and attain legitimacy while obtaining efficiency. Such kinds of studies will give 
additional and complementary knowledge to the research on banks' lending behaviour. 
This will also enable to provide more complete understanding of banks and institutions' 
interplays. 
Such kinds of studies can also further test the applicability of the developed framework in 
different institutional and cultural context. Moreover, it could be instrumental in 
expanding the richness of the framework in contexts such as Europe and US to identify 
the weaknesses in institutional pressures on banks which led to crises. 
8.5.3 Triangulations with Further Studies from Businesses Perspective 
This study has taken from the banks' point of view in which they make decisions to 
accept or reject loan applications. It would create an interesting project to observe the 
---------.....------------'~, 
-----------------------------------------------
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requirements imposed on businesses by the banks. In other words, indirect effects passed 
on to the borrowers by regulatory authorities through the banks and their responses to 
these requirements, especially their relationships with their value appraisals. The results 
from this study can allow the researcher to triangulate the findings with the current study 
and will give the complete picture of the whole phenomenon by which institutions can 
have direct and indirect effects on businesses. 
Intensity Task environmental factors 
,,'\==1 Businesses 
r 
~ ~~r----­
~ ~\I,I <Il 
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Banks 
Figure 8-2: Future Research Directions 
Future research can also focus on entrepreneurial side of general public by investigating 
people's willingness to start businesses if the banks are able to provide them with loans. 
Another potential research project could be the further investigation on relationships 
between loans officers and businesses. As it is has been identified by the banks' 
management as bribing at the lower level being an issue, the research on the process by 
which businesses interact with them will make a good research project. However, to study 
from these value appraisers will be quite challenging as bribing is a sensitive issue which 
can have serious consequences. 
318 References 
References 
ABRATT, R. 1989. A new approach to the corporate image management process. 
Journal ofmarketing management, 5, 63. 
ACHARY A, A. 1999. Realism, institutionalism, and the Asian economic crisis. 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21, 1-29. 
AGARWAL, S. & WANG, F. H. 2008. Motivating loan officers: an analysis of salaries 
and piece rates compensation. Federal Reserve Bank ofChicago Working Paper. 
AGOR, W. H. 1984. Intuitive management: integrating left and right brain management 
skills, Prentice-Hall. 
Budgetary process in uncertain contexts: a study ofstate-owned enterprises in 
Bangladesh, 1997. Article. Directed by ALAM, M. 
ALTHEIDE, D. & JOHNSON, J. M. C. 1998. Criteria for assessing interpretive validity 
in qualitative research. In: DENZIN, N. K. & LINCOLN, Y. S. (eds.) Collecting 
and interpreting qualitative materials. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
ALVESSON, M. 2003. Methodology for close up studies - struggling with closeness and 
closure. Higher Education, 46, 167-193. 
ANDREWS, J. D. & THOMPSON, M. 2008. Getting the bank to say yes. (cover story). 
CA Magazine, 141,56-58. 
AOKI, M. 2001. What are institutions? How should we approach them? Toward a 
comparative institutional analysis. MIT Press. 
APG 2008. APG Mutual Evaluation Report on Myanmar. AsialPacific Group on Money 
Laundering. 
ARNOLD, L. G. & RILE, J. G. 2009. On the Possibility of Credit Rationing in the 
Stiglitz-Weiss Model. American Economic Review, 99,2012-202l. 
BARASINSKA, N. 2009. The role of gender in lending business: evidences from an 
online market for peer-to-peer lending. DIWBerlin Working Paper. 
BARBOZA, G. A. 2009. Lending to the Unbankable - Dynamic Incentives and Joint 
Liability in a Trust Game with Social Collateral. SSRN eLibrary. 
References 319 
BARRETT, M., MAYAN, M., MORSE, J. M., OLSON, K. & SPIERS, J. 2002. 
Verification Strategies for Establishing Reliability and Validity in Qualitative 
Research. International Journal ofQualitative Methods, 1, 1-19. 
BAUM, C. F., CAGLAYAN, M. & OZKAN, N. 2002. The Impact ofMacroeconomic 
Uncertainty on Bank Lending Behavior. Society for Computational Economics. 
BAZERMAN, M. H. & MESSICK, D. M. 1998. ON THE POWER OF A CLEAR 
DEFINITION OF RATIONALITY. Business Ethics Quarterly, 8,477-480. 
BEBCZUK, R. N. 2003. Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: Introduction and 
Application, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
BECK, T., BEHR, P. & GUETTLER, A. 2009. Gender and Banking: Are Women Better 
Loan Officers? Working Paper. 
BECK, T., DEMIRGO<;-KUNT, A., LEVINE, R. & RESEARCH, N. B. O. E. 2005. 
Bank supervision and corruption in lending, National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
BECKER, G. S. 1983. A Theory ofCompetition Among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence. The Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 98, 371-400. 
BELLUCCI, A., BORISOV, A. & ZAZZARO, A. 2009. Does gender matter in bank-firm 
relationships? Evidence from small business lending. Working Paper. 
BELLUCCI, A., BORISOV, A. & ZAZZARO, A. 2011. Do Male and Female Loan 
Officers Differ in Small Business Lending? A Review ofthe Literature. In: 
CALCAGNINI, G. & FAVARETTO, 1. (eds.) The Economics ofSmall 
Businesses. Physica-Verlag RD. 
BEN NACEUR, S. & KANDIL, M. The impact of capital requirements on banks' cost of 
intennediation and performance: The case of Egypt. Journal ofEconomics and 
Business, 61, 70-89. 
BERGER, A. N. & FRAME, W. S. 2005. Small Business Credit Scoring and Credit 
Availability. Atlanta. 
BERGER, A. N., KLAPPER, L. F. & UDELL, G. F. 2001. The ability ofbanks to lend to 
infonnationallyopaque small businesses. Journal ofBanking & Finance, 25, 
2127-2167. 
BERGER, A. N. & UDELL, G. F. 1995. Relationship Lending and Lines ofCredit in 
Small Finn Finance. The Journal ofBusiness, 68, 351-381. 
BERGER, A. N. & UDELL, G. F. 2002. Small Business Credit Availability and 
Relationshp Lending: The Importance ofBank Organisational Structure. The 
Economic Journal, F32-F53. 
References 320 
BERGER, A N. & UDELL, G. F. A More Complete Framework for SME Finance. 
W orId Bank Conference on Small Medium Enterprises: Overcoming Growth 
Constraints, 2004. 
BERLIN, M. & MESTER, L. J. 1997. On the Profitability and Cost ofRelationship 
Lending. SSRN eLibrary. 
BERRY, A, GRANT, P. & JARVIS, R. 2004. European Bank Lending to the UK. SME 
Sector. International Small Business Journal, 115-130. 
BESANKOR, D. & THAKOR, A V. 1987. Competitive-Equilibrium in the Credit 
Market under Asymmetric Information. Journal ofEconomic Theory, 42, 167­
182. 
BESSIS, J. 2002. Risk Management in Banking, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
BHASKAR, R. 2008. A Realist Theory ofScience, Routledge. 
BLAIKIE, N. 2009. Designing Social Research, Polity. 
BOYATZIS, R. E. 1998. Transforming qualitative information: thematic analysis and 
code development, Sage Publications. 
BRAUNSCHEIDEL, M. J., HAMISTER, J. W., SURESH, N. C. & STAR, H. 2011. An 
institutional theory perspective on Six Sigma adoption. International Journal of 
Operations & Production Management, 31,423-423-451. 
BROWNBRIDGE, M., HARVEY, C. & GOCKEL, A 1998. Banking in Africa: the 
impact offinancial sector reform since independence, J. Currey. 
BRYANT, K. 2001. ALEES: an agricultural loan evaluation expert system. Expert 
Systems with Applications, 21,75-85. 
BRYMAN, A 2012. Social Research Methods, Oxford University Press. 
BURNS, L. R. & WHOLEY, D. R. 1993. Adoption and Abandonment ofMatrix 
Management Programs - Effects ofOrganizational Characteristics and 
Interorganizational Networks. Academy ofManagement Journal, 36, 106-138. 
BUTTNER, E. & ROSEN, B. 1988. Bank loan officers' perceptions of the characteristics 
ofmen, women and successful entrepreneurs. Journal ofBusiness Venturing, 3, 
249-258. 
CAPRIO, G. 2003. Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial Crises. World Bank. 
CARROLL, G. R. & HUO, y. P. 1986. Organizational Task and Institutional 
Environments in Ecological Perspective: Findings from the Local Newspaper 
Industry. The American Journal ofSociology, 91,838-873. 
CHAPMAN, A 2009. CAMPARI on the Rocks. IRM Focus - Papers on Risk [Online]. 
I 
References 321 
CIA. 2012. Country Comparison: Net Migration Rate [Online]. Central futelligence 
Agency. [Accessed 06/06/2012 2012]. 
CLEMENS, B. W. & DOUGLAS, T. J. 2005. Understanding strategic responses to 
institutional pressures. Journal ofBusiness Research, 58, 1205-1213. 
CLIFFORD, S. J. & WARNER, J. B. 1979. On financial contracting: An analysis of bond 
covenants. Journal ofFinancial Economics, 7, 117-161. 
COHEN, L., MANION, L., MORRISON, K. & MORRISON, K. R. B. 2007. Research 
methods in education, Routledge. 
COOK, K. S., LEVI, M., O'BRIEN, J. & FAYE, H. 1990. Introduction: The Limits of 
Rationality, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press. 
CRESWELL, J. W. 2009. Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
approaches, Sage Publications. 
DACIN, M. T. 1997. Isomorphism in context: The power and prescription of institutional 
norms. Academy ofManagement Journal, 40, 46-81. 
DACIN, M. T., GOODSTEIN, J. & SCOTT, W. R. 2002. INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL 
RESEARCH FORUM. Academy ofManagement Journal, 45,45-56. 
DANESHKHAH, A. R. 2004. Uncertainty in Probabilistic Risk Assessment: A Review. 
[Accessed 23/10/2011]. 
DAVIES, A. & KEARNS, M. 1992. Banking Operations: UK Lending and International 
Business, London, Pitman. 
DE MEZA, D. & WEBB, D. C. 1987. Too Much fuvestment: A Problem ofAsymmetric 
fuformation. The Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 102, 281-292. 
DEGRYSE, H. & V AN CAYSEELE, P. 2000. Relationship Lending within a Bank­
Based System: Evidence from European Small Business Data. Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 9, 90-109. 
DENSCOMBE, M. 2007. The Good Research Guide, McGraw-Hill. 
DENZIN, N. K. & LINCOLN, Y. S. 2000. Introduction: The discipline and Practice of 
Qualitative Research. In: DENZIN, N. K. & LINCOLN, Y. S. (eds.) Handbook 
ofQualitative Research. London: Sage. 
DESHMUKH, S. D., GREENBAUM, S. 1. & KANATAS, G. 1983. Lending Policies of 
Financial-Intermediaries Facing Credit and Funding Risk. Journal ofFinance, 
38, 873-886. 
References 322 
DEYOUNG, R, GOLDBERG, L. G. & WHITE, 1. J. 1999. Youth, adolescence, and 
maturity of banks: Credit availability to small business in an era of banking 
consolidation. Journal o/Banking & Finance, 23,463-492. 
DILL, W. R 1958. Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 2,409-443. 
DIMAGGIO, P. J. & POWELL, W. W. 1983. The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American 
Sociological Review, 48, 147-160 
DINC, I. S. 2005. Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned banks 
in emerging markets. Journal ofFinancial Economics, 453-479. 
DOUGLAS, M. & WILDV ASKY, A. B. 1982. Risk and culture: An essay on the 
selection oftechnical and environmental dangers, Berkley, University of 
California Press. 
EDWARDS, P. 2006. Industrial Relations and Critical Realism: IR's Tacit Contribution. 
Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations. Coventry University ofWarwick. 
EILON, S. 1969. What is a decision? Management Science, December. 
ELSTER, J. 1990. When Rationality Fails, Chicago and London, The University of 
Chicago Press. 
ELY, D. P. & ROBINSON, K. J. 2001. Consolidation, technology, and the changing 
structure of banks' small business lending. Economic & Financial Review, 23-32. 
ENCHZAJAA, C. 2006. Impact ofinstitutions on lending: informal constraints and 
enforcement ofbank regulation in Mongolia, Dt. Univ.-VerI. 
ETHERINGTON, 1. D. & RICHARDSON, A. J. 1994. Institutional pressures on 
university accounting education in Canada. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
141-14l. 
FERRI, G., LID, 1. G. & STIGLITZ, J. E. 1999. The Procyc1ical Role of Rating 
Agencies: Evidence from the East Asian Crisis. Economic Notes, 28,335-355. 
FINLAY, 1. 2002. "Outing" the Researcher: The Provenance, Process, and Practice of 
Reflexivity. Qualitative Health Research, 12,531-545. 
FLICK, U. 2009. An introduction to qualitative research, Thousand Oaks, CA:SAGE. 
FLIGSTEIN, N. 1985. The Spread of the Multidivisional Form among Large Firms, 
1919-1979. American SOciological Review, 50,377-391. 
FRANCIS, J., ZHENG, C. C. & MUKHERJI, A. 2009. An Institutional Perspective on 
Foreign Direct Investment. Management International Review, 49, 565-583. 
UCLA.. 
References 323 
GAMBACORTA, L. & MISTRULLI, P. E. 2003. Bank Capital and Lending Behaviour: 
Empirical Evidence for Italy. Temi di discussione (Economic working papers). 
Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. 
GEORGE, A. 1991. Qualitative Analysis: Evaluating a Borrower's Management and 
Business Risks. The RMA Journal, 73, 6-6. 
GIDDENS, A. 1991. Modernity and SelfIdentity: Selfand Society in the Late Modern 
Age, Cambridge, Polity Press. 
GILLHAM, B. 2005. Research interviewing: the range o/techniques, Open University 
Press. 
GLASER, S. R., ZAMANOU, S. & HACKER, K. 1987. Measuring and Interpreting 
Organizational Culture. Management Communication Quarterly, 1,173-198. 
GODDARD, C. 2005. The Languages 0/East and Southeast Asia: An Introduction, 
Oxford University Press. 
GODLEWSKI, C. J. 2007. An Empirical Investigation ofBank Risk-Taking in Emerging 
Markets within a Prospect Theory Framework A Note. Banks and Bank Systems, 
Vol. 2, 2007. 
GOLAFSHANI, N. 2003. Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research. 
The Qualitative Report, 8,597-607. 
GOODSTEIN, J. D. 1994. Institutional Pressures and Strategic Responsiveness ­
Employer Involvement in Work Family Issues. Academy o/Management 
Journal, 37, 350-382. 
GRANDOR!, A. 1984. A Prescriptive Contingency View of Organizational Decision 
Making. Administrative Science Quarterly, 29, 192-209. 
GREENWOOD, R. & HININGS, C. R. 1996. Understanding radical organizational 
change: Bringing together the old and the new institutionalism. Academy of 
Management Review, 21, 1022. 
GRUCHY, A. G. 1984. Neo Institutionalism, Neo-Marxism, and Neo-Keynesianism: An 
Evaluation. Journal ofEconomic Issues, 18,547-556. 
GUBA, E. & LINCOLN, Y. 1994. Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In: 
DENZIN, N. & LINCOLN, Y. (eds.) Handbook ofqualitative research Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
GUBA, E. & LINCOLN, Y. 2000. Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and 
emerging confluences. In: DENZIN, N. & LINCOLN, Y. (eds.) Handbook of 
qualitative research Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
GUBA, E. C. 1990. The Alternative Paradigm Dialog. Paradigm Dialog, 17-27 
-
References 324 
424. 
GURLEY, J. G. & SHAW, E. S. 1955. Financial Aspects ofEconomic Development. The 
American Economic Review, 45,515-538. 
GUSTAFSON, C. R. 1989. Credit Evaluation: Monitoring the Financial Health of 
Agriculture. American Journal ofAgricultural Economics, 71, 1145. 
HAN, S. K. 1994. Mimetic Isomorphism and Its Effect on the Audit Services Market. 
Social Forces, 73, 637-664. 
HARRISON, E. F. 1996. A process perspective on strategic decision making. 
Management Decision, 34,46-53. 
HASELMANN, R. & WACHTEL, P. 2006. Institutions and Bank Behavior: Legal 
Environment, Legal Perception, and the Composition of Bank Lending. Journal 
ofMoney, Credit and Banking, 42, 965-984. 
HAUNSCHILD, P. R. 1993. Interorganizational Imitation - the Impact of Interlocks on 
Corporate Acquisition Activity. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38,564-592. 
HAUSWALD, R. & MARQUEZ, R. 2006. Competition and Strategic Infonnation 
Acquisition in Credit Markets. T71e Review ofFinancial Studies, 19,967-1000. 
HAYASHI, A. M. 2001. When to trust your gut. Harvard Business Review, 78, 59-65. 
HEALY, M. & PERRY, c. 2000. Comprehensive criteria to judge validity and reliability 
of qualitative research within the realism paradigm. Qualitative Market 
Research: An International Journal, 3, 118-126. 
HEMPELL, H. S. & S0RENSEN, c. K. 2010. The impact of supply constraints on bank 
lending in the euro area - crisis induced cmnching?, Working Paper Series. 
European Central Bank. 
HENSMAN, A. & SADLER-SMITH, E. 2011. Intuitive decision making in banking and 
finance. European Management Journal, 29, 51-66. 
HERNANDEZ-cANOVAS, G. & KOETER-KANT, J. 2010. The institutional 
environment and the number ofbank relationships: an empirical analysis of 
European SMEs. Small Business Economics, 34,375-390. 
HERNE, K. 2011. Rational Choice Rationality and Individual Behavior. Homo 
Oeconomicus, 28, 111-121. 
HERON, J. & REASON, P. 1997. A Participartory Paradigm. Qualitative Inquiry, 3,274­
294. 
HIRSCH, P. M. & LOUNSBURY, M. 1997. Ending the family quarrel- Toward a 
reconciliation of "old" and "new" institutionalisms. American Behavioral 
Scientist, 40, 406-418. 
------__________IIILIII_lIii•••IIII&:i\i 
.. 

References 325 
HOFFMAN, A. & VENTRESCA, M. 2002. Organizations, policy and the natural 
environment: institutional and strategic perspectives, Stanford University Press. 
HOFSTEDE, G. H. 1984. Culture's consequences: international differences in work­
related values, Sage Publications. 
HOLLOWAY, 1. 1997. Basic concepts for qualitative research, Blackwell Science. 
HOLSTEIN, J. A. & GUBRIUM, J. F. 2005. Interpretive Practice and Social Action. In: 
DENZIN, N. K. & LINCOLN, Y. S. (eds.) Handbook ofQualitative Research. 
London: Sage. 
HONDA, Y. 2004. Bank capital regulations and the transmission mechanism. Journal of 
Policy Modeling, 26, 675-688. 
Managing organizations in the Third World: a case study ofmanagement control in a 
Bangladeshijute mill, 1994. Article. Directed by HOQUE, Z., SIDDIQUEE, N. 
A. & HOPPER, T.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
HORKHEIMER, M. 1975. Critical Theory: Selected Essays, Bloomsbury. 
HOWE, K. R. 2003. Closing methodological divides: toward democratic educational 
research, Kluwer Academic. 
HUSSAIN, M. M. & GUNASEKARAN, A. 2010. Non-financial management accounting 
measures in Finnish fmancial institutions. European Business Review, 14,210­
229. 
IHANTOLA, E.-M. & KIHN, L.-A. 2011. Threats to calidity and reliability in mixed 
methods accounting research. Qualitative Research in Accounting and 
Management, 8,39-58. 
JANKOWICZ, A. D. & HISRICH, R. D. 1987. Intuition in Small Business Lending 
Decisions. Journal ofSmall Business Management, 25,45. 
JEONG, H. & JOH, S. W. 2010. Risk Taking of 'Too Big To Fail' Banks: Evidence from 
Surviving Banks after a Financial Crisis. The 5th International Conference on 
Asia-Pacific Financial Markets. Seoul, Korea: Asia Pacific Joumal of Financial 
Studies. 
JEPPERSON, R. L. 1991. Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism. In: 
POWELL, W. W. & DIMAGGIO, P. J. (eds.) The new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 
JOHNSON, H. J. 1994. Prospect Theory in the Commercial Banking Industry. Journal of 
Financial and Strategic Decisions, 7. 
KAHNEMAN, D. & TVERSKY, A. 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision 
Under Risk. Econometrica, 43, 263-292. 
_'1_2 I _i>&J&~,""'" .. 
-
References 326 
KARLSSON, T. 2005. Business Plans in New Ventures. PhD, Jonkoping University. 
KHOURY, G. E. 2009. Procyclicality of the Banking System: The Prudential and 
Accounting Framework of the Procyc1icality ofBank Balance Sheet. The 
Business Review, Cambridge, 14, 139-149. 
KLEIN, G. A. 2003. Intuition at work: why developing your gut instincts will make you 
better at what you do, CurrencylDoubleday. 
KOSTOVA, T. & ROTH, K. 2002. ADOPTION OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
PRACTICE BY SUBSIDIARIES OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: 
INSTITUTIONAL AND RELATIONAL EFFECTS. Academy ofManagement 
Journal, 45,215-233. 
LAMMERS, J. C. & BARBOUR, J. B. 2006. An institutional theory of organizational 
communication. Communication Theory, 16,356-377. 
LANDSTROM, H. 1992. The relationship between private investors and small firms: an 
agency theory approach. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 4, 199-223. 
LANE, C. & QUACK, S. 2001. The Social Dimensions ofRisk: Bank Financing of 
SMEs in Britain and Germany. Organization Studies, Vol. 20, No.6, 987-1010 
LANE, C. & QUACK, S. 2002. How Banks Construct and Manage Risk: A Sociological 
Study of Small Firm Lending in Britain and Germany. ESRC Centre for Business 
Research, University 0/Cambridge WorAing Paper. 
LAWSON, R. B. & SHEN, Z. 1998. Organisational psychology: Foundation and 
applications, New York, NY, Oxford University Press. 
LEWIS, J. 2009a. Redefining Qualitative Methods: Believability in the Fifth Moment. 
International Journal o/Qualitative Methods, 8. 
LEWIS, P. M. 2009b. Ethnologue: Languages ofthe World [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ethnologue.com/showJanguage.asp?code=mya [Accessed 
06/06/20122012]. 
LINCOLN, Y. S. & GUBA, E. G. 1985. Naturalistic inquiry, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage. 
LIPARA, c., ALDEA, A. & CIOBANU, A. 2011. Equity Risk Premium for Investments 
Projects in Renewable Resources. Theoretical & Applied Economics, 18, 115­
124. 
LIPSHITZ, R. & SHULIMOVITZ, N. 2007a. Intuition and Emotion in Bank Loan 
Officers' Credit Decisions. Journal o/Cognitive Engineering and Decision 
Making, 1,212-233. 
i 
-
327
References 
LIPSHITZ, R. & SHULIMOVITZ, N. 2007b. Intuition and Emotion in Bank Loan 
Officers' Credit Decisions. Journal ofCognitive Engineering and Decision 
Making, 1,212-233. 
LID, H., MOLYNEUX, P. & NGUYEN, L. H. 2012. Competition and risk in south east 
Asian commercial banking. Applied Economics, 44,3627-3644. 
LID, J. H. 2011. Asian Epistemologies and Contemporary Social Psychological Research. 
In: DENZIN, N. K. & LINCOLN, Y. S. (eds.) The Sage Handbook ofQualitative 
Research. Sage. 
LOUNSBURY, M. 2008. Institutional rationality and practice variation: New directions 
in the institutional analysis of practice. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
33,349-361. 
LUHMANN, N. 1993. Risk: a sociological theory, Berlin, De Gruyter. 
LYN C, T. 2000. A survey of credit and behavioural scoring: forecasting financial risk of 

lending to consumers. International Journal ofForecasting, 16, 149-172. 

MACHAUER, A. & WEBER, M. 1998. Bank behavior based on internal credit ratings of 

borrowers. Journal ofBanking & Finance, 22, 1355-1383. 
MAHMOOD, R. 2000. An Empirical Investigation ofthe Lending Decisions on Small 
Businesses by Bank Managers in Malaysia. Doctor ofPhilosophy, University of 
Glasgow. 
MARSHALL, C. & ROSSMAN, G. B. 2010. Designing Qualitative Research, Sage. 
MASON, J. 2006. Mason, Jennifer (2006) Six strategies for mixing methods and linking 
data in social science research. NCRM Working Paper. ESRC National Centre for 
Research Methods. 
MAXWELL, J. A. 2004. Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach, SAGE 
Publications. 
MAZNEVSKI, M., KEMP, R., OVERSTREET, G. & CROOK, J. 2001a. The power to 
borrow and lend: investigating the cultural context as part ofthe lending decision. 
Journal ofthe Operational Research Society, 1045-1056. 
MAZNEVSKI, M. L., KEMP, R. S., OVERSTREET, G. A. & CROOK, J. N. 200lb. The 
Power to Borrow and Lend: Investigating the Cultural Context as Part of the 
Lending Decision. The Journal ofthe Operational Research Society, 52, 1045­
1056. 
MCGIVERN, Y. 2005. The practice ofmarket and social research: an introduction, 
Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
328 References 
MCNAMARA, G. & BROMILEY, P. 1997. Decision Making in an Organizational 
Setting: Cognitive and Organizational Influences on Risk Assessment in 
Commercial Lending. The Academy ofManagement Journal, 40, 1063-1088. 
MELEWAR, T. C. 2003. Determinants of the corporate identity construct: a review of the 
literature. Journal ofMarketing Communications, 9, 195-220. 
MICCO, A. & P ANIZZ, U. 2006. Bank ownership and lending behavior. Economic 
Letters, 93,248-254. 
MICCO, A. & PANIZZA, U. 2006. Bank ownership and lending behavior. Economics 
Letters, 93,248-254. 
MILES, M. & HUBERMAN, A. 1994. Qualitative data analysis: an expanded 
sourcebook, Sage Publications. 
MILLER, G. J. 1990. Managerial Dilemmas: Political Leadership in Hierarchies. In: 
COOK, K. S. & LEVI, M. (eds.) The Limits ofRationality. Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
MODIGLIANI, F. & MILLER, M. H. 1958. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review, 48,261-297. 
NEUMAN, W. L. 2000. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches, Allyn & Bacon, Incorporated. 
NILSSON, W. 0.2003. Social Innovation: An Exploration of Literature. [Accessed 
http:// sig. uwaterloo. cal sites/ default/files/ documents/SocialInnovation. pdf] . 
NORTH, D. C. 1990. Cooperation: the theoretical Problem. Institutions, Institutional 
Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
O'REILLY, C. A. & CHATMAN, J. A. 1996. Culture as social control: Corporations, 
culture and commitment. In: STAW, B. M. & CUMMINGS, 1. L. (eds.) 
Research in Organizational Behavior. Greenwich: JAI Press. 
OLIVEIRA, A. 2007. A Discussion ofRational and Psychological Decision-Making 
Theories and Models: The Search for a Cultural-Ethical Decision-Making Model. 
Electronic Journal ofBUsiness Ethics and Organization, 12. 
OLIVER, C. 1991. Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes. The Academy of 
Management Review, 16,145-179. 
OLIVER, C. 1992. The antecedents of deinstitutionalization. Organizational Studies, 13, 
563-588. 
OLIVERO, M. P., 11, Y. & JEON, B. N. 2009. Competition in banking and the lending 
channel: Evidence from bank-level data in Asia and Latin America. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 35, 560-571. 
References 329 
ORSER, B. J. & FOSTER, M. K. 1994. Lending Practices and Canadian Women in 

Micro-based Businesses. Women In Management Review, 9,11-19. 

OTWAY, H. J. & VONWINTERFELDT, D. 1982. Beyond Acceptable Risk - on the 

Social Acceptability ofTechnologies. Policy Sciences, 14,247-256. 

PANAGOPOULOS, Y. & SPJLIOTIS, A. 1998. The determinants of commercial banks' 
lending behavior: Some evidence for Greece. Journal ofPost Keynesian 
Economics, 20, 649-672. 
PATTON, M. Q. 2002. Qualitative research and evaluation methods, Sage Publications. 
PERRY, C., RIEGE, A. & BROWN, L. 1998. Realism Rules OK: Scientific Paradigms in 
Marketing Research about Networks. ANZMAC, University o/Otago, Dunedin. 
PETERSEN, M. A. & RAJAN, R. G. 1995. The Effect of Credit Market Competition on 
Lending Relationships. The Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 110, 407-443. 
PICK, D. & THEIN, H. H. 2010. Development failure and the resource curse: the case of 
Myanmar. International Journal ofSociology and Social Policy, 30,267-279. 
PITNEY, W. A. & PARKER, J. 2009. Qualitative research in physical activity and the 
health professions, Human Kinetics. 
PRING, M. J. 1993. Investment Psychology Explained: Classic Strategies to Beat the 
Markets, New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
PYETT, P. M. 2003. Validation of qualitati.ve research in the "real world". Qualitative 
Health Research, 13, 1170-1179. 
RAJAN, R. 1992. Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between informed and arm's length 
debt. Journal ofFinance, 47, 1367-1400. 
RAJAN, R. & ZINGALES, L. 2003. Saving Capitalismfrom the Capitalists, Crown 
Business Publishing. 
RAKOW, T. 2010. Risk, Uncertainty and Prophet: The Psychological Insights of Frank 
H. Knight. Judgment and Decision Making, 5,458-466. 
RARICK, C. A. & NICKERSON, I. 2006. An Exploratory Study ofMyanmar Culture 
Using Hofstede's Value Dimensions. SSRN eLibrary. 
RAVINA, E. 2008. Love and loans: the effect of beauty and personal characteristics in 
credit markets. New York University Working Paper. 
RENN, O. & SWATON, E. 1984. Psychological and Sociological Approaches to Study 
Risk Perception. Environment International, 10,557-575. 
RIAZ, S. 2009. The Global Financial Crisis: An Institutional Theory Analysis. Critical 
Perspectives on International Business, Vol. 5, Nos. 1/2, pp. 26-35, 2009. 
w. 
-

References 330 
RICHARDS, L. 2009. Handling Qualitative Data: A Practical Guide, SAGE 
Publications. 
RITCHIE, J. & LEWIS, J. 2003. Generalising from Qualitative Research. In: RITCHIE, 
J. & LEWIS, J. (eds.) Qualitative Research Practice: A Guidefor Social Sciece 
Students and Researchers. London: Sage. 
ROBBIE, M., COULBECK, N. & MOULDS, T. 1983. Lending Packages for Small & 
Medium-sized Companies, Croom Helm. 
ROBBINS, S. P. & COULTER, M. K. 2011. Management, Pearson. 
ROBLING, M., FELLOW, R., OWEN, P., PRACTITIONER, G., ALLERY, L., 
KRAVITZ, R., ARONOWITZ, R., BERKWITS, M., CHARON, R., GREENE, 
M., ADELMAN, R., STONE, D., RICH, J., POSES, R. & ISEN, A. 1998. In 
defense of qualitative research. Journal afGeneral Internal Medicine, 13,64-72. 
ROBSON, C. 2011. Real World Research, John Wiley & Sons. 
ROCHA, R., HINZ, R. & GUTIERREZ, J. 1999. Improving regulations and supervision 
of pension funds : are there lessons from the Banking Sector? Social Protection 
Discussion Papers. The World Bank. 
ROUSE, C. N. 2004. Bankers' Lending Techniques, Financial World Publishing. 
RUBIN, H. J. & RUBIN, 1. S. 1995. Qualitative interviewing: The art ofhearing data, 
Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage. 
RUBINSTEIN, A. 1998. Modeling bounded rationality, MIT Press. 
RUCKES, M. 2004. Bank Competition and Credit Standards. The Review ofFinancial 
Studies, 17,1073-1102. 
SALAS, V. & SAURINA, J. 2003. Deregulation, market power and risk behaviour in 
Spanish banks. European Economic Review, 47, 1061-1075. 
SAPIENZA, P. 2004. The effects ofgovernment ownership on bank lending. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 72, 357-384. 
SAUNDERS, M., LEWIS, P. & THORNHILL, A. 2009. Research Methods for Business 
Students, Pearson Education. 
SCHEIN, E. 1985. Organizational Culture and Leadersip, San Francisco, CA, Jossey 
Bass. 
SCHINDLER, M. 2007. Rumors in Financial Markets, Chichester, John Wiley and Sons 
Ltd. 
SCHWARBER, P. D. 1967. Leaders and the decision-making process. Management 
Decision, 43, 1086-1092. 
SCOTT, R. W. 2001. Institutions and Organizations, London, Sage Publications . 
• e .. 
331 References 
SCOTT, W. R. 1983. The Organizations of Environments: Network, Cultural and 
Historical Elements. In: SCOTT, W. R. & MEYER, J. W. (eds.) Organizational 
Environments. Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications. 
SCOTT, W. R. 1994. Institutions and Organizations: toward a theoretical synthesis. In: 
SCOTT, W. R. & MEYER, J. W. (eds.) Institutional Environments and 
Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications. 
SCOTT, W. R. 2009. Institutions and Organizations, CA, Sage. 
SCOTT, W. R. & MEYER, J. W. 1994. Institutional Environments and Organizations: 
Structural Complexity and Individualism, Sage Publications. 
SEABRIGHT, P., FRIES, S. M. & NEVEN, D. J. 2002. Bank Performance in Transition 
Economies.IHEID Working Papers. Economics Section, The Graduate Institute 
of International Studies. 
SEIDMAN,1. 2006. Interviewing as qualitative research: a guide for researchers in 
education and the social sciences, Teachers College Press. 
SHRIEVES, R. E. & DAHL, D. 1995. Regulation, recession, and bank lending behavior: 
The 1990 credit crunch. Journal ofFinancial Services Research, 9, 5-30. 
SHUBIK, M., ROBERT, A. & SERGIO, H. 2002. Chapter 62 Game theory and 
experimental gaming. Handbook ofGame Theory with Economic Applications. 
Elsevier. 
SIMON, H. A. 1976. Administrative behavior: a study ofdecision-making processes in 
administrative organization, Macmillan. 
SINKEY, J. F. 1983. Commercial bankfinancial management, Macmillan. 
SOLVIC, P. 2001. The Perception ofRisk, London: Earthscan. 
SOON, A. & CUMMINGS, L. L. 1997. Strategic Response to Institutional Influences on 
Information Systems Outsourcing. Organization Science, 8, 235-256. 
STAGE, F. K. & MANNING, K. 2003. Research in the College Context: Approaches 
and Methods, Brunner-Routledge. 
STAHL, B. C. 2008. Information systems: critical perspectives, Routledge. 
STIGLITZ, J. & WEISS, A. 1981. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information. American Economic Review, Vo!' 71, No.3 (June), 393-410. 
STRAUSS, A. L. & CORBIN, J. M. 1998. Basics ofQualitative Research: Techniques 
and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory, Sage Publications. 
SU, X. 2010. A Re-Examination of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz and Weiss Model. 
SSRN eLibrary. 
References 332 
TASHAKKORI, A. & TEDDLIE, C. 2003. Thepastandfoture ofmixed methods 
research: from data triangulation to mixed model design, Thousand Oaks, SAGE 
Publications. 
TAYLOR-GOOBY, P. & ZINN, J. O. 2006. Current Directions in Risk Research: New 
Developments in Psychology and Sociology. Risk Analysis, 26,397-411. 
TEMPLE, B. & YOUNG, A. 2004. Qualitative Research and Translation Dilemmas. 
Qualitative Research, 4, 161-178. 
THEIN, M. 2004. Economic development ofMyanmar, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. 
THELEN, K. 1999. Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. Annual Review of 
Political Science, 2, 369-404. 
THOMPSON, J. D. 1967. Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of 
Administrative Theory, New York, McGraw-Hill. 
TIN, M. M. 2000. Creating Domestic Investment Via the Banking System in Myanmar. 
In: THAN, M. & THEIN, M. (eds.) Financial Resourcesfor Development in 
Myanmar. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
TOBIN, G. A. & BEGLEY, C. M. 2004. Methodological rigour within a qualitative 
framework. Journal ofAdvanced Nursing, 48, 388-396. 
TSOHOU, A., KARYDA, M., KOKOLAKIS, S. & KIOUNTOUZIS, E. 1993. 
Formulating information systems risk management strategies through cultural 
theory. Information Management & Computer Security, 14, 198-217. 
TSOUKAS, H. 1989. The Validity of Idiographic Research Explanations. The Academy 
ofManagement Review, 14, 551-561. 
TURNELL, S. 2003. Myanmar's banking crisis. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, December. 
TVERSKY, A. & KAHNEMAN, D. 1992. Advances in Prospect-Theory - Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty. Journal ofRisk and Uncertainty,S, 297-323. 
V AUS, D. A. D. 2001. Research design in social research, SAGE. 
WENGRAF, T. 2001. Qualitative Research Interviewing: Biographic Narrative and 
Semi-Structured Methods, Sage. 
WETTE, H. C. 1983. Collateral in Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information: Note. The American Economic Review, 73,442-445. 
WHITLEY, R. 2003. How and why are international firms different? The consequences 
of cross-border managerial coordination for firm characteristics and behaviour. 
In: MORGAN, G., KRISTENSEN, P. H. & WHITLEY, R. (eds.) The 
References 333 
Multinational Firm: Organizing Across Institutional and National Divides OUP 
Oxford. 
WILKINSON, B. 1996. Culture, Institutions and Business in East Asia. Organization 
Studies, 17,421-447. 
WIN, M. T. 2010. Liquidity Measurement and Management in Myanmar. In: 
SUBHAl\TIJ, T. (ed.) Liquidity Measurement and Management in the SEACEN 
Economies. Kuala Lumpur: The South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) 
Research and Training Centre. 
WINDHOFF-HERITIER, A. 2002. Common goods: reinventing European and 
international governance, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
WIT, B. D. & MEYER, R. 2010. Strategy: Process, Content, Context, An International 
Perspective, Cengage Learning. 
YILMAZ, E. 2009. Capital accumulation and regulation. The Quarter~v Review of 
Economics and Finance, 49,760-771. 
ZHONG, X. & YING, B. 2009. Bank Size and Small- and Medium-sized Enterp11se 
(SME) Lending: Evidence from China. World Development, 37,800-811. 
ZHU, H. 2008. Capital Regulation and Banks' Financial Decisions. International Journal 
ofCentral Banking, 4, 165-211. 
ZIKMUND, W. G., BABIN, B. J., CARR, J. C. & GRIFFIN, M. 2009. Business 
Research Methods, Cengage Learning. 
334 Appendices 
Appendices 
Appendix 1 335 

Appendix 1: Interview Request Letter 
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Professor Paul Bums 
Dean, Business School 
Park Square Luton 
Bedfordshire LU1 3JU 
United Kingdom 
t +44(0)1582 743069 
+44 (011582 489192 
bfo@bedsoacouko 
wwwobedsoacouk8011001 
Managing Director 

First Private Bank Ltd 

619-613 Marchant Road, 

Comer of Bo Soon Pal Street, 

Pabedan Township ,Yangon. 

Dear Sir or Madam, 
Subject: A Request for Arrangement ofan Interview 
My name is Sandar Win, a PhD student from the University of Bedfordshire. My research area is 
to study how banks lend to businesses. The objective ofmy study is to compare the lending behaviour of 
banks in different countries and to explore the differences in perceptions of risks in the assessments of 
credit loan applications. 
I have selected your esteemed bank as part ofmy PhD research because of its reputation of being 
one of Myanmar's long established local banks providing financial senrices to businesses across the 
country. It would be a great opportunity for me ifyou can participate in my research. This will allow us to 
understand how risks are perceived and mitigated differently in different countries and how it can be 
regulated efficiently and effectively while reducing the costs of lending and taking precautions of possible 
cn:dit risks. 
I would be very grateful ifyou could participate as part of my research study. Your support will be 
highly appreciat~d and please do n01 hesitate to contact m~, should you require further infom13tion. I look 
forward to hearing from you. In addition, a request for confidentiality will be respected. 
... 
PhDS 
MSc,BBA,BA 
Business Management Research Institute (BMRI), Business School 
University ofBedfordshire 
Park Square Luton Bedfordshire LUI 3JU, UK 
E-mail: sandar.win@beds.ac.uk 
Website: http://w,,vw.beds.ac.ukJdepartmentsiaccountinglresearchstudents/sandar-win 
Tel: 01234400 400 Ext: 2128 
Registered Offlce 
Park Square Lutonr~\ 8edfordshlfe LU1 3JU ~J England 
........ 
 Vice Chancellor 
Professor Les Ebdon CBeINVESTOR IN PEOPLE 
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Loan Allocation 
4. Do you regard any ofthese sectors more important than the other? Ifso, what are the reasons for this? 

Which type oflwinesses do you lend.$e ~ost~G__~ l: . .c.,..,.J:; (J .... ___ 5< __ .:..Q, -=v~;~.............Q 
~~~~:eq:co~~\S"~~O.QOO~-'QOD<OlI~~Wo./'V~~ .~-": 
doo~ ~OD~~~:c%~@~,@f3~\ 
S. Does the bank decline to support certain sectors, for exa~le, industry, services or other? Why? 
~~80~:0!).p-?8:cg=>:6'q;C'r.>~(.(p1d1~~: b DXl~drr.3'. 
" . 
=p 
Appendix 2 
7. What are tbe pre-screerung crrtena tor banks to reject applicatiOnS In wmcn you WOUlil automancallY reject 
apl'lications? Ifso, could you elaborate,and give some examples? 
@oX~~~~~~:~~(X)e8§6't2l:eo~: 
a~JJ~: c3'o'lool'l3",. 
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Loan SpecifICations 
2. An: you allowed to increase or decrease the inten:st premium and service charge if you think the targets set by the 
bank may be high for the loan applicants? 
3. Does the bank consider personal decisions ofJoan officers? 
~£l:~ff"tP'~o:::6;9€~£lJ3'£P~~oo~qf:,,&O'.)·.d1ooC"lif-): v 
3 
I11'.'._t, (l 
• 
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2. How do you detennine if the information obtained through evidence is factual? Can false documentation arise at 

initial stages - do you have a filtering policy, or do you accept documents at face value? What instances have loans for 

development or investments~been
med dO)1ffl because oflimited informalioJlj If so, could you elaborate? G80'.a~q~rY.)6'D'OD . <U::b'iP'~~El>g6e>Cf.~(905doo~ I ~t!IO£l~~~© .G..O!:@ ~;~:>.y,.DOO0£1:6S6'ogxx:&oo"81~o9d~6'<9' 
4 
----- ------_.-­
_4 
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4. How would you describe the process oflending in terms of the banks' desires and aims? 
Examination of the Process of Preference and Identification of Lenden 
------_._---_ ...._..._.... 
t__ 
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~~.€,~E>e C~.flt?C)c&EJ~ Cd1.).oee8)bOllO:.s$dooltY): \. 
5. Do you have the Central Bank's Daily, Weekly, or Monthly supervision? 
Underlying Values 
I. Are you able to exercise influence over credit allocation based Oil your personal values or do you follow the bank's 
culture (~iop~s, ~licies. etc)? r . C <086'fr),~.>O"O:~D\~6'px-E:rir ~<?P8~O'JcE~CY.)gq-.,gorJdI~ ,I 
2. Are there any policies ill place which exclude certain bIlSinesses on moralJethical grounds? If so, what are they and 
why? 
3. Do you change interest rates becaIlSe you favour tile sector or bIlSiness'l 
7 
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4. Ifthere is a new staff, are there any in-house inductions? What is the process? 
5. Do you see the new banks as your competitor? Why? 
Efficiency or Legitimacy 
1. How do you feel about your bank' lending performance? 
2. Do you think you will be able to lend more or to different sectors and different stages of businesses (eg. Start-ups) if 
you were able to set your own policies without much influence from external environment? 
3. Are there any policies (both external and internal) that you think might be better off for the banks ifthey Were 
changed? What are they and how do you think they could be changed? 
8 
-
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4. Does 2006 financial crisis has any effect on the internal and external policies? If yes, how have they affected t)'le 
lending policies? Do you prefer the policies before or after the crisis? 
5. Do you think the interest rates set by the CB is high or low? Why? 
Additional Questions 
1. 	 What do you think ofmicrofinance? Would you participate? Why? 
2. 	 What do you think about the future prospects oflending? 
3. 	 In other countries, they have government guarantee schemes, would. you be able to lend more if 
the government shares some risks? 
9 
--_.._-------- ----------------­
.. 
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4. 	 ~~~u limit taking deposits? During the limitations, do you accept from any group ofpeople? 
5. 	 I heard that foreign business owners depositing money in Myanmar banks Do ha th 

problems? If yes. how do you tackle these issues? . you ve ese 

b . 'Do 300.. roro;c\t .some.. 0\ .;he.. ~\e,.e..!> ~ ~b:»:>1:.~ )<1: 3'0 -tI-iok. f\ rdI,g-n 
do 9='00 (\.01" you-bon~? 
. 'llo ~ou... n~~ ,ot~e1 'tclQS o.nd ~Q1'~Ic.(Il, cho.r~ CXl'i;h oh4U" bOf)k~? 
10 
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When there is a conOid in whether to lend or not, what are the maiD drivers that lead to your final 
decision"! ~t~~:x:t de.ci~oo ~~S?~eB:&.:x:t605c:jfDD,\:)" 
Whll.t are the most important non-financial criteria do YOII think are tbe most important in lending 10 
~;~~:~.cr£!:~~o:)(P,;P~\$~~~cSOOtP.~DO~ 
ft:)oSc:;p,o.!)~q:~~~050b0co. 
What pereent~es of loans are driven by non-financial factors instead of fmanclal factors? 
coIIoJer-oJ~' \=8 dg®do oooo:>S~:~.~6'.:(l·(Y.Y.)~8~: I 
In poJicy making, how much are shareholders important? 
A 
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Figure A-I: Imported Interview Transcripts in NVIVO 
The above diagram A-I shows the interview transcripts being in NVIVO. It has helped 
the researcher in organising data. It shows the number of codes and references each 
interview transcript had . In manual coding, a significant amount of time was needed to be 
given to accomplish this task. Nodes in NVlVO represented the codes assigned in each 
source (interview transcripts). The references represented the number of quotes identified 
in the nodes. They could be identified as in the following Figure A-2 
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Figure A-2: Description of Codes, Sources and References in NVIVO 
'Opinions on Banks' Perfonnance' was part of the tree node coding in NVIVO (see 
Figure A-3). The diagram below shows some of the codes. Tree nodes were fonned to 
create coding hierarchy. In this case, theoretical framework was the basis for the creation 
of coding structure. 
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Figure A-4: Tree Nodes Coding in NVIVO 
The 'open nodes' were coded under 'free nodes' which were later reviewed or assigned to 
newly created or predetermined categories . It is important to assign them later because 
these free nodes could provide the researcher with some of the important themes at later 
stage of the data analysis. It could identify new concepts and ideas for existing theoretical 
framework. Hence, analysis was done multiple times. 
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Figure A-5: Open Nodes in NVIVO 
VIVO had also been used in this thesis to provide visual presentat ion of the data. The 
following diagram was developed in NVIVO. It helped the researcher in interpreting the 
data and seeing things c learly. 
l.oIorintlrti1n11t~1 
~ inlhlm p"., 
__0_ mp.,r impott.ro i:Jr 
tpUityofrolht.n..b 
toMr Profit Due 
to POOI 
Agncal'''''' 
BIlSu.ueo: dunng 
lWnyS-On 
Figure A-6: Example of the Visual Representation of the process by which Coercive 
Pressures affect Banks' Lending Process 
NVIVO has great tools for qualitative researchers to identify patterns in the data. 
However, one should be careful in overemphasising on numbers, such as percentage 
coverage. Every diagrams or figures generated by NVIVO should be analysed in detailed 
to make sure that they represented the actual account. For instance, ' heterogeneities in 
coercive pressures' was a code developed based on idea that how different banks receive 
leniencies or different levels of requirements in conforming to coercive pressures. P -B 
was the private bank who first informed the researcher about how some of the 
government related banks received such leniencies from BM. Afterwards, this led the 
researcher to explore the types of leniencies that these government affiliated banks 
354 Appendix 3 
received. By looking at the chart only, both the researcher and reader would identify P-B 
as a bank which received such leniencies. Therefor , the tools provided by NVrvO were 
used after anal ysing the sources and the quotes (or references) before including them as 
part of the analy, is to prevent any misinterpretations. 
Helerogenelles In CoerCive Pressures · Coding by Source 
P·B was the one who informed the existence of 
heterogeneities in coercive pressures received by other 
banks. Hence, this should not be included in the 
development of this chart. 
ouree 
Figure A-7: Tree Node Coding Chart of the Code 'Heterogeneities m Coercive 
Pressures' 
The above chart induced the researcher to identify the patterns across banks with different 
ownership structures. In addition, as the research included samples from government, 
semi-government and private banks, these imported interview transcripts were later 
grouped according to their ownership affiliations in 'sets'. As in Figure A-8 those 
interviewed five semi-government banks were included in the set named 'Semi­
Government Banks', four private banks in the set' Private Banks' and three government 
owned banks in the set 'Government Banks'. 
Appendix 3 
-­--­ ----------, First Set: Government Banks 
Second Set: Private Banks 
; 
Sel!rch 10 • ~~GO"ierr.men 
• Se~ I 
Conbr.gen F or5 _______~ 
e"t.". I ...""----­
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H. er~en et ' ,. 
Import.! r. ce"" if LDon Approv;,ts 
Pri vate &nks 
Sem,-Governmenl Banks 
Source. 
Third Set: Semi-Government 
Nodes Banks 
Figure A-8: Creating Sets in NVIVO 
Semi-Government Banks 
Name 
~ 5-S 
[5J $ ·A 
~ 5-E 
~ 5-e 
~ 5-D 
In Folder 
I r tem~ls\e..nks 
In ter . 1.San'" 
Internol.',Bank. 
In ter .I.'&nks 
Inlem~I.\Bank< 
Matrix coding was also used in this research . It allowed the researcher to identi fy the 
sources under which the themes were coded. They were useful in detecting patterns in the 
data. From this display, it was possible to compare patterns for different banks and also 
with their related ownership structures . Those texts which had been coded using VIVO 
could be used to construct matrix displays based on the co-occurrence of codes within the 
text. The resulting matrix display (see Figure A-9) provides both the sources of responses 
and they could refer back to the detailed content of responses, allowing the researcher to 
assess both patterns of associations and the nature of associations. Matrices, generally, are 
useful for facilitating comparative analysis of data. For this research, it' s for the 
comparison between banks with different ownership structures . Similar to the tree node 
coding chart, matrix coding also required the researcher to check the quotes and sources 
again as to avoid misinterpretation of the data. The matrix display in Figure A-9 provides 
the researcher with the effects of new banks of different banks. The pattern that is given 
in the matrix is that government banks were not affected by new banks but only those 
banks with private stakes. Detailed analysis for this matrix coding will be given in chapter 
seven. 
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Appendix 4: Daily Report Forms Provided by Central Bank of 
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